Smith v. Ohio State Univ.Smith v. Ohio State Univ.
Rendered on December 5, 2017
On brief: Glancy Prongay & Murray LLP, Marc L. Godino, and Mark S. Greenstone; Kooperman Mentel Ferguson Yaross Ltd., and Katherine C. Ferguson, for appellants. Argued: Mark S. Greenstone.
On brief: Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Robert N. Webner, and Martha Brewer Motley; Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Lee Ann Rabe, and Randall W. Knutti, for appellees. Argued: Robert N. Webner.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Deanna Smith and Harmoni Sauder, appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio dismissing their claims against defendant-appellee, The Ohio State University (“OSU“), for lack of standing. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In 2012, OSU hired Sauder as a facility manager, and, in 2014, OSU hired Smith as a housekeeper. In October 2015, appellants, individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, filed suit against OSU under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
{¶ 3} In November 2015, OSU removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, based on federal question jurisdiction. In June 2016, the federal court found that appellants failed to allege that they sustained any injury-in-fact due to OSU‘s alleged violations of the FCRA, and that they therefore lacked standing under
{¶ 4} In July 2016, OSU moved to dismiss the action in the Court of Claims based on its contention that, as in federal court, appellants lacked standing to bring their claims in Ohio state court because they alleged no injury-in-fact resulting from the alleged violations of the FCRA. In response, appellants argued that Ohio law recognizes standing even in the absence of an injury-in-fact, when that standing is conferred by statute. In February 2017, the Court of Claims dismissed appellants’ claims against OSU based on its conclusion that they failed to plead any particularized injury-in-fact and lacked statutory standing to pursue their claims in the absence of a cognizable injury.
{¶ 5} Appellants timely appeal.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} Appellants assign the following error for our review:
The Court of Claims committed reversible error in holding that Appellants lack standing to sue for the FCRA violations alleged by Appellants.
III. Discussion
{¶ 7} In their sole assignment of error, appellants assert that the trial court erred in dismissing their FCRA claims against OSU for lack of standing. Appellants argue that the FCRA conferred standing on them to sue for violations of the requirements contained therein. According to appellants, this “statutory standing” exists regardless of whether they could otherwise meet the traditional or common-law requirements of standing,
{¶ 8} Pursuant to
{¶ 9} Standing to sue is part of the common understanding of what makes a case justiciable and is considered a “jurisdictional requirement.” Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, ¶ 21-22. “It is fundamental that a party commencing litigation must have standing to sue in order to present a justiciable controversy.” Id. at ¶ 41. Thus, “[b]efore an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal, 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27; see Moore v. Middletown, 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 23 (“It is well settled that standing does not depend on the merits of the plaintiff‘s contention that particular conduct is illegal or unconstitutional. Rather, standing turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted by the plaintiffs.“). Whether a party has established standing to bring an action before the court is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. State, 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, ¶ 23.
{¶ 10} Ohio courts are not bound by federal standing principles derived from
{¶ 11} Although not dispositive of the standing issue presented here, the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, ___U.S.___, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016), is instructive. In Spokeo, the Court analyzed the minimum requirements of standing in federal court in the context of a FCRA case and reaffirmed the principle that Congress may not confer standing in the absence of an alleged particularized and concrete injury-in-fact. The Court acknowledged the role of Congress to “identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements,” and thus “its judgment is also instructive and important” regarding the issue of standing. Spokeo at 1549. Consequently, Congress “may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.’ ” Spokeo at 1549, quoting Lujan at 578. Stated differently, ” ‘Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.’ ” Spokeo at 1549, quoting Lujan at 580. However, the Court in Spokeo emphasized that the power of Congress is limited by the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III. Id. at 1547-48. Thus, for there to be standing under Article III, there must be a “concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. at 1549. In some circumstances, “the violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient * * * to constitute injury in fact.” Id. However, in the context of the FCRA, a “violation of one of the FCRA‘s procedural requirements may result in no harm.” Id. at 1550.
{¶ 12} Here, appellants rely on the concept of “statutory standing” as the basis for the Court of Claims’ jurisdiction to hear their FCRA claims against OSU. Appellants
{¶ 13} “Statutory standing” in Ohio has been described as the statutory grant of authority to sue. Wooster v. Enviro-Tank Clean, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 13CA0012, 2015-Ohio-1876, ¶ 12. The Supreme Court of Ohio has indicated that, in addition to standing authorized by “common-law,” which requires injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability, “standing may also be conferred by statute.” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. at ¶ 17, citing Middletown v. Ferguson, 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75 (1986); State ex rel. Walgate at ¶ 23; see State ex rel. Mason v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 133 Ohio App.3d 213, 217 (10th Dist.1999) (common-law standing principles were not required because the Ohio General Assembly conferred standing on “any person” seeking to enforce Ohio‘s Sunshine Law under
{¶ 14} Thus, Ohio and federal law have diverged on the issue of whether a party may have standing to sue in the absence of an injury-in-fact. However, even though Ohio
{¶ 15} For these reasons, we find that the trial court correctly found that appellants lacked standing to sue OSU for its alleged violations of FCRA procedural requirements. Accordingly, we overrule their sole assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 16} Having overruled appellants’ sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
TYACK, P.J., and BROWN, J., concur.