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Smith v. Owen
841 S.W.2d 828
Tenn. Ct. App.
1992
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*1 828

Second, recognize, as did the United we Powers, Supreme

States Court racial

prima facie case of discrimination if the

may more difficult establish juror potential

defendant and the excused — Powers, race. U.S. are not of same

at—, Neverthe 111 at 1373-74. S.Ct.

less, begun examining mixed- courts have Powers, challenges

race in the wake of though always

even the defense has pur prevailing on the issue of

succeeded See,

poseful e.g., v. discrimination. State 577, 583,

Hernandez, 63 St 3d Ohio (1992) (Hispanic defen

N.E.2d challenge raising for exclusion

dant Batson veniremember); Brashear v. black 709, 715,

State, A.2d Md.App. (1992)(white challenging ex veniremembers). of black Based

clusion Powers, find can no

upon reading our we allowing for not this mixed-race

reason proceed.

challenge to

Therefore, we reverse Appeals and remand of Criminal Court a further

this ease to the trial proceedings, if neces-

hearing and other

sary, in directions set accordance

out above. C.J., DROWOTA,

REID, O'BRIEN JJ., ANDERSON, concur. wife, Mary E.

Robert G. SMITH

Smith, Individually, and as the Smith, Kyle Plain-

and next-of-kin

tiffs/Appellees, (Wallace), Ann OWEN

Katherine Defendant/Appellant. Tennessee, Middle Appeals of

Court of

Section, at Nashville. 19, 1992.

June Appeal Denied

Permission Court

by Supreme 19, 1992.

Oct. *2 They following

trical shock. asserted the (1) theories: that defendant violated Sec- Housing tion 303.4 of the of Cookeville regulations state as well as enacted pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. 68-40-101 §§ seq., et and that such violations constitute se; (2) doctrine liable under the (2d) Torts, as stated in the Restatement 402(a); (3) that the defendant is lia- § general principles ble under the gence. parties agreed to bifurcate the trial and submit the issue of judge sitting trial jury, without a with the damages amount of to be submitted to a jury judge any liability. should the find accident, May the date of the

On Smith, plaintiffs, Mary Robert and Cookeville,Tennessee, resided in a house renting they had been from defen- dant, Wallace, Katherine Owen since Au- gust Upon inspecting dryer of 1981. and the in the house the acci- after dent, an electrician discovered that the wir- ing leading to the electrical outlet at the reversed, dryer was so that the entire dryer frame of was electrified with 110 electricity. grounded volts of There was a gas pipe directly dryer, behind the and the electrician concluded that the child must have received the shock as a result of com- pipe ing in contact with the and the electri- dryer fied frame at the same time. Jones, Moore, Jones, E. John Rader & Clift, P.C., Cookeville, plaintiffs/appel- for compe- The electrician testified that no lees. tent electrician would have installed the Madewell, Jared, D.

James Madewell and wiring in the manner he found it. He Cookeville, defendant/appellant. using discovered the defect a meter monly used electricians. He also testi-

OPINION that, electricity fied since would not flow CANTRELL, Judge. dryer the metal frame and the between floor, dryer persons using the linoleum This is from a of liabili- not have been alerted to the fact would se, ty, theory moving that it After into was electrified. unknowing passive of a munici- an violation house, plaintiffs it had noticed pal ordinance. We affirm. long for their unusually took an time History I. Facts and Procedural get prob- dry, clothes to but assumed taking the dryer. lem After brought against Plaintiffs this suit their dryer appliance repair shop, where no to an landlord, seeking damages injuries suf- found, simply problem plaintiffs had by their minor child when he crawled fered kept on dryer was slow and assumed plaintiffs’ dryer pipe clothes and a between using elec- it. against the wall received severe injured The court also found that

Ms. Wallace owned since 1979. where the accident occurred within the child was grandparents Before that her adopting the Standard it The house was had owned since 1924. protect. Further, Code was intended in 1951. completely remodeled and rewired violation of *3 lived there from 1951 Defendant’s of nance the cause the was 1961, to 1961. Since the house been injuries, pointing child’s out that “an in- various rented to tenants. premises prior of the spection lease defendant, of her testimony From the would have revealed the defective condi- tenants, trial mother and some former the plaintiffs The also that tion.” found outlet in the electrical contributory guilty negligence. were not of question was sometime between installed The held defendant trial court liable No one ever com- 1961 and 1969. had violating of the basis defendant, municipal or to the plained to city ordinance. The court held that inspector, performance or codes about theory was not on the liable of inspector The safety of this outlet. codes simple negligence, finding “by that reason- department that his does not rou- testified diligence, the Defendant able care and inspections tinely conduct unless known of the unsafe and could not have plaint is received. dangerous holding this condition.” While rewiring and of the remodeling After the previ- one in the appears to contradict the 1951, prior in mov- house but only in paragraph, ous we are concerned in, adopted the ing of Cookeville negligence per se theo- this with the Code, edition, Housing pub- Standard it did not ry. The court concluded Building Code Con- lished Southern of the issues whether de- need to address Chapter III of the gress International. regulations and fendant violated state Housing captioned “MINI- Standard apply in liability should whether strict EQUIP- MUM STANDARDS FOR BASE these circumstances. FACILITIES,” im- specifically MENT AND granted defendant’s mo- The trial court owner-occupants poses certain duties on interlocutory appeal pursuant tion for and landlords: 9, T.R.A.P. Rule SECTION 301—GENERAL occupy shall as owner-occu- No Municipal Housing Code Establishes II. let another for occu- pant or or sublet to of Applicable Duty Care any dwelling unit de- pancy dwelling or held that the date of The trial court signed to be used for the or intended letting premises, rather than the date living, cooking or purpose sleeping, comply remodeling, not eating ... does or determines therein construction in requirements enumerated requirements whether [the Chapter this applicable in case. code are III]. Congress Building Interna Southern Code found that the condition The trial court codes, major seven other publishes tional question in outlet was of the electrical building code. including a construction following section: compliance in with the the Stan preface edition of the 1979 303.4—ELECTRIC LIGHTS SECTION pur its explains that dard Code REQUIRED AND OUTLETS re pose is minimum standards to establish light fix- to the electric ... In addition “use, and mainte lating occupancy laundry every and ture bathroom buildings.” nance residential room, at one provided shall least there be added). 101.4 (Emphasis Section (1) Every such out- convenience outlet. provides expressly code “[t]he installed, properly let fixture shall any apply provisions of Code shall good safe shall be maintained house or apartment, apartment dwelling, condition, be connect- working and shall when said irrespective house rooming power in a of electric ed to the source altered, constructed, or re- building manner. safe added). (Tenn.1988) Queen (citing paired.” (Emphasis Day The various 232-233 v. Co., 458, subsections of Section 101.4 deal with how Iron 95 Tenn. 32 S.W. ton Coal & additions, determine alterations whether (1895) Memphis Railway Street v. repairs existing buildings made to shall or (1904)). Haynes, Tenn. 81 S.W. 374 required comply municipal Second, proof the in must show that code, building in addition to the jured party was within code. legislative body whom the intended ben correctly gave weight The trial court no protect by efit and the enactment of that the fact that the defective particular Traylor statute or ordinance. installed before the code was Coburn, (Tenn.App. adopted by council. Section 301 1980) Redmond, (citing 142 Tenn. Carter v. imposes duty on the owner not *4 258, (1920)). In 218 S.W. 217 addition to another, occupy, any and not to lease to establishing negligence per by showing se building building unless that elements, plaintiff these two must of plies every requirement with each and enu- negligence course that show such was the Chapter housing merated in III of the code. proximate injury. cause of the Brookins v. faulty wiring The fact that the install- Table, 547, The Round 624 S.W.2d knowledge ed without the of defendant and (Tenn.1981); Armstrong, Alex v. 215 Tenn. housing the enactment of before 276, 283, (1964). S.W.2d duty. nance does not her from relieve agree that We Ms. Wallace did Negligence III. Liability Per Se Not De- not have notice of the unsafe condition of pendent on Landlord’s Actual or Con- However, the electrical im outlet. this is Non-Complying structive Notice of material, negligence per liability because Condition Itself turns on constructive notice of the duty appellant’s argument main thrust of ordinance, imposed by the statute or not of is that “the intent of the Hous- [Standard non-complying condition itself. For the ing] perverted Code when such Code is below, that, reasons discussed we hold as a litigation utilized as a hammer in civil law, appellant matter of had constructive support theory approaching a liability strict duty imposed by notice of the of care negligence per and/or se.” She acknowl- housing inju ordinance and is for the liable that, rule, edges general as a violation of ry proximately by caused her breach of negligence an ordinance does constitute duty. that However, contends, per se. she where defendant had neither actual nor construc- Subject Liability a. Owner for Breach knowledge tive of the violation and was not Duty Inspect Electrical Outlets negligent, otherwise Tennessee courts have Leasing Property Before so, liability. declined to find To do she ordinance, housing by virtue of its insists, impose Council, City enactment the Cookeville on the defendant based on an unknown placed dwelling all in that on owners points latent defect. She also out that the constructive notice of the duties and stan- expressly incorporates ordinance care therein. dards of articulated One an official enforcement mechanism and express the duty does not intention to create a those duties is the not to lease a private cause of action. dwelling everything in to someone unless dwelling complies require- The doctrine of se is ments of the code. In the instant firmly in our case In established law. or case, evidence the uncontradicted establish- negligence der to recover on the basis of faulty es that the that caused the se, elements must three be established. injury at the time defendant child’s existed First, it must be shown that the defendant dwelling plaintiffs. De- first rented the or “im violated a statute ordinance which of her fendant was on constructive notice poses duty prohibits or an act for the duty apartment rent to them not to public.” of a or the Nevill benefit Tullahoma, making compli- without first sure it was cuting persons It any code. is not her who violate its provi- anee knowledge knowledge or lack of the non- sions: complying condition itself determines SECTION AND 108—VIOLATIONS subject she is

whether PENALTIES se, gence per but rather her constructive firm, Any person, corporation or agent, inspect and knowledge of the a provision who shall violate of this are no sure there code violations before therewith, comply any or fail to or with to a lessee. over requirements thereof ... shall be prosecuted provided by within the limits purposes of Standard state or local laws.... are as follows: Code described REMEDIAL SECTION 101.2—CODE do see the existence of a munici- We mechanism, hereby pal provi- or the This Code is declared enforcement remedial, prosecution, shall be construed to se- sion for criminal as basis on pur- distinguish cure the which to beneficial interests and public from various ordinances poses safety, thereof —which are at issue here through penal implicated in other cases general health and statutes welfare— sanitation, pri- have strength, stability, structural where Tennessee courts allowed adequate ventilation, action light and and safe- vate causes of based *5 See, The ty property per e.g., to life and from fire and se. Brookins v. Round Table, Inc., (Tenn.1981) other hazards incident to the construc- S.W.2d tion, (statute alteration, removal, prohibited of to repair, demoli- sale alcohol minors tion, provided penalties); of and occupancy use and residential criminal Alex v. buildings. Armstrong, 215 Tenn. 385 S.W.2d (1964)(statute dogs allowing declared to be housing The of the effectiveness large provided at a and for misdemeanor promoting safety in and nance health fines). severely dwelling undermined if accomplish purposes, to its the owners were allowed use lack of knowl- In order to specific edge non-complying housing imposes as duties on of a condition a code dwellings. The against liability injuries fact that the defense civil for owners fined, by may to com- owner have his or proximately property caused their failure condemned, essence, subjected defen- her or be ply with the ordinance. In nothing to asking prosecution her criminal does make dant is this court insulate injured the as a person from for no other reason than that whole with, noncompliance. That either did not familiarize herself result of the owner’s she ignore, why the sections of the hous- is the doctrine of se or chose to duty inspect. just a for civil ing impose the as basis code that been established liability. This we cannot do. time, the making injured At the same provide

The code does for on the sole tenet which party whole is not by municipality. ap The enforcement the above, discussed the rests. As doctrine “Housing pro is pointment of Official” statute or only applies where doctrine 102.1, powers and the vided Section person to a duty owed imposes provided duties of the official are Appellant’s contention persons. or class of in Section 103. Section 104 authorizes the facts negligence inspections. housing official make The effect, liability, is is, in such as these notifying the owner of a code procedure without merit. is described in subsection 103.2. violation process deal Sections 105-107 Intended to be b. Tenants Within Class of the official to appealing actions Housing Ordinance by Protected Adjustments Ap Board of pro imposed Section legal duty The of care provides peals. Section applies owners dwellings. 301 of the code condemnation of unfit cedure for occupy premises themselves prose- who either expressly provides also The code TODD, another, Presiding Judge, dissenting. and to lessees or lease them to primary- parties. sublet to third who great respect and deference to the With protected intended to be reasoning upon authorities and obviously who by the ordinance is those based, majority I must conclusion of the is actually dwelling premises. in the will register my disagreement I con- with what period, of the lease At the commencement unjust sider to be an result. person who owns or has had control The record reflects that the defective position to know premises is a better knowledge without the was installed dangerous conditions then about or consent of the defendant-landlord before than is the new tenant. which, ac- the enactment of the code plaintiffs here moved into cording majority, made the landlord dangerous condition had been on which a safety premises. an insurer of the years. The ordi- latent for a number contrary long law This is established designed protect nance them from in this Max- of landlord and tenant State. being injured by non-complying such condi- Tenn., Corp. Tenn.App. well v. Davlo why imposes the ordinance tions. That 528, and authorities cited inspect prem- on the lessor the therein. ises before them over to a new tragic case are pro- tenant. The are The facts of this within regrettable, tected class. the result of but were gence of a unknown without concur- Inspect c. Defendant’s Failure any party to this rence of Injury Proximate Cause of case. The trial court found that the defen- should be reversed and the dant’s violation of the ordinance was the case dismissed. *6 proximate injury. cause of the As have we stated, imposed the ordinance inspect before plaintiffs. over to In case, instant electrician discovered faulty wiring using a meter with which

any electrician familiar. The trial specifically inspection found that “an FANN, Marjorie Plaintiff/Appellee, Gale premises prior to the lease would

have revealed the condition.” defective preponderance sup- of the evidence BRAILEY, Eugene Leroy Robert ports finding the trial court’s Shanes, M. and Bill Odom cause. Defendants/Appellants. The trial were Tennessee, Appeals of Court of contributorily negligent. Appellant Section, Middle at Nashville. finding. not contested this July 1992. IV. Conclusion Appeal Denied Permission to above, the reasons stated we affirm For Supreme Court trial court’s on the 26, 1992. Oct. The cause is basis of se. Putnam

remanded to the Circuit Court for

County proceedings further consistent opinion. Tax the costs on appellant. J.,

LEWIS, concurs. P.J.,

TODD, opinion. dissents with

Case Details

Case Name: Smith v. Owen
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Date Published: Jun 19, 1992
Citation: 841 S.W.2d 828
Court Abbreviation: Tenn. Ct. App.
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