92 Neb. 39 | Neb. | 1912
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court for Lincoln county quieting title in the plaintiff to a tract of land in that county. The plaintiffs title is derived by a sheriff’s deed which was issued in a tax foreclosure suit brought by Lincoln county against David G. Potter and his wife and others. This case was before this court' at a prior term. See 90 Neb. 298. For a more complete statement of the facts in the case we refer to the opinion heretofore published. The defendant in the court below, David G. Potter, received a patent to the land in controversy in 1887. Afterwards, in 1892, he executed and delivered a note and mortgage to A. D. Buckworth to secure the payment of a note for $389. This note was indorsed to the North Platte National Bank, of which Buckworth was president. That bank became insolvent, and one Doolittle, who was appointed the receiver of the bank, sold the note and mortgage as such receiver. The defendant Hoagland claims to own this note and mortgage and a decree of foreclosure based upon the same,' and he now claims the right to redeem from the tax lien because he owns this note and mortgage and the decree mentioned, and because the tax foreclosure proceedings upon which the plaintiff’s title to the land depends are invalid. He filed an answer and a cross-petition. He claims in the answer and cross-petition the right to redeem. Lincoln county obtained a decree of foreclosure for the delinquent taxes on the land without making a prior administrative sale. Service was had by publication and the land was sold to satisfy the decree. The land was purchased at sheriff’s sale by the defendant
It is claimed that Potter and his wife executed and delivered to the North Platte National Bank renewals of the note executed and delivered to Buckworth. The last of these renewal notes is claimed to have been executed in January, 1894. It is claimed that the receiver of the bank, by virtue of an order of the comptroller of the currency, advertised all of the assets of the bank remaining in his hands to be disposed of, and that he held the sale on or about the 1st day of January, 1900; that on or about the 18th day of January, 1900, he offered the notes and indebtedness secured by the mortgage and covered by the decree for sale at public auction and -sold the same to one A. H. Davis, and that he delivered the notes to Davis. There was an affidavit for service by publication in the tax foreclosure proceedings. It is claimed that no valid service by publication could be had upon Potter and his wife because of the fact that they were all the time residents of the state of Nebraska and that the affidavit for service by publication was untrue. Buckworth was a resident of Lincoln county until he died in the year 1894, or thereabouts. In the tax foreclosure proceedings it is alleged that no personal service of summons was had upon Potter and his wife and upon Buckworth. This court reversed the judgment of the district court quieting title in Smith. The appellees Wilcox, Dikeman and Smith have filed a motion to vacate the judgment of reversal entered by this court, and the question is whether the judgment of this court reversing the judgment of the court below shall stand or whether a new judgment shall be rendered.
This court bases its finding that the appellant Hoagland is the owner of the note and mortgage in controversy on the opinion in the case of McCabe v. Reed, 88 Neb. 457. In the former opinion this court quotes from the opinion
It is next claimed that the publication was insufficient. The publication was in a semi-weekly newspaper issued on Tuesdays and Fridays of each week. The first publication
The next proposition is that the affidavit for publication states that the defendants are nonresidents of the state of Nebraska and service of summons cannot be had on them or either of them. It is said that this is insufficient, and it is argued that the affidavit should allege that service
It is argued that the rule should be applied in this case which is said to have been established in Britton v. Larson, 23 Neb. 806. That was in an action of ejectment. There was a trial in the district court resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendant. The record in that case showed that in April, 1875, one Harry Brownson was the owner of the real estate in question; that on March 8, 1871, he and his wife executed and delivered to the First National Bank of Omaha a mortgage on the real estate. On the 16th of April, 1875, a summons was issued to the sheriff of Wayne county directing him and notifying the said Harry Brownson and Jennie Brownson of the institution of an action to foreclose the mortgage. A summons Avas returned on the day of its issue not served, the defendants not being found in Wayne county. On the next day an affidavit was filed showing the nonresidence of the Brownsons. Service was had by publication. August 24, 1874, a decree of foreclosure was rendered, and the land Avas sold under the order of the court, and September 20, 1876, the same was confirmed and the sheriff directed to execute the usual deed to the purchaser. On the 18th of February, 1885, Brownson and wife conveyed the land in question by a quitclaim deed to the plaintiff.- The plaintiff insisted that the district court was without jurisdiction to render the decree because there was a defect in the affidavit showing the nonresidence of the Brownsons. The affidavit did not describe the property mortgaged. There Avas no attempted description of it. It was not described by numbers; nor Avas it alleged to be in Wayne county.
It was also objected that the affidavit did not show that the BroAvnsons could not be served with summons within the state, and therefore that the affidavit did not comply
The affidavit for publication in the instant tax foreclosure case sets up that H. S. Ridgley is the attorney for the county of Lincoln, the plaintiff in the action, and that on the 25th of June, 1900, the plaintiff filed its petition in the district court for Lincoln county, Nebraska, against David G. Potter, Potter, his wife, first name unknown, Central Nebraska Loan & Trust Company, A. D. Buckworth, first name unknown, J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company, and John Doe, true name unknown, defendants; that the object and prayer are to foreclose the tax liens mentioned in said cause of action; that “the plaintiff seeks to foreclose a tax lien upon the southeast quarter of section 24, in township 15 north, of range 33 west of the sixth principal meridian, in said county, and there is now
It will also be seen that there is no description in the notice of the tax liens to be foreclosed. It does not appear what years they are for, nor the amount of each. There is a statement of the aggregate. Section 79 of the code provided that the notice must, contain a “summary statement of the object and prayer of the petition.” In Scarborough v. Myrick, 47 Neb. 794, it was stated in the seventh paragraph of the syllabus: “Plaintiff’s cause of action is not required to be set forth in an affidavit for service by publication. It is sufficient if such affidavit states that the defendant is a nonresident of this state, and that service of summons cannot be had upon him therein, and facts showing the action to be one of those mentioned in section 77 of the code, in which constructive service is authorized.” In the body of the opinion in that case it was said : “It wa,s not necessary that the affidavit should disclose plaintiff’s title to the property in controversy. He was not required to state his cause of action in the affidavit, but in his petition. Grebe v. Jones. 15 Neb. 312. The affidavit shows that the nature or char
The petition filed to foreclose the alleged liens is brought by the county of Lincoln against the defendants above named. It alleges taxes against the land for the years 1892 to 1898, inclusive; that the taxes for each year became delinquent in each of the years following; that the premises described were advertised and offered for sale, and returned not sold for want of bidders. The item of tax for each year is given. It is alleged of the defendant Potter that David G. Potter claims to be the owner of the premises, and that-Potter is his wife; that the defendant, the Central Nebraska Loan & Trust Company, claims an interest in the premises by virtue of a mortgage lien; that A. D. Buckworth claims an interest in the premises by virtue of a mortgage lien; that the defendant, the J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company, claims an interest in the premises by virtue of a mortgage lien. It is claimed that the interest of the defendants is inferior to the lien of the plaintiff by virtue of the assessment and levy of the taxes. The prayer is that an accounting be had, and the amount due the plaintiff on account of the taxes, -interest and penalties be decreed a first lien upon the premises; that the defendants and all persons, except.the plaintiff, be fored and barred from all right, title and interest in and (o the preanises; that the premises be sold under a decree of the court and the proceeds applied toward the payment of taxes, interest, penalties and costs-of the action; that, upon the confirmation of the sale, the sheriff be ordered to make the purchaser of said premises a good and sufficient deed, and that he put the purchaser in possession. The decree seems to have been rendered on the 2d of December, 1901. The assignment of Milton Doolittle as receiver of the North Platte National Bank to A. H. Davis seems to have been on the 8th of January, 1900.
On the 28th of March, 1908, David G. Potter and Lydia
On the trial of the instant case before the- Honorable W. H. Westover, sitting as judge of the district court, there was a finding that no service of summons was had in this action upon defendants David G. Potter and Lydia A. Potter, and “that special appearances of said David Gr. Potter and Lydia A. Potter were sustained by the court, and this action was and lias been dismissed’’ as to the said David Gr. Potter and Lydia A. Potter. The court further finds that the Central Nebraska Loan & Trust- Company and the J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company have been served with processes upon plaintiff’s petition by publication, and the court further finds that the Central Nebraska Loan & Trust Company is a corporation, organized under the laws of the state of Nebraska, and that service upon said defendant by publication was and is invalid. A. D. Buckworth is shown by the evidence to have been a resident of Lincoln county, Nebraska, until he died.
Hoagland testifies to the details concerning the property that he turned over to Davis. “Q. I asked you what it was you gave Davis for the property you had bid in? A. C. Ó. Davis asset, $3.25; O. E. and W. C. Elder asset, $80; S. E. 18-10-30. * * * Q. Tell me what Davis turned over to you that he bid in? A. The only memorandum I have here is the D. G. Pott'”' property.” He then testifies that one evening at home he saw in the North Platte paper William Smith against Potter, describing this land, and that he said he believed he was interested in the land, and the next morning he went down and investigated. He found the notes and mortgage and assignment in his safe. He was unable to tell why he did not get an assignment from Davis, but thought he had overlooked it. “Q. You did not get any assignment ,of the decree? A. Not unless the assignment of\ these papers carried it. Q. As a matter of fact you and Davis had no talk about the decree, did you, when you made this transfer? * * * As a matter of fact you didn’t know then that this was in decree at that time? A. I would not say that I knew it was in decree at that time, we bought the notes. Q. You would not say; you have no recollection about it now? A. No; I did investigate some of the assets of the bank prior to that time, but whether or not T learned this was in decree, I don’t know.”
He then testifies that he discovered the matter was in decree before he saw the notice in the newspaper of Smith against Potter. He seems to have at once written a letter to Mr. Davis immediately after the lawsuit was commenced. As soon as the case Avas started he wrote Davis for an assignment of the decree. He wrote Davis that he (Davis) had neglected in the transfer of the papers the assignment of the mortgage. “Q. Prom the time that
Davis, when called as a'witness, controverted Hoagland’s testimony, but his testimony is evasive and unsatisfactory. “Q. Was there ever any talk between you and him by which he was to have these instruments? A. No; after Mr. Hoagland and I had our settlement, I got these papers after that, I was supposed tó have got them. Q. What are the facts as to whether or not you and Hoagland had some kind of an arrangement or agreement at the receiver's sale?” To this question the witness testified that they agreed between themselves that when one bid on a piece of property the other would not, and that they Avere to divide the assets, a.nd that Davis was to have a half section of land to be bid in for him by Hoagland, and that Hoagland Avas to have the Lewis mortgage for whatever it could be bid in at. Davis says: “We bought a number of assets, and among them were these two which I mentioned. We did not get a settlement between us at the time. We had Mr. Doolittle make a memorandum on his sale book of what Hoagland bought and what I bought and Ave were afterwards, ■ when we got together, to put them doAvn and see Avhat each one was to have and to let him (Doolittle) knoAv, so he could put them on his book and make the assignments regular. I think it Avas a Aveek probably afterwards that Hoagland and I agreed on settlement of the assets, and Ave settled. Hoagland took them doAvn and made a list of them, of wha.t I Avas to have and what he was to haAre. I went to Doolittle’s office across the street, and Hoagland wrote Doolittle what
On cross-examination, Davis admits that he got a letter from Hoagland after he moved to Grand Junction. “Q. How did it come that you sent this to Mr. Wilcox as soon as you received this from me? A. I do not recollect ever having assigned to you this Potter matter at all, and T did not know what I had done with that or what become of it. I made a hunt through a bundle of those old assets, with a number of others, to see if I had any Potter assets, and I found I did not have. ' I immediately Avrote Mr. Wilcox and told him to investigate and see what there Avas in it, that it was probably of value to you; if it belonged to you, you Avere entitled to it, and, if it belonged to me, I Avanted it. Q. Have you ever made any demand upon me for it? A. No, sir. Q. Did you get the list from the receiver at the time you bought these assets, a list of Avhat you had bought? A. No; I made a memorandum of what I bought and what you bought. Q. What you bought? A. What we bought together.” He then testifies that he does not knoAV what he did with the list. He does not knoAV Avhether the receiver gave Mm a list. Davis in- his testimony corroborates the testimony of Hoagland as to the material things. He corroborates
We think the evidence fully establishes the fact that Hoagland is the owner of the note, mortgage and decree, and that he has been the owner of the same ever since the sale by Doolittle, the receiver of the bank. As Hoagland was not made a party defendant, or any one representing him, and the owner of the note, mortgage and decree was not brought into court at any time, it would seem that the claim in question is' not barred, unless the statutes and decisions affecting the matter created such bar. That every man is entitled to his day in court expresses a primary principle concerning the disposition of property and the enforcement and guaranty of property rights.
Sections 1-11, laws 1875, p. 107, entitled “An act to provide a method of foreclosing tax liens upon real estate in certain cases,” furnish a method of foreclosure under which the premises in this case were sold. Section 1 provides that the tax lien upon real property may be enforced “by an action in the nature of ,a foreclosure of a mortgage.” Section 3 provides that all petitions for the foreclosure of such tax liens “shall be filed in the district court in chancery, where the lands are situated.” Section 4. provides: “Service of process in causes instituted under this chapter, shall be the same as provided by law in similar causes in the district courts, and where the owner of the land is not known, the action may be brought against the land itself, but in such cases the service must be as in the case of a nonresident.” Section 9 provides: “All lands sold by the sheriff by virtue of this act shall be appraised, advertised and sold as upon execution, and the title conferred by his deed shall be entitled to all.the presumptions of any judicial sale.” Section 4 of the act contemplates proceedings the same as provided by law in similar causes in the district courts, and, where the owner
In Carman v. Harris, 61 Neb. 635, the court said: “The decree, of course, could' only bind the parties to the suit, and those claiming under them, and could not affect third parties.” In Alexander v. Thacker, 30 Neb. 614, the court said: “In a suit to foreclose a lien for taxes, all parties having an interest in the real estate are proper parties, and the person holding the equity of redemption is an indispensable party.” In Carson v. Dundas, 39 Neb. 503, the fourth paragraph of the syllabus reads: “A sale to satisfy tax liens, Avhen the action Avas brought in personam and not against the land itself, passes only the title of the parties to the action and their privies in estate. It does not. divest the title, of strangers.” In Merriam v. Goodlett, 36 Neb. 384, the court said: “As
In Selby v. Pueppka, 73 Neb. 179, there was a suit in equity brought by the grantee of the original owner to redeem land sold for taxes at a judicial sale. There was a general demurrer to the plaintiff’s petition, which was sustained by the court. The plaintiff elected not to plead further, and from a judgment of dismissal brought error to this court. There had been a sale for taxes by the sheriff of Rock county upon a decree of foreclosure entered at a suit of Rock county as plaintiff. There had been no adminstrative sale for taxes. Rock county undertook to foreclose a tax lien without resorting to a sale. It procured the premises to be sold to the defendant’s grantor and the sale was confirmed, and a sheriff’s deed was issued upon the order of confirmation. Afterwards this title was conveyed to the defendant. The owner at the time of the assessment of the taxes after-wards conveyed to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff brought his action to redeem from the taxes, alleging that the foreclosure proceedings were all void, for the reason that the petition in that action showed that there had been no prior sale of the premises for taxes. The petition also urged that the constitution of the state allowed a redemption within two years from any tax sale. In favor of the alleged judgment, it was urged that the fact that a petition was demurrable did not make the decree of a competent court, subject to collateral attack where the parties were before it and the subject matter was one of which the court had cognizance. To the claim of the plaintiff that two years’ time for redemption from a sale for taxes had not run, it was replied that the decree of confirmation was as conclusive as to the sale as that of foreclosure is to the lien and the right to sell under it. It was urged that to permit a redemption was to allow a collateral attack upon the decree of confirmation. Com
Judge Duffif, as commissioner of this court, delivered the opinion in Clifford v. Thun, 74 Neb. 831. In speaking of Selby v. Pueppka, supra, he says : “In that case it was urged that the confirmation of the sale and the making of a deed cut off the owner’s right to redeem,” but he does-not say that was the decision. As we have just seen, it was not. In that case Clifford, who was the plaintiff in error, filed his petition for the foreclosure of a mortgage on 80 acres of land made to the Globe Investment Company by Henry Thun and his wife. The petition was filed February 21, 1903, and September 5, 1903, he filed an amended petition, in which he alleged that on August 6, 1901, the land covered by his mortgage was sold for the delinquent taxes due thereon for the years 1895-1900, both inclusive; that one Skillman was the purchaser at said sale, and that Skillman on August 21, 1901, commenced an action to foreclose his tax certificate, making various parties defendants; that a decree was entered fore
An examination of these cases show that there was ndiscussion of the act in question. The trouble about these cases is that the lawyers and judges neglected to hunt up the statute and discuss it. More than that, the court attempted to and did bar the rights of the plaintiff without an examination of the facts of the case. It is rather difficult to understand why he would refuse to consider the foreclosure of the mortgage.
That the tax lien is to be enforced “by .an action in the nature of a foreclosure of a mortgage” means that the procedure shall be similar to the foreclosure of a mortgage, and there should be no severity unusual to that
The notice was published in August and September, .1900. It was directed to “David G. Potter, and - Potter, his wife, * * * Central Nebraska Loan & Trust Company, A. D. Buckworth, first name unknown, J. I. Case Threshing Machine Company.” An examination of the record leaves the matter perhaps in some doubt as to whether Potter and his wife were residing in Nebraska or South Dakota at that time, and Dr. Buckworth, it seems, was dead, having died about that time at North Platte, in Lincoln county. He was the president of the North Platte National Bank up to the time that it failed. The Potters and Buckworth should have been served with a summons so that the court might have jurisdiction. The Potters made the mortgage to Buckworth, and Buckworth or his legal representatives should have been served with a summons. Buckworth might have turned the note and mortgage over to the bank, but, if so, the bank should have been brought in. Under the evidence and the rule in McCabe v. Reed, 88 Neb. 457, Hoagland was shown to be the owner of the note, mortgage and decree.
While there may be some doubt about the facts, as the pleadings are very long and much involved, and the testimony voluminous, we are constrained, after a somewhat careful examination of the record, to modify our former opinion touching the length of time the notice for constructive service was published, and to hold, that it was published the required length of time, four weeks, but we adhere to our former views as stated in the opinion filed November 28, 1911, that the testimony of the witness Davis is not sufficient to overcome that of Hoagland, supported as it was by his possession and production of the papers, and that Hoagland is not barred by the foreclosure
As thus modified, we adhere to our former opinion, and the judgment of the district court for Lincoln county stands
Reversed.
I concur only in the result reversing the judgment of the district court.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The evidence shows that Potter, the owner of the land, was a nonresident and that he was served by publication. Since the conclusion therefore rests'upon that portion of the opinion which holds that a mortgagee is a necessary and indispensable party in an action to foreclose a tax lien under the statute of 1875, I am compelled to dissent. This is a new doctrine in this state and directly overrules what has heretofore been considered to be settled law. Moreover, the former cases are not specifically overruled. Since it is probable that lands have been purchased in reliance upon titles acquired under proceedings based upon the ruling formerly announced, the doctrine has become a rule of property which should not be interfered with. Neither do I agree to the proposition that such an action is purely one in personam. Its only purpose is to subject to sale a specific tract of land upon which the county and state have already acquired a lien, in order to pay the taxes levied and assessed against that particular tract. No personal judgment can be rendered and no deficiency enforced. It is an action quasi in rem and not purely in personam.
We have held that the word “owner” in the 1875 statute, under which the foreclosure action was brought, means the same as when used in the general revenue law. In Leigh v. Greene, 62 Neb. 344, a like case to this, which held that one Patrick, a mortgagee, was not a necessary party, in the opinion by Albert, C., after reciting a number of provisions of the revenue law in which the word “owner” appears, it is said: “These, and many other provisions of the revenue act, clearly indicate that the legislature used the word ‘owner’ in the popular sense, the sense in which it is understood by the people at large; and having employed it in that sense in the other parts of the act, the inference is warranted that they used it in the same sense in the sections providing for the foreclosure of tax liens. Tracy v. Reed, 38 Fed. 69. At first sight, it may seem anomalous that a person should be concluded by a proceeding to which he was not a party and of which he had no notice. But it must be kept in mind that the procedure providing for the foreclosure of a tax lien is a part of the revenue system of the state, and that the necessities of a government will not always permit an overserupulous regard for private rights. * * * In our opinion, Patrick Avas mot the owner within the meaning of the statute, and the proceedings for the foreclosure of the tax lien were in substantial compliance with the statute, and conclusive against the whole Avorld.” This
It is certainly more in consonance with the proper conduct of the public business and the collection of money with which to carry on the affairs of government that the holder of a mortgage on a tract of land should be charged with the duty of protecting his lien by seeing, either that the taxes are paid by the owner of the equity of redemption, or by paying them himself, rather than by compelling the tax collector or the holder of the tax lien to search the records or to look for hidden liens, all of which by statute are subject and inferior to the lien of the taxes. The tax in this state is not levied upon the person owning the land or upon the lien holder. It is not a personal tax, and cannot be collected except from the land. It is the land itself that is charged with the payment. If the owner or occupant alone are entitled to notice in administrative sales, and a mere lien holder is bound to take notice of the statute, Avhy is he not equally bound to take notice of other proceedings to enforce a tax which has been delinquent for years? I believe the former doctrine reaffirmed so recently by the court should be upheld. Even if the present construction might have been adopted at first, a rule of practice long approved should not be lightly set aside, especially when titles to land depend upon it. It is such vacillation that breeds litigation, since no lawyer can safely advise his client, when the court itself does not adhere to settled rules.
A motion in the alternative for a rehearing, or for a modification of our former opinion by striking out of the statement in the opinion, “and that Hoagland is not barred by the foreclosure proceedings, which were so far void as to fail to convey title to Wilcox,” the latter clause of said statement. Upon a reconsideration of the case, it is held that the motion for rehearing be denied, and the motion to modify sustained. The words, “which were so far void as to fail to convey title to Wilcox,” are therefore stricken out of our said opinion.
Former opinion modieied.