97 Iowa 640 | Iowa | 1896
I. In October, 1892, the defendant, Skow, and wife, for the purpose of securing the payment of two thousand dollars, in accordance with the terms of a certain promissory note, executed and delivered to plaintiff, a mortgage upon certain, real
II. . The sole question is as to priorty of liens. In Bibbins v. Clark, 90 Iowa, 230 (57 N. W. Rep. 884, 59 N. W. Rep. 290), this court held that, where taxes on personal property became a lien upon real estate after the lien of a mortgage had attached thereto, such tax lien was junior and inferior to the mortgage lien. Two members of the court dissented from that holding, and adhered to the contrary rule, as stated in the opinion in Trust Co. v. Young, 81 Iowa, 732 (39 N. W. Rep. 116 and 46 N. W. Rep. 1103). The act providing for the assessment of the tax in controversy and creating a lien therefor, reads: “All such taxes shall be a perpetual lien upon all property, both personal and real, used or connected with the business.” Chapter 62, section 1, Acts Twenty-fifth General Assembly. As the several members of this court adhere to their former opinions touching the lien of personal taxes on real estate with reference to mortgages which-exist upon real estate, when such personal