John William Smith, Jr. v. State of Maryland
No. 1736, Sept. Term, 2024
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND
April 6, 2026
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
REPORTED; Circuit Court for Washington County, Case No.: C-21-CR-24-000291
Once a prisoner causes written notice of a request for final disposition to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and appropriate court in the receiving state, the receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days, unless a continuance is granted “for good cause shown in open court,” with the prisoner or counsel present.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – MANDATORY DISMISSAL
Failure to bring a prisoner to trial within the 180-day statutory period, absent a valid continuance compliant with the IAD, requires dismissal of the charges with prejudice.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – CONTINUANCES – REQUIREMENTS
A valid IAD continuance requires: (1) jurisdiction; (2) a proceeding in open court; (3) presence of the defendant or counsel; (4) a showing of good cause made in open court; and (5) a continuance that is necessary or reasonable. The State bears the burden of establishing all five elements.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – CONTINUANCES – “OPEN COURT” REQUIREMENT
A continuance granted during an unrecorded, in-chambers scheduling conference is not a continuance granted “in open court” within the meaning of the IAD. The absence of a verbatim record precludes appellate review of whether good cause existed.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – BURDEN OF THE STATE
Once the prisoner requests disposition under the IAD, the burden shifts entirely to the State to ensure compliance with statutory deadlines and procedural requirements. Defense counsel has no obligation to remind the State of the IAD‘s requirements.
A defendant may waive IAD time limits by requesting or expressly agreeing to a continuance; however, silent acquiescence or failure to object is insufficient to constitute waiver. The absence of any record reflecting consent to a post-deadline trial date precludes a finding of waiver.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – WAIVER OF RIGHTS – UNRECORDED SCHEDULING CONFERENCE NOT SUFFICIENT
The State‘s assertion that defense counsel “cleared dates” during an unrecorded chambers conference is insufficient to establish waiver, particularly where there are no open court proceedings to indicate consent to exceed the 180-day deadline.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – APPELLATE REVIEW – LACK OF RECORD
Where a trial court grants a continuance beyond the IAD deadline without creating a record explaining the basis for good cause in open court, appellate courts cannot perform meaningful review; the absence of such a record requires reversal.
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS (IAD) – VIOLATION – REMEDY
Because the State failed to comply with the IAD‘s procedural requirements and did not bring the defendant to trial within the statutory period, dismissal of the charges with prejudice is mandated.
Kehoe, S.,
Eyler, James R. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Kehoe, J.
Filed: April 6, 2026
On October 28, 2024, appellant entered a plea of not guilty on an agreed statement of facts to two counts of third-degree sexual offense. In doing so, he preserved the right to appeal the decision of the trial court to deny his motion to dismiss. The court sentenced appellant to a total of twenty years’ imprisonment, with all but ten years suspended, in favor of five years of probation. The court imposed that sentence consecutively to a sentence appellant was then serving in Pennsylvania for similar charges.
Appellant noted a timely appeal and presents us with one question: Did the circuit court err in denying [his] motion to dismiss?
For the reasons stated below, we shall answer that question in the affirmative and we shall therefore reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss appellant‘s criminal charges with prejudice.
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers
“The IAD, to which Maryland became a signatory in 1965, is a congressionally sanctioned compact among forty-eight states, the Federal Government, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.” State v. Pair, 416 Md. 157, 160 (2010). “The IAD consists of nine articles, ‘which, in Maryland, correspond to sections of the Correctional Services Article of the Maryland Code.‘” State v. Meadows, 261 Md. App. 464, 475 (2024) (quoting Aleman v. State, 469 Md. 397, 406–07 (2020)).
Article I of the IAD states, that “it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this Agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition” of outstanding criminal charges against a prisoner already being held in another state.
Articles III and IV of the IAD explain the procedural requirements of the statute. Article III gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State. Article IV enables a participating State to gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction, in order to try him on criminal charges.
Id. at 477 (cleaned up).
As we explained in Meadows, when the receiving state (in this case, the State of Maryland) lodges a detainer with the warden of the institution where an out-of-state prisoner is currently imprisoned, i.e., “the sending state“, the sending state “must inform the defendant of the detainer and of the right to request the final disposition of the charges under the IAD.” Id. at 477–78. The defendant may then “request a transfer to the receiving
If a criminal defendant consents to, or requests, a continuance that carries the case past the 180-day mark, the criminal defendant waives the speedy trial protections afforded by the IAD. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118 (2000). On the other hand, merely failing to object to the continuance, does not result in such a waiver. Meadows, 261 Md. App. at 489.
Factual and Procedural Background
On September 24, 2022, while serving a sentence of incarceration for possession of child pornography and corruption of a minor in Waymart, Pennsylvania, appellant was charged with several sexual offenses in the District Court of Maryland for Washington County. In March 2024, appellant invoked his rights under the IAD, requesting final disposition of the charges within 180 days. The State Correctional Institute – Waymart sent his request by registered mail to the State‘s Attorney‘s Office for Washington County and the District Court for Washington County, both of which confirmed receipt on April 17, 2024.
On June 12, 2024, The State charged appellant by criminal information in the Circuit
According to the parties, on August 6, 2024, the prosecutor and defense counsel attended a scheduling conference in the chambers of the Administrative Judge.5 While there appears to be no record of the conference, the parties tell us that appellant was not present for it. The conference was not transcribed. On August 8, 2024, two days after the scheduling conference, the court issued a scheduling order stating, inter alia, the following:
This case is presently scheduled for a Jury trial on October 15, 2024 at 9:30 a.m., this matter is hereby CONTINUED, with good cause having been found, and shall be rescheduled as referenced below.
It is ORDERED by the Circuit Court for Washington County that a three-day JURY trial is scheduled for October 28, 2024 through October 30, 2024, beginning at 9:30 a.m.[.]
The previously scheduled trial date, October 15, 2024, was the last day of the 180-day period contemplated by the IAD for trial to commence.67 As noted earlier, on October
On October 24, 2024, the State filed a paper opposing appellant‘s motion to dismiss. In that motion, among other things, the State explained how scheduling conferences generally occur in the Administrative Judge‘s chambers in the Circuit Court for Washington County. In addition, the State‘s Attorney who prepared the opposition motion explained that she personally recalled that, during the August 6, 2024 scheduling conference, proposed trial dates were cleared for conflicts by counsel for both parties. The State also explained that “[t]here was no objection or other pleading filed indicating any issue with that trial date by either party.”
On October 24, 2024, which was the same day that the State filed its opposition to appellant‘s motion to dismiss, the circuit court signed an order summarily denying appellant‘s motion without holding a hearing on it.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
“The interpretation of a statute, in this instance the IAD, is a question of law which
Parties’ Contentions
Appellant contends that, while it is possible to waive the speedy trial right protections in the IAD by seeking, or acquiescing in, a continuance, New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 112–13 (2000), no such waiver can be determined to have occurred in this case, because there is no record of the chambers conference. According to appellant, the most that could be inferred from the State‘s recollection about what occurred, or did not occur, during the scheduling conference is that, to the extent that appellant‘s counsel was even aware of the 180-day deadline, appellant‘s counsel had no scheduling conflicts with the contemplated trial dates. Under that scenario, according to appellant, his case is similar to Meadows where this Court determined that remaining silent and/or not objecting to trial dates that extend past the 180-day deadline does not amount to waiver because it is the State‘s burden to ensure that the deadline is met once appellant has notified the State that he was invoking the provisions of the IAD that required the State to promptly bring him to trial.
The State argues that, by clearing dates during the chambers scheduling conference, appellant waived his right to be tried within the IAD‘s 180-day period. The State further argues that the IAD‘s requirement that continuances be made “for good cause shown in
As for the lack of a transcript of the scheduling conference, the State contends that, the absence of a transcript, by itself, does not warrant reversal. Moreover, the State claims that it was appellant‘s responsibility to attempt to create a record of what occurred during the scheduling conference. The State seems to be asserting that we should adopt what it terms its “uncontradicted account of what occurred [during] the schedul[ing] hearing.” The source of that “uncontradicted account” was the State‘s written opposition to appellant‘s motion to dismiss. According to the State, appellant did not challenge that account in its reply to the State‘s opposition.8
Analysis
“Courts have routinely stressed that the IAD is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed in favor of the prisoner against whom the detainer is lodged.” Pair, 416 Md. at 177. It is further understood that because the State “controls the only ultimate guarantee of performance for the benefit of the prisoner,” “‘the burden of compliance with the procedural requirements of the IAD rests upon the party states and their agents.‘” Id. at 177–78 (quoting Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. 1973)).
As noted in Meadows, an inmate seeking to invoke the IAD has “one, and only one burden,” that is, “to ask the prison official who has custody over him to prepare and send
The IAD contains “five distinct requirements for obtaining [] a continuance.” Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1993). Those are (1) the court must have competent jurisdiction, (2) the grant of the continuance must be in open court, (3) the defendant and/or his attorney must be present, (4) the movant must demonstrate good cause in open court, and (5) the length of the continuance must be reasonable or necessary. Id.; See also
Plainly, the continuance in this case did not occur in “open court.” In Dillon v. State, 844 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1992), the Supreme Court of Tennessee described what “open court” means in the context of the IAD, as follows:
“Open court” requires, at a minimum, that a verbatim record be made of the proceedings. The State has an affirmative duty to abide by the statutory requirements and make a record on the question whether a continuance has been granted for good cause. Although we decide the present issue based on lack of notice to Defendant, because there is no transcript of the in-chambers
discussion, we would in any event be unable to properly exercise our appellate duty to review whether the State met its burden of showing good cause for a continuance.
Id. at 142 (footnote and citations omitted).910
In this case, the State failed to shoulder its burden under the IAD when it chose to permit an in-chambers scheduling conference rather than conduct that proceeding on the record in open court. While an informal chambers conference may be acceptable for routine trial calendaring, in this case the specific statutory requirements of
We are completely unpersuaded by the State‘s post-hoc and ad-hoc effort on appeal to re-create the record of the chambers scheduling conference by referencing what it terms “an uncontradicted account of what occurred [during] the schedule[ing] hearing” sourced from its opposition to appellant‘s motion to dismiss. As a result, we are likewise unpersuaded that appellant‘s supposed waiver of his IAD rights obviated the need to find good cause during proceedings conducted in open court. This case is not like the situation in Hill where the proceedings took place in open court and, in response to the trial court‘s question, “how is [the new trial date] with the defense counsel,” defense counsel expressly agreed to the new trial date by saying “[t]hat will be fine, Your Honor.” 528 U.S. at 112–13. Under those circumstances, the defendant waived any complaints about the 180-day IAD deadline.
Meadows makes clear that it is incumbent on the State to make sure that there is adherence to the statute. 261 Md. App. at 489. To that end, if there had been an in-chambers discussion as to why a trial date within the 180-day window was unworkable, it was the responsibility of the State to request to go on record to set forth that basis.
Although the case deals with motions for new trial, Isley v. State, 129 Md. App. 611, 671 (2000), is instructive. In that case, Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. noted that there must first be an exercise of discretion before there can be an analysis of an abuse of discretion. Id. In this case we have no record as to why the court found cause to go beyond the 180-day window. It was incumbent on the State to make sure that there was a record.
Because the State failed to comply with the IAD‘s procedural requirements, its subsequent failure to bring appellant to trial on or by October 15, 2024, violated the express terms of the IAD and dismissal of the charges against him with prejudice is mandated under
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY WASHINGTON COUNTY.
Notes
In Odom, there was a chamber‘s conference during which Odom‘s attorney requested a continuance to allow for the completion of Odom‘s psychiatric evaluations. Id. at 229. The record indicated that the court approved this request with the consent of both counsel. Id. A motion signed by the government‘s attorney recited that both counsel had requested a continuance and the reasons for the request. Id. It was clear from that motion that defense counsel needed additional time to prepare. Also, the court found that there had been a waiver by the defendant because he continued to negotiate a plea agreement after learning about the delay beyond the 180-day window. Id. at 230. None of these formal requests are present in the record of the instant case. Instead, there is a blanket recitation of good cause shown, without any evidence as to what might have constituted the good cause. There is also nothing in the record to indicate a waiver by defense counsel.