45 F.3d 402 | 11th Cir. | 1995
I.
On October 25, 1989, at the conclusion of her six-year term, the Board of Commissioners of Fulton County, Georgia voted to replace its white female clerk, Alice Smith, with an African-American female, Avarita Hanson.
Count one of Smith’s complaint,
After the parties joined issue and engaged in considerable discovery, the defendants
II.
In their brief, appellants properly concede, for summary judgment purposes, that they voted not to reappoint Smith solely on account of race;
A.
Appellants contend that, because they were engaged in the activity of voting to replace Smith, they are entitled to absolute
Legislative immunity provides protection from suit to government officials when they take actions that are “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which [legislators] participate in ... proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation.” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2627, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972); see also Yeldell v. Cooper Green Hosp., Inc., 956 F.2d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir.1992) (“Only those acts which are ‘necessary to preserve the integrity of the legislative process’ are protected.” (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2540, S3 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972))); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir.1982) (“[T]he absolute immunity inquiry becomes one of whether the Commissioners in the instant ease were engaging in legislative activity.”), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 1431, 75 L.Ed.2d 791 (1983). Typically, legislators’ employment decisions are deemed administrative acts. Yeldell, 956 F.2d at 1062; Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 175 (3d Cir.) (concluding that the commissioners’ vote to fire plaintiff was not a legislative function, but rather a “managerial” function), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242, 104 S.Ct. 3513, 82 L.Ed.2d 822 (1984); cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229,108 S.Ct. 538, 545, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (classifying a judge’s decision to discharge a probation officer as “administrative”). There can be no question that voting on the appointment of a Board clerk is not the sort of broad “legislative” activity that is typically associated with grants of absolute immunity.
Appellants argue, however, that we should not focus on the obviously administrative nature of their decision; rather, they would have us determine that the single act of voting for the person to be appointed clerk rendered their conduct immune from suit. We decline to adopt such a sweeping definition of legislative immunity.
Our cases have recognized that a legislator’s vote constitutes the act of “legislating,” and thus cloaks the legislator with immunity, see, e.g., Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1011 (11th Cir.1992); Espanola Way, 690 F.2d at 829, if the vote is cast for or against the enactment of a law.
[I]t has been held that “[although a local legislator may vote on an issue, that alone does not necessarily determine that he or she was acting in a legislative capacity.” Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560, 580 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054, 105 S.Ct. 2115, 85 L.Ed.2d 480 (1985).
A legislative act involves policymaking rather than mere administrative application of existing policies. Minton v. St. Bernard Parish School Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir.1986) (citing Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 608-09 (5th Cir.1964)).... If the facts utilized in making a decision are specific, rather than general, in nature, then the decision is more likely administrative. Moreover, if the decision impacts specific individuals, rather than the general population, it is more apt to be administrative in nature. See Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir.1984).
Id. at 1485 (second alteration in original). We noted that the plaintiffs complaint “focused on the [commissioners’] decision to uphold the denial of the development permit” and determined that their decision constituted “the application of policy to a specific party”; therefore, the commissioners were not entitled to legislative immunity. Id. at 1485-86.
Likewise, appellants’ decision not to reappoint Smith constituted the application of a county policy, expressed in the Fulton County Code, see swpra note 1, to a specific party. The decision was not general in nature; rather, it was simply a decision regarding whom to hire. In sum, we are obliged to adhere to our precedent and conclude that the appellants’ vote to appoint Hanson to the clerk position was an administrative act and, thus, was not protected by legislative immunity.
B.
The appellants maintain that even if they are not entitled to absolute legislative immunity, their actions were taken in good faith and are protected by qualified immunity. They are protected by such immunity, they contend, because, at the time they cast their allegedly discriminatory votes, it was not clearly established that the Equal Protection Clause forbad them from voting not to employ a person on account of the person’s race. Specifically, appellants argue that: (1) it was not clear that the Equal Protection Clause applied to them because it was not clear whether they were protected from Fourteenth Amendment liability by the doctrine of legislative immunity; and (2) it was not clear whether the personal staff exemption, found in Title VII and the ADEA, rendered them exempt from liability under section 1983 for violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
Qualified immunity enables a public official to avoid liability for an alleged eonsti-
We need not engage in a lengthy discussion of the patently obvious illegality of racial discrimination in public employment at the time the appellants voted to replace Smith. As we stated in Yeldell, “[i]t can hardly be argued that in ... 1989, when the events leading up to this lawsuit [took] place ... intentional race discrimination in the workplace” did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 956 F.2d at 1064 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-48, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)).
For the reasons stated in part II.A. of this opinion, we think it obvious that a reasonable commissioner would have known that his or her vote to replace an employee on account of race was outside the protection of legislative immunity. The applicability of legislative immunity to this situation, however, is of no moment. Appellants cannot breathe new life into their unsuccessful legislative immunity claim by arguing that uncertainty regarding the parameters of legislative immunity rendered the law governing intentional race discrimination unclear. Where applicable, legislative immunity shields a legislator from suit. The grant of legislative immunity is not a declaration that the claimed constitutional right does not exist or that it is not clearly established. Given the clear state of the law prohibiting racial discrimination in public employment at the time the Board voted to replace Smith, no reasonable commissioner, with the information possessed by Lomax and Hightower,
We also reject appellants’ argument that the law was not clearly established because they believed themselves shielded from section 1983 liability by a statutorily created personal staff exemption. The appellants’ argument that, in providing the personal staff exemption contained in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress intended to eliminate section 1983 as a remedy for Equal Protection Clause violations in a setting such as the one before us is patently frivolous.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motion for summary judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. The Code of Laws of Fulton County, Georgia § 1-3-3 states:
The term of the clerk ... shall be for ... six (6) years and the person elected to fill such office shall serve for a term of six (6) years or until his successor is appointed and qualified but said clerk shall be subject to removal at the pleasure of said board.
. The Board consisted of seven commissioners. The vote to replace Smith with an African-American took place at a Board meeting on October 25, 1989. Six members were present. Five voted in favor of the replacement; one abstained.
. In this opinion, we refer to Smith's amended complaint, which is framed in three counts, as her complaint.
. Read literally, counts two and three seek the same relief against Lomax and Hightower in their individual capacities. They could not, however, be considered her employer; Fulton County is her employer. Accordingly, they cannot be held liable under the ADEA or Title VII. See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) ("The relief granted under Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees
. Lomax and Hightower also moved the court for summary judgment on counts two and three of Smith's complaint.
. We have jurisdiction to review the district court’s rejection of Lomax's and Hightower’s claims of legislative and qualified immunity as "an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (permitting immediate appellate review of a grant or denial of qualified immunity by applying the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), and extending the rule in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982) (authorizing immediate appellate review of a grant or denial of legislative immunity)).
In appealing the district court's decision on the immunity issues, appellants contend that the district court should have dismissed Smith's equal protection claim because she did not sue all of the commissioners who voted not to reappoint her. According to appellants, “[i]t does not make sense to allow Smith to potentially sustain a cause of action and obtain damages from only two out of the five commissioners who voted to elect Hanson as clerk.” In other words, appellants and the three other commissioners who voted against Smith and in favor of Hanson should be considered joint constitutional tortfea-sors who cannot be sued separately. The notion that Smith must sue all or none of the tortfeasors has no bearing on the questions before us: whether the district court should have granted appellants legislative or qualified immunity.
. For purposes of summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue, we consider the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Smith. That is, with respect to the conduct that allegedly constitutes appellants’ intent to discriminate against Smith on account of her race, we give Smith the benefit of all inferences that can fairly be drawn from the evidence. Then we ask, on the issue of qualified immunity, whether precedent clearly established that such conduct violated the Equal Protection Clause.
On the legislative immunity issue, the parties' rendition of the material facts do not conflict. The Board voted to replace Smith with an African-American female at its October 25, 1989 meeting; whether that action constituted a legislative decision, as opposed to an administrative (employment) decision, is a pure question of law.
. At least one Board member, Commissioner Lowe, was concerned that the Board's failure to reappoint Smith because of her race might be construed as an act of "reverse discrimination." He therefore put the following question to the County Attorney:
It is my understanding [that in the opinion of the Fulton County Attorney] there is no such thing as reverse discrimination when this Board has an appointment.... This is not like an employee or is it? ... [I]s this a case that might be considered by a court as being reverse discrimination?
After first stating, “You don't want me to answer this,” the County Attorney replied, "I don't know.... [A]t the time you appoint them you can appoint whoever you please, and the criteria that you use is yours to determine.” Shortly thereafter, the Board voted.
. The only case cited by appellants to support their contention that absolute legislative immunity shields a legislator’s vote in the context of an employment decision is Hudgins v. City of Ashburn, 890 F.2d 396 (11th Cir.1989). The Hud-gins court determined that city council members who failed to reappoint the plaintiff, a city clerk, were entitled to qualified immunity because the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that her dismissal deprived her of a clearly established property right. In a footnote, the court opined that "the council members ... more appropriately should have asserted the defense of absolute or legislative immunity since ‘their challenged conduct furthers legislative duties.’" Id. at 406 n. 20 (quoting Baytree of Inverrary Realty Partners v. City of Lauderhill, 873 F.2d 1407, 1409 (11th Cir.1989)). Baytree, the case cited in Hudgins, concerned a city council's vote to deny rezoning of the plaintiff’s property. According to the Bay-tree court, ”[u]nder both federal and Florida law, zoning and land use decision-making ... is normally characterized as a legislative function.” 873 F.2d at 1409. For the reasons we give in the text, we reject as dicta the Hudgins court's suggestion that a legislator's employment decision, even when made by vote, is an exercise of legislative decisionmaking that is entitled to the protection of absolute legislative immunity.
. The Crymes court did suggest, however, that the commissioners’ vote to remove a particular road from the list of available truck routes — a decision from which the plaintiff was specifically excepted — affected the general population, was therefore "legislative in nature,” and would have been protected by legislative immunity had it been challenged by a party affected by the change in available routes. Id.
. The personal staff exemption to Title VII, essentially repeated in the personal staff exemption to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(f), states:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that the term "employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (emphasis added).
. We reject the appellants' suggestion that the Fulton Counly Attorney's opinion, given at the October 25 meeting in response to Commissioner Lowe's inquiry whether a decision not to reappoint Smith could be considered "reverse discrimination,” demonstrates that the Equal Protection Clause's application to the Board's action was not clearly established. The objective Harlow standard cannot be satisfied by pointing to the reluctant, even cryptic, observations the Board-appointed Counly Attorney made in response to Lowe's inquiry. See supra note 8.
. The argument that the personal staff exemption of these two statutes renders them immune from liability under section 1983 for the equal protection claim in this case assumes that they may be held liable under the statutes for the employment decision at issue. The assumption is false because they cannot be considered the “employer” of the Board's clerk within the meaning of those statutes. See supra note 4. But assuming, for sake of discussion that they are the clerk's employer, their argument is, to put it bluntly, preposterous. Stripped to the bare bones, appellants seem to be saying that Congress, in enacting the personal staff exemption, impliedly repealed section 1983 as a remedy for the sort of equal protection violation alleged in this case. Appellants concede the weakness of their argument in their brief, when they state that they "recognize that applying the personal staff exception to § 1983 claims of race discrimi
