OPINION
Evelyn Smith appeals from a judgment of divorce contending the district court improperly
The Smiths were married in 1951. In 1955 respondent, Paul Smith, began work for the Ideal Supply Company, and shortly thereafter became general manager. In 1958, the owner of Ideal, Jack Kurtz, died, leaving 52% of the capital stock to his wife, and the balance to his two sons. One year later, Mrs. Kurtz died and bequeathed her stock to respondent in his name alone. The corporation thereafter retired the remaining stock, making respondent the sole owner of the company.
1. Appellant first contends the district court erroneously found the Ideal stock to be respondent’s separate property.
Appellant recognizes that our statutory scheme presumes “[a]ll property of the husband . . . acquired by him ... by gift, bequest, devise, ... [to be] separate property.” NRS 123.130(2). However, she claims the presumption should not apply where the bequest was made in remuneration for services rendered. Appellant mistakenly claims there are two species of gifts: those acquired under “onerous” title, and those acquired under “lucrative” title. By definition, Onerous title is acquired where either spouse during marriage gains property through “labor or industry or other valuable consideration.” DeFuniak & Vaughn,
Principles of Community Property,
§ 62, 127 (2nd Ed. 1971) “[Lucrative title, [however,] is that acquired through gift, succession,
inheritance
or the like.” (Emphasis added.)
Ibid
at 128. Moreover, appellant has failed to present any authority where such a title distinction has been made when property is acquired by bequest.
Cf. Ibid
at § 70, pp. 157-160; Scott v. Ward,
2. Appellant additionally contends she was entitled to apportionment of the Ideal assets, because respondent continued to work at the company after he became owner.
See
Schulman v. Schulman,
3. Finally, we perceive no abuse of discretion by the district court in refusing to set aside respondent’s separate property for support; in awarding $1,000 per month alimony with cost of living increases; and in refusing appellant’s request for $18,000 in attorney’s fees. NRS 125.150,
cf.
Buchanan v. Buchanan,
Affirmed.
