14601 | Conn. | May 18, 1993
The issue in this case, on certification from the United States District Court, is whether the provisions of General Statutes § 52-225a
The plaintiff filed a four count complaint
We start with the text of § 52-225a (a), which provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal
The first issue raised by the certified question is whether § 52-225a applies directly to insurance contracts so as to reduce the amount of insurance coverage available to claimants who seek recourse to underinsured motorist benefits and who have received collateral source payments. Although § 52-225a applies to actions sounding in contract, as well as to actions sounding in tort, we hold that the statute does not reach that far. The statute defines the offset for collateral source payments as reducing awards for economic damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death. A claim concerning coverage under an insurance policy does not, in common parlance, give rise to an award for damages of any kind, let alone to an award for damages resulting from personal injury or wrongful death. The words used in a statute must be given their commonly approved meaning, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed. General Statutes § 1-1 (a); Superintendent of Police v. Freedom of Information Commission, 222 Conn. 621" court="Conn." date_filed="1992-06-30" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/superintendent-of-police-v-freedom-of-information-commission-7842309?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7842309">222 Conn. 621, 628 n.7, 609 A.2d 998" court="Conn." date_filed="1992-06-30" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/superintendent-of-police-v-freedom-of-information-commission-7842309?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7842309">609 A.2d 998 (1992); Cos Cob Volunteer Fire Co. No. 1, Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 212 Conn. 100" court="Conn." date_filed="1989-07-11" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/cos-cob-volunteer-fire-co-no-1-inc-v-freedom-of-information-commission-7840965?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7840965">212 Conn. 100, 105, 561 A.2d 429 (1989); Martone v. Lensink, 207 Conn. 296" court="Conn." date_filed="1988-05-03" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/martone-v-lensink-7840385?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="7840385">207 Conn. 296, 302, 541 A.2d 488 (1988). We conclude, therefore, that § 52-225a does not, on its face, create a statutory offset against the coverage provided by underinsured motorist benefits.
The second issue is whether, even if § 52-225a does not operate to reduce underinsured motorist coverage,
The relationship between § 52-225a and underinsured motorist protection turns, therefore, on the distinction between the amount of coverage and the amount of
The question certified by the District Court asks “Are collateral source payments under [General Statutes] § 52-225a applicable to underinsured motorist claims?” Our answer is that such payments are applicable, in accordance with the statute, to determine the amount of damages but not to determine the amount of coverage.
No costs will be taxed in this court to either party.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 52-225a provides in relevant part: “reduction in ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN PERSONAL INJURY AND WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS FOR collateral source payments, (a) In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury or wrongful death . . . and wherein liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compensate the claimant, the court shall reduce the amount of such award which represents economic damages, as defined in subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 52-572h, by an amount equal to the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (b) of this section less the total of amounts determined to have been paid under subsection (c) of this section, except that there shall be no reduction for (1) a collateral source for which a right of subrogation exists and (2) that amount of collateral sources equal to the reduction in the claimant’s economic damages attributable to his percentage of negligence pursuant to section 52-572h.”
General Statutes § 52-225b defines “collateral sources” as follows: “For purposes of sections 52-225a to 52-225c, inclusive: ‘Collateral sources’ means any payments made to the claimant, or on his behalf, by or pursuant to: (1) Any health or sickness insurance, automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits, and any other similar insurance benefits, except life insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by him or provided by others; or (2) any contract or agreement of any group, organization, partnership or corporation to provide, pay for or reimburse the costs
General Statutes § 52-572h (a) (1) defines “economic damages” as “compensation determined by the trier of fact for pecuniary losses including, but not limited to, the cost of reasonable and necessary medical care, rehabilitative services, custodial care and loss of earnings or earning capacity excluding [compensation for physical pain and suffering and mental and emotional suffering].”
The uninsured motorist coverage provided by the defendant includes coverage for injuries caused by an underinsured motorist. Hotkowski v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 224 Conn. 145, 151, 617 A.2d 451 (1992).
The first count of the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendant’s refusal to pay the plaintiff’s claim for underinsured motorist insurance was a breach of the defendant’s contractual obligation. The second count alleged that the defendant’s refusal to pay was an unfair insurance practice, in violation of General Statutes § 38-61 (1), (6) and (15). The third count alleged that the defendant’s refusal to pay was an unfair trade practice, in violation of General Statutes § 42-110b. The fourth count alleged that the defendant’s refusal to pay violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in the defendant’s contractual relationship with the plaintiff.
General Statutes § 51-199a provides in relevant part: “uniform certification OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT. . . .
“(b) The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by . . . a United States District Court when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court of this state.”
Practice Book § 4168 provides: “[certified questions from federal courts]—in GENERAL
“The supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by the supreme court of the United States, a court of appeals of the United States or a United States district court when requested by the certifying court if there are involved in any proceeding before it questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court of this state.”
The certified question of law is: “Are collateral source payments under [General Statutes] § 52-225a applicable to underinsured motorist claims?”
After the filing of briefs in this court, the plaintiff moved to withdraw the certified question. On March 25, 1993, the District Court denied the motion.
See footnote 1 for the text of General Statutes § 52-225b.
The defendant acknowledges, in its brief, that the collateral source reduction is not to be deducted from the limit of underinsured motorist coverage.
General Statutes § 38a-336 (formerly § 38-175c) provides in relevant part: “uninsured motorist coverage, (a) (1) Each automobile liability insurance policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured motorist coverage, in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to section 38a-334, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles and insured motor vehicles, the insurer of which becomes insolvent prior to payment of such damages, because of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom. Each insurer licensed to write automobile liability insurance in this state shall provide uninsured motorists coverage with limits requested by the named insured upon payment of the appropriate premium, but the insurer shall not be required to provide such coverage with limits in excess of the limits of the bodily injury coverage of the policy issued to the named insured. No insurer shall be required to provide uninsured motorist coverage to (A) a named insured or relatives residing in his household when occupying, or struck as a pedestrian by, an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or a motorcycle that is owned by the named insured, or (B) to any insured occupying an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle or motorcycle that is owned by such insured. . . .
“(d) For the purposes of this section, an ‘underinsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made under subsection (b) of this section.”
The Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, § 38a-334-6 provides in relevant part: “minimum provision for protection against uninsured motorists [formerly § 38-175a-6].
“(c) exclusions. The insurer’s obligations to pay may be made inapplicable:
“(1) To any claim which has been settled with the uninsured motorist without the consent of the insurer;
“(2) if the uninsured motor vehicle is owned by (A) the named insured or any relative who is a resident of the same household or is furnished for the regular use of any of the foregoing, (B) a self insurer under any motor vehicle law, or (C) any government or agency thereof;
“(3) to pay or reimburse for workers’ compensation or disability benefits.
“(d) limits OF liability. The limit of the insurer’s liability may not be less than the applicable limits for bodily injury liability specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112 of the general statutes, except that the policy may provide for the reduction of limits to the extent that damages have been
“(1) paid by or on behalf of any person responsible for the injury,
“(2) paid or are payable under any workers’ compensation or disability benefits law, or
“(3) paid under the policy in settlement of a liability claim. The policy may also provide that any direct indemnity for medical expense paid or payable under the policy or any amount of any basic reparations benefits paid or payable under the policy will reduce the damages which the insured may recover under this coverage and any payment under these coverages shall reduce the company’s obligation under the bodily injury liability coverage to the extent of the payment.”