196 Pa. 314 | Pa. | 1900
Opinion by
The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company issued its policy to Harry L. Smith on March 26, 1897, promising to pay his executors, administrators or assigns, the sum of $2,000
In his answers made to the medical examiner, the insured stated that he had not, since childhood, had the disease or disorder of “spitting or raising of blood.” The uncontradicted and undisputed evidence was, that the deceased had spit blood about a year before the policy was issued, and the appellee, therefore, contended that there could be no recovery upon it. This view was sustained by the learned trial judge, who directed a verdict for the defendant. The appellant insists that, though the insured had spit blood, the spitting was not a “ disease or disorder of spitting or raising of blood ” as contemplated in the question submitted to him, because he had spit but once, and that the court erred in holding that an untruthful answer had been made. Witnesses called by the plaintiff, as well as by the defendant, testified to the spitting of blood by the deceased in the city of Boston in the fall of 1895 or the spring of 1896, and it will be well to now review their testimony; for, if an examination of it discloses that the answer of the insured to a question material to the risk was not “ true, full and fair,” the verdict directed by the learned trial judge cannot be dis-. turbed. Edgar Wilson, called by the defendant, testified, “ He did have a hemorrhage. • We were going from our place where
The appellant concedes, that if the question propounded to the insured had been “ Have you ever spit blood ? ” the instructions of the court below to the jury would have been correct, but insists that as it was “ Have you had, since childhood, the disease or disorder of spitting or raising of blood ? ” a truthful .answer was made, and error was committed in directing a verdict for the defendant. Turning to the express warranty of the insured, that his answers were to be true, full and fair to the questions asked, this distinction may be pardoned to professional zeal, but is too refined for judicial approval. The answer of Smith, that he had not had, since childhood, the disease or disorder of spitting or raising of blood was not true, but he may have unintentionally so made the false answer. He may have really believed that he had not had disease or disorder, but he did have spitting of blood, and, though it may not have been at the time, a disease with him as popularly understood, it was at least a disorder, which has been defined to be want of order, irregularity, derangement of the animal •economy. If there had been order in his system and no irregularity, there would have been no spitting of blood. It was disorder, if not disease, and, having had either, the answer which he warranted, and may have believed, to be true, was false. By his warranty, he became bound, and his contract with the company was valid or void, as his representations of matters material to the risk were actually true or false. “ No principle of law will enable a party who guarantees a fact upon which a contract for insurance is based, which fact is after-wards found not to exist, to enforce the contract. He agrees to answer for the truth of the fact, and cannot escape on the ground of his mistake as to its existence: ” Com. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Huntzinger, 98 Pa. 41. In Wall v. Royal Soc. of Good Fellows, 179 Pa. 355, the present chief justice said: “ The general doctrine that, in actions on policies of insurance with a warranty of the truth of the facts, the validity of the contract depends on the truth of the warranty, and that the engagement of the policy holder is absolute that the facts shall be as they are stated when his rights under the policy attach, is so
The answers to the questions were not only to be true, but. full and fair. Assuming that the insured may have believed he was answering truthfully when he said he had not had the disease or disorder referred to, it is difficult to -understand how he could have felt that he was answering fully and fairly when he said “ No ” to the question asked ; but, even if he did so feel, he was again bound by his warranty. He had spit blood, was. frightened and had consulted a physician about it. A full and fair answer would have disclosed to the company exactly what, had happened, and if, after such disclosure, it had assumed the= risk, because, in its judgment, the applicant had not had disease- or disorder, it could not defend on the ground of an untruthful answer; but with nothing from the insured except the unqualified answer “ No ” to the question “ Have you had, since childhood, any of the following diseases or disorders: spitting or raising of blood? ” the insurer can justly say that the insured, had not answered fully and fairly. From the answbr, as given,, and relying upon the warranty that it would be full and fair,, the company was justified in believing that the insured intended to say that he had never spit blood. It must have so-understood the answer, for it issued its policy to the insured;, but not having received from him a true, full and fair answer to a question most material to the risk, it cannot be held to a promise to pay which it might not have made if such answer had been given.
The answer to the question framed by the company to elicit information as to the spitting of blood was, as has been uniformly held, material to the risk, and not having been true, full and fair, whether tested by the evidence submitted on behalf of the plaintiff or the defendant, there was nothing for the jury to pass upon: March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629. The law imposed upon the learned trial judge; the duty of telling them what their finding should be, and he. properly discharged it when he directed the verdict that was rendered. The third and fourth assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.