817 F.2d 365 | 5th Cir. | 1987
Following the lead of every circuit court that has considered the question directly or indirectly, we hold that a bankruptcy court’s turnover order, in a separate adversary proceeding, compelling a defendant to turn over property in his possession to the trustee in bankruptcy, is a final order and hence appealable as of right.
The bankruptcy trustee for Shearn Moody, Jr. filed an adversary complaint against Norman D. Revie for the purpose of compelling Revie to turn over a valuable antique coin, described as an 1879 “Coiled Hair 10 Struck,” alleged to be property of the bankruptcy estate. After a trial on the merits, the bankruptcy judge signed a document entitled “Decision and Order on Complaint to Compel Turnover of Property,” directing Revie to turn over the coin to the trustee within three days.
On the fourth day after its order, the bankruptcy court held a hearing to determine whether Revie had complied. The trustee reported that he had not done so. The bankruptcy court then directed the trustee to “file papers to proceed accordingly for non-compliance with the Court’s order.” Without requesting leave from the district court, Revie filed with it an appeal of the turnover order. The district court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the bankruptcy order was not appealable for the following reasons: (1) It was interlocutory; (2) Revie had not requested the leave required by 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) for appealing interlocutory bankruptcy court orders; and (3) Revie had demonstrated, in the words of the district court, “no exception to the prohibition [in § 158(a) ] against appeal of interlocutory orders.”
Finality is a prerequisite to appealability of district court judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 158(a), moreover, requires finality for appeals from bankruptcy court decisions to the district court unless the district court grants leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal.
The issues before us, therefore, are solely whether the order of the bankruptcy court, which Revie has sought to appeal, was a final order appealable as of right, and whether the district court erred in deciding that it was not. In non-bankruptcy matters, a final order is one that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg
The unit of litigation by which finality will be measured is a “proceeding arising under title 11 of the United States Code or arising in or related to a case under title 11.” A “case under title 11” is the umbrella under which all other matters take place. It is initiated by the filing of a petition under title 11 in the bankruptcy court, and terminated by an order dismissing or closing the case. Everything that occurs in the bankruptcy court between these two events is treated as “a proceeding arising in or related to” the bankruptcy case. This broad phrase encompasses everything that was formerly known as an adversary proceeding, contested matter, administrative matter, proceeding in bankruptcy or controversy arising in a proceeding in bankruptcy.7
The First Circuit, in In re Saco Local Development Corp.,
Were this not a bankruptcy case, we doubt that the kind of order before us would be considered “final.” Traditionally, every civil action in a federal court has been viewed as a “single judicial unit,” from which only one appeal would lie____ [Ordinarily,] an action remains a “single judicial unit” even when it contains multiple claims and multiple parties ____ As a result, an order that effectively disposes of a claim by one plaintiff against one defendant normally, although not invariably, is regarded as interlocutory as long as the other claims remain unsettled.
* * * * * *
Although Congress has defined appellate bankruptcy jurisdiction in terms ... similar to those appearing in other jurisdictional statutes, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1291, the history of prior federal bankruptcy law and the 1978 Act convinces us that Congress did not intend the word “final” here to have the same meaning — at least not with respect to the application of the traditional “single judicial unit” rule.10
Noting that Congress had previously provided that “orders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately appealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case,”
By this standard, the turnover order was final. Revie’s compliance with it would have completely disposed of the matter before the court. That further proceedings were necessary to enforce the judgment, or to cite the putative possessor of the coin for contempt by virtue of his failure to comply, does not mitigate the effect of the order. A judgment becomes final despite the fact that it has not been executed. The finality of a decree is not impaired because some future order of the court may become necessary to carry it into effect.
In a similar case, In re Cash Currency Exchange, Inc.,
The issue between the parties to this adversary proceeding was definitively resolved when the court issued the turnover order. It was then that the party to whom the order was addressed had to decide whether to comply. It was then that the litigation in the bankruptcy court was at an end save for execution of the order. At that moment, then, the order was final, and hence appealable.
For these reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1987).
. See In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 408, 413 (2d Cir.1985); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1038 (3d Cir.1985).
. See In re Charter Co., 778 F.2d 617, 620, 622 (11th Cir.1985); 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.03[6][a], at 3-149 (15th ed. 1987).
. Cf. In re Covington Grain Co., 638 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981).
. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945); cf. In re Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71 L.Ed.2d 658 (1982).
. 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 3.03, at 3-152 (15th ed. 1987).
. Levin, Bankruptcy Appeals, 58 N.C.L.Rev. 967, 985 (1980).
. 711 F.2d 441 (1st Cir.1983).
. Id. at 444-46.
. Id. at 443-44.
. Id. at 444 [emphasis in original].
. Id. at 445-46; see also In re Leimer, 724 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir.1984).
. 762 F.2d 542, 546 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 233, 88 L.Ed.2d 232 (1985).
. Id. See also In re Flying W. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 320, 321 n. 1 (3d Cir.1971); Sproul v. Levin, 88 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir.1937); cf. George A. Fuller Co. of P.R. v. Matta, 370 F.2d 679, 680 (1st Cir.1967); O'Keefe v. Landow, 289 F.2d 465, 466 n. 1 (2d Cir.1961).