{¶ 2} In November 2003, appellant visited appellee's place of business in New Philadelphia, Ohio, to shop for a new manufactured home for herself, her son, and her daughter-in-law. Appellee is engaged in the business of selling and installing manufactured housing for residential use. Appellant ultimately chose a three-bedroom model #58A4, with a total base price of $86,848.00. She signed certain contracts for purchase, delivery, and installation services on November 7 and November 14, 2003. Said contracts incorporated an agreement to arbitrate any subsequent disputes. Appellant also paid appellee $56,595.00 toward the total price.
{¶ 3} Appellee made delivery of the manufactured home to appellant's property near Pisgah Road in Guernsey County shortly after Thanksgiving 2003. Appellant thereafter claimed that the home was damaged during delivery, that the kitchen cabinetry was of lesser quality than the display model she had viewed, and that the flooring, fireplace, and countertops were of different colors than she had selected. Appellant thus refused to accept the home as tendered. On April 13, 2004, appellant sent a letter to appellee requesting the tender of a new home. Appellee refused to do so.
{¶ 4} On May 11, 2004, appellant gave written notice to appellee that she considered the company in breach of the sales agreements and UCC obligations. Appellant therein also offered to settle all claims if her $56,595.00 payment were returned to her and the sales contract were cancelled. Appellee refused the settlement offer, and on June 7, 2004, filed a demand with the American Arbitration Association seeking "approximately $29,000.00" in contract damages and alleging appellant was in breach of the sales agreement.
{¶ 5} On June 21, 2004, appellant answered appellee's demand. Appellant denied any wrongdoing and presented an affirmative demand seeking actual damages, including her $56,595.00 payment to appellee, and additional incidental and consequential damages of "approximately $74,500.00." She also claimed entitlement to alternative relief under R.C.
{¶ 6} The arbitration hearing went forward on August 27 and September 16, 2004. On October 14, 2004, the arbitrator issued his decision. The arbitrator found, inter alia, that the manufactured home had "suffered substantial damage" during delivery, and that appellee's subsequent repair of certain components was "partial or ineffective," and that some repairs were simply not made, despite sufficient time therefor. The arbitrator further found that certain home components differed from those ordered by appellant or represented by appellee. Award of Arbitrator at 1.
{¶ 7} The arbitrator concluded that although appellant had "claim[ed] treble damages, but by testimony and evidence request[ed] rescission," the two remedies were mutually exclusive, and that appellant had "opt[ed] to rescind the contract." He thereupon denied appellee-seller's claim for the purchase balance due, but granted appellant a rescission of the sales contract, with no treble damages. He also denied appellant attorney fees and consequential damages. Award of Arbitrator at 2-3.
{¶ 8} On January 7, 2005, appellant timely filed a motion in the common pleas court to confirm the arbitrator's award as to breach of contract, but also moved to vacate, modify, or correct the CSPA counter-demand award under R.C.
{¶ 9} On August 26, 2005, appellant filed a notice of appeal. She herein raises the following three Assignments of Error:
{¶ 10} "I. THE ARBITRATOR'S AWARD, AND THE LOWER COURT JUDGMENT UPHOLDING IT, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, THE PRODUCT OF MATERIAL MISTAKE AND EXTENSIVE IMPROPRIETY, AND EXCEED THE SCOPE OF ARBITRAL POWERS ACTUALLY DELEGATED BY THE PARTIES, IN THAT MRS. SMITH WAS DENIED HER ELECTION OF THE DAMAGES REMEDY SHE HAD DEMANDED IN WRITING AS WAS HER RIGHT UNDER R.C.
{¶ 11} "II. THE LOWER COURT AND THE ARBITRATOR ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW BY DENYING MRS. SMITH'S R.C.
{¶ 12} "III. THE LOWER COURT AND THE ARBITRATOR ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW BY DENYING REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AND LITIGATION COSTS BASED UPON AN APPLICATION OF AN INCORRECT AND ILLEGAL ELIGIBILITY STANDARD."
{¶ 14} "For a dispute resolution procedure to be classified as `arbitration,' the decision rendered must be final, binding, and without any qualifications or conditions as to the finality of an award. * * * The jurisdiction of the courts to review arbitration awards is thus statutorily restricted; it is narrow and it is limited." Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield,
Clermont App. No. CA2005-09-083,
{¶ 15} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 16} (A) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
{¶ 17} (B) There was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or any of them.
{¶ 18} (C) The arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
{¶ 19} (D) The arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
{¶ 21} However, a reviewing court's inquiry into whether the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority within the meaning of R.C.
{¶ 22} "Q. Are you stating that one of the options here is to have Palm Harbor come in and make the corrections that you —"
{¶ 23} "A. Not on that house."
{¶ 24} Tr. II at 153.
{¶ 25} Under such circumstances, we are unable to conclude the trial court erred, under its statutorily-limited level of review, in declining to find the arbitrator had exceeded his authority by concluding appellant had elected rescission of the contract. "The only way to give effect to the purposes of the arbitration system of conflict resolution is to give lasting effect to the decision rendered by an arbitrator whenever that is possible." Hillsboro, supra, at 176.
{¶ 26} Appellant's First Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
{¶ 28} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 29} As per our analysis of appellant's First Assignment of Error, we are unable to conclude the trial court erred in declining to hold the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in awarding rescission as opposed to treble damages.
{¶ 30} Appellant's Second Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶ 32} Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 33} This Court has recognized that "[a]ctions brought under R.C. Title 13 typically involve relatively small damages, yet the cost of recovering those damages may be enormous, as the offending suppliers may stoutly defend themselves * * *. Confronted with the likelihood of incurring very much more debt in attorney fees than could be recovered in damages, most consumers would never bring or continue to prosecute an action for a private remedy." Gaskill v. Doss (Dec. 26, 2000), Fairfield App. No. 00 CA 4, quoting Sprovach v. Bob Ross Buick,Inc., (1993),
{¶ 34} In the case sub judice, the trial court deferred to the findings of the arbitrator, who had found the evidence devoid of proof of appellee's "awareness of or intent to commit a deceptive act." Award of Arbitrator at 3. Appellant essentially contends such a result contradicts our prior holding that the language of R.C.
{¶ 35} Clearly, the determination of factual matters is within the powers of the arbitrator. Lancaster Educ. Ass'n,
supra. However, issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo by appellate courts. Yommer v. Outdoor Enterprises, Inc.
(1998),
{¶ 36} Accordingly, appellant's Third Assignment of Error is sustained on the issue of attorney fees.
{¶ 37} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Guernsey County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court with directions to conduct proceedings on appellant's claim for statutory attorney fees.
Wise, P.J. Gwin, J., and Boggins, J., concur.
Costs to be split evenly between appellant and appellee.