Smith v. . Sink

Jun 30, 1937
Versions:
Stacy, C. J.

The case was here before, 210 N. C., 815, on demurrer to the complaint, C. S., 511. It is here now on demurrer to the evidence, C. S., 567. The two are not the same in purpose or result. One challenges the sufficiency of the pleading; the other the sufficiency of the evidence.

In negligence cases, it is proper to sustain a demurrer to the evidence and to enter judgment of nonsuit:

*727 1. When all tbe evidence, taken in its most favorable light for the plaintiff, fails to show any actionable negligence on the part of the defendant. Love v. Asheville, 210 N. C., 476, 187 S. E., 562; Cheek v. Brokerage Co., 209 N. C., 569, 183 S. E., 729; Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N. C., 497, 181 S. E., 562; Grimes v. Coach Co., 203 N. C., 605, 166 S. E., 599; Eller v. R. R., 200 N. C., 527, 157 S. E., 800; Poovey v. Sugar Co., 191 N. C., 722, 133 S. E., 12; Young v. R. R., 116 N. C., 932, 21 S. E., 177; Brown v. Kinsey, 81 N. C., 245. See S. v. Carter, 204 N. C., 304, 168 S. E., 204; S. v. Montague, 195 N. C., 20, 141 S. E., 285. “It all comes to this, that there must be legal evidence of the fact in issue and not merely such as raises a suspicion or conjecture in regard to it” — Walker, J., in S. v. Prince, 182 N. C., 788, 108 S. E., 330.
2. When it clearly appears from the evidence that the injury complained of was independently and proximately produced by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of an outside agency or responsible third person. Newell v. Parnell, 209 N. C., 254, 183 S. E., 374; Beach v. Patton, 208 N. C., 134, 179 S. E., 446; Haney v. Lincolnton, 207 N. C., 282, 176 S. E., 573; Ward v. R. R., 206 N. C., 530, 174 S. E., 443; Hinnant v. R. R., 202 N. C., 489, 163 S. E., 555; Chambers v. R. R., 199 N. C., 682, 155 S. E., 571; Burke v. Coach Co., 198 N. C., 8, 150 S. E., 636; Herman v. R. R., 197 N. C., 718, 150 S. E., 361; Hughes v. Luther, 189 N. C., 841, 128 S. E., 145; Lineberry v. R. R., 187 N. C., 786, 123 S. E., 1; Harton v. Tel. Co., 141 N. C., 455, 54 S. E., 299. Compare Brown v. R. R., 208 N. C., 57, 179 S. E., 25.
3. When contributory negligence is established by plaintiff’s own evidence. Wright v. Grocery Co., 210 N. C., 462, 187 S. E., 564; Stamey v. R. R., 208 N. C., 668, 182 S. E., 130; Tart v. R. R., 202 N. C., 52, 161 S. E., 720; Scott v. Tel. Co., 198 N. C., 795, 153 S. E., 413; Davis v. Jeffreys, 197 N. C., 712, 150 S. E., 488; Lunsford v. Mfg. Co., 196 N. C., 510, 146 S. E., 129; Davis v. R. R., 187 N. C., 147, 120 S. E., 827; Horne v. R. R., 170 N. C., 645, 87 S. E., 523; Wright v. R. R., 155 N. C., 325, 71 S. E., 306. See S. v. Fulcher, 184 N. C., 663, 113 S. E., 769. Compare Absher v. Raleigh, ante, 567; Diamond v. Service Stores, ante, 632; Hayes v. Tel. Co., ante, 192; Boykin v. R. R., ante, 113; Oldham v. R. R., 210 N. C., 642; Lincoln v. R. R., 207 N. C., 787, 178 S. E., 601.

Even if it be conceded that here the corporate defendant was under the duty of keeping the overhead bridge in repair, Stone v. R. R., 197 N. C., 429, 149 S. E., 399, which may be doubted on the facts revealed by the record, Pickett v. R. R., 200 N. C., 750, 158 S. E., 398, still the judgment of nonsuit would seem to be correct, it appearing that the active negligence of the driver of the ear was the real, efficient cause of plaintiff’s intestate’s death. Haney v. Lincolnton, supra; Baker v. *728 R. R., 205 N. C., 329, 171 S. E., 342; Hinnant v. R. R., supra; Herman v. R. R., supra; Brigman v. Const. Co., 192 N. C., 791, 136 S. E., 125.

We bad occasion to examine anew tbis doctrine of insulating tbe conduct of one, even wben it amounts to passive negligence, by tbe intervention of tbe active negligence of an independent agency or third party, as applied to variant fact situations, in tbe recent cases of Beach v. Patton, supra; George v. R. R., 207 N. C., 457, 177 S. E., 324; Haney v. Lincolnton, supra; Baker v. R. R., supra; Hinnant v. R. R., supra; Herman v. R. R., supra; Craver v. Cotton Mills, 196 N. C., 330, 145 S. E., 570; Ballinger v. Thomas, 195 N. C., 517, 142 S. E., 761; Lineberry v. R. R., supra. These decisions, and others, are in full support and approval of Mr. Wharton’s statement in bis valuable work on Negligence (sec. 134) : “Supposing that if it bad not been for tbe intervention of a responsible third party tbe defendant’s negligence would have produced no damage to tbe plaintiff, is tbe defendant liable to tbe plaintiff? Tbis question must be answered in tbe negative, for tbe general reason that causal connection between negligence and damage is broken by tbe interposition of independent responsible human action. I am negligent on a particular subject matter. Another person, moving independently, comes in, and either negligently or maliciously so acts as to make my negligence injurious to a third person. If so, tbe person so intervening acts as a nonconductor, and insulates my negligence, so that I cannot be sued for tbe mischief which tbe person so intervening directly produces. He is tbe one who is liable to tbe person injured.”

Tbe same rule announced by Mr. Justice Strong in R. R. v. Kellogg, 94 U. S., 469, regarded as sound in principle and workable in practice, has been quoted with approval in a number of our decisions. He says: “Tbe question always is, Was there an unbroken connection between tbe wrongful act and tbe injury — a continuous operation? Did tbe facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between tbe wrong and tbe injury ? It is admitted that tbe rule is difficult of application. But it is generally held that, in order to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act amounting to a wanton, wrong, is tbe proximate cause of an injury, it must appear that tbe injury was tbe natural and probable consequence of tbe negligence, or wrongful act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in tbe light of attending circumstances.”

As tbe record discloses no sufficient predicate for a reversal of tbe judgment of nonsuit, it will not be disturbed.

Affirmed.