35 F. 677 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Missouri | 1888
In 1886 the firm of Seiberling, Miller & Co. obtained judgment in this court against one Jacob M. Smith. Under execution issued thereon the land in controversy in this action was levied upon. This land consists of about 40 acres, lying near the city of St. Joseph, in this state, and for convenience it will be designated in this opinion as the “St. Jo Property.” Upon such levy being made, the complainant heroin filed her bill in equity against the said judgment creditors, mak
The validity of this deed is assailed by the judgment creditors upon the grounds that it was voluntary, without sufficient consideration, and was collusive and fraudulent as against the creditors of the grantor. A. husband may convey his property to his wife as a gift; and the obligation of love and affection, springing from the marital relation, is a sufficient consideration to support it against him, and even against subsequent creditors, when made in good faith. Pepper v. Carter, 11 Mo. 344. But, on the maxim that a man must be just before he is generous, such transfer of property will not stand when its effect would be to hinder or delay the collection of his just debts. A man in insolvent circumstances may not so convey his property to his wife, free from the claim of his creditors. The contention of the complainant is that she occupies in this controversy the attitude of a purchaser for value, and in good faith; that the real consideration for the deed to her was the relinquishment of her .dower interest in certain other lands then owned by her husband. The law is well settled that such relinquishment by the wife constitutes a valid and good consideration for a conveyance by the husband to her of other property, and enables her to maintain the attitude of any other purchaser. Caldwell v. Bower, 17 Mo. 564; Woodson v. Pool, 19 Mo. 340; Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533; Hollowell v. Simonson, 21 Ind. 398. Although the dower of the wife in the husband’s land during coverture is denominated an inchoate right, yet it is analogous to an estate in land, and is the frequent subject of contract between husband and wife, recognized and enforced by the courts as forming the basis of a valuable consideration; and, if such a contract be free from fraud, it will be upheld. 1 Bish. Mar. Worn., §§ 722, 723, 758; 1 Scrib. Dower, 644.
The relative value of the property conveyed to the wife to the other property owned by the husband is an element to be considered in determining the bona fides of the transaction. There may be such a disproportion between the estate conveyed to her and her dower interest as to discredit the integrity of the transfer. Bullard v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 533, 538, 541; Hollowell v. Simonson, 21 Ind. 398; Ward v. Crotty, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 59. The only witness aside from complainant who deposed to the value of the St. Jo property placed it at $3,000. Accepting the valuation of $4,000, expressed in the deed, as more probable, we will consider this aspect of the question on this basis. As already stated, the estimated value of this property in 1880, including the St. Jo property, was about $42,000, with an incumbrance thereon of $17,500, leaving an excess of $24,000. While she had joined in the mortgage deeds, her right of dower was not thereby extinguished. It was only postponed to the rights of the mortgagees. Upon satisfaction of the debts- her dower interest would remain intact. It is inferable from the evidence that at the time of the execution of the deed from the husband to wife his business affairs were such as not to unreasonably justify the expectation that he would liquidate his debts without foreclosure. This, coupled with the fact that the St. Jo property had been deeded to the husband by a near relative, with the understanding between them that the relative was not to be disturbed in the possession thereof during his life, which was at least an obligation deemed binding in morals on the parties to that understanding, enforce the conclusion that there was no such inequality between the value of this property and the wife’s dower interest, at that ' timej in the other lands as to justify an impeachment of this conveyance. Nor do I find sufficient proof of the existence of extrinsic fraud and collusion to invalidate it. It is true, there is evidence of Smith’s financial embarrassment in 1880, and of his consciousness of the fact. But there are conspicuous facts in proof well calculated to warrant the impression which Mrs. Smith deposes she had of her husband’s solvency. His business operations had in no degree abated. As highest proof of his business reputation and credit, a committee of representative business men of Atchison,. Kan., headed by the governor of that state, visited Quincy in the spring of 1880, to persuade Mr. Smith to abandon his
The final contention of respondents’ counsel is that this property can be protected against her husband’s debts only by having been vested in the wife as her sole and separate estate, and this must be evidenced by the deed itself, and no extrinsic evidence is admissible to control the language of the deed, which in this case vested fin the wife only a legal, as distinguished from a separate, estate; citing Tennison v. Tennison, 46 Mo. 77; Schafroth’s Adm’r v. Ambs, Id. 114; Bank v. Taylor, 53 Mo. 444. This is a misconception of the law of these cases as applied to this case. By statute of the state of Missouri, where this land is situated, the real estate which comes to a married woman by gift or grant during coverture is exempt from the debts of the husband. Section 3295, Rev. St. 1879, concerning married women. An ordinary deed of conveyance to a married woman, without apt words creating what is known as a separate estate, invests her with a legal estate in the land, which is as effectually protected against the husband’s sole creditors as if made to a trustee to her separate use, with the exception that the annual products arising therefrom may be liable for the husband’s debts created for family necessaries, etc. There is also high authority holding that, while such a deed as this is void at law, it is good in equity, and a court of equity will effectuate the manifest purpose of the parties, as the law presumes it was the intention to convey an estate for the separate use of the wife. Sims v. Rickets, 35 Ind. 181. The result is that the decree will go for the complainant.