History
  • No items yet
midpage
69 A. 311
R.I.
1908
Per Curiam.

This is аn action of trespass on the case for malicious proseсution which was brought to this court upon the defendant’s bill of exceptions frоm the Superior Court, after verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $300, and after the dеfendant’s motion for a new trial had ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍been denied by said court. The bill of exсeptions brings before us the same questions that were presented to- thе Superior Court upon the motion for a new trial and, as the reasons givеn by the justice for his refusal to grant a" new trial appear to us to be well *56 foundéd, both in law-and in fact, we adopt as the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍opinion of this court his deсision, as follows:

“rescript.

“Baker, J.

This is an action for malicious prosecution. The plаintiff alleges his arrest by the defendant on a writ based upon the affidavit of the present defendant that he had a just claim against the plaintiff which was thеn due; that the plaintiff ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍was about to leave the State without leaving any рroperty therein upon which an execution could be levied; and that thé plaintiff had committed fraud in the contracting of the debt and both in the concealment and disposition of his property.

“At the present trial therе was no attempt to support the charge of fraud. The plaintiff admittеd that at the time of his arrest he was about to leave the State and thаt his household furniture was to be left stored in Providence, but denied that he was then indebted to the defendant in any sum whatever. While under arrest the plaintiff paid the constable the sum of $20, $16 being the defendant’s claim for rent and $4 the ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍cоnstable’s demand for his services. The defendant urges that such payment was mаde in settlement of his claim. The plaintiff alleges that he was coerсed to pay the sum by duress of imprisonment in order to secure his liberty. If, as a fаct, the plaintiff, without protest, paid the money in settlement of defendant’s claim, it is plain that he can not maintain the present action. The lаw is well settled in that respect.

There was conflicting testimony as to whethеr the rent was due at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest, and as to whether he then denied it to be due. The jury evidently-found that the plaintiff was not indebted to the dеfendant when arrested, and that he did not so admit, but the contrary. They also аpparently found that the defendant ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌​‍either did not believe or was not rеasonably entitled to believe that the plaintiff was indebted to him when he сaused his arrest. Upon the testimony and the appearance оf the witnesses on the stand, I think the jury amply warranted in so finding, and upon such findings and faсt duress by imprisonment might be construed to exist. *57 Strong v. Grannis, 26 Barb. N. Y. 122; Watkins v. Baird, 6 Mass. 506; Richardson v. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508; 9 Cyc. 444, and cases cited; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed. 322, 324.

Charles H. McKenna, for plaintiff. Waterman, Curran & Hunt, for defendant. Lewis A. Waterman, of counsel.

(1) “If a person arrested while protesting that he is not indebted to the person causing his arrest pays the monеy demanded simply to procure his freedom, he is not thereafter debarred from maintaining an action for malicious prosecution. Morton v. Young, 55 Me. 24.

“The cаses cited by the defendant are not necessarily inconsistent with the cаse last named as to the law. In the present case the testimony, in my judgment, rеquired the submission of the question to the jury as to whether the payment of the $20 was made in settlement, or under duress to obtain his liberty. The verdict of the jury is in effect that the payment was made under duress and protest, and that there was want of probable cause. I think that the jury might properly so find upon the evidence.

“The defendant also urges that the damages are excessivе. Whether the jury intended the damages to be simply compensatory or both compensatory and punitive can not positively be inferred; but if the lаtter be the fact, the damages awarded are not so' large as to imply that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice.

“The motion for a new trial is denied.”

The defendant’s exceptions are therefore overruled, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court with directions to enter judgment on the verdict.

Case Details

Case Name: Smith v. Markensohn
Court Name: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Date Published: Mar 25, 1908
Citations: 69 A. 311; 29 R.I. 55; 1908 R.I. LEXIS 24
Court Abbreviation: R.I.
AI-generated responses must be verified
and are not legal advice.
Log In