13 Barb. 209 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1852
The plaintiffs are journeymen saw-makers in the city of Ncw-York, and have instituted this suit in behalf
The 71st section of the 2d title of the said act, provides that no convict who shall thereafter be sentenced to imprisonment in either of the state prisons, shall be permitted to work therein at any other mechanical trade than that which, as shall appear by the certificate of the clerk of the court in which he was convicted, (and which by the preceding section the clerks' are directed to give,) such convict had learned and practiced previous to his conviction, except in the making or manufacture of articles for which the chief supply for the consumption of the state is imported from other countries or states. The 75th section of the same title enacts that any inspector, agent or warden of either of the state prisons, who shall knowingly let or hire, or consent to the letting or hiring of the labor or services of a convict, contrary to law, and any officer of either prison, who shall knowingly or willfully cause a convict to be employed at work prohibited by law, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall on conviction be punished by fine in a sum not exceeding one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, and by the 76th section it is made the duty of the attorney general, upon complaint and satisfactory inform
If the plaintiffs are entitled to any redress for their alledged grievances, it must be under the provisions of the act. They alledge no invasions of their rights at common law or by virtue of any other statute. The defendants had a right to make and pursue the contract in question, unless they were prohibited by the 71st section of the act. That section prohibits the employment of convicts in any trade different from that mentioned in the certificates of their conviction, who should thereafter be sentenced to imprisonment. There is no allegation in the complaint that the contract between the defendants included, or was designed to include, the labor or employment of any convict sentenced after the passage of the act. There are allegations that the convicts who have been and are employed under the contract did not learn or practice the art before their sentences of imprisonment, that the business has been introduced into the state prison within the last year, that the convicts who are employed under the contract have learned or practiced the art since such contract was made, and that no certificates of the clerks of the different courts, showing that such convicts had learned or practiced such art were delivered to the warden of the prison, and there is a general allegation that the defendants have taught the convicts, and are now employing them in the pursuit of such mechanical trade, contrary to the statute. The facts specifically alledged may all be true, and yet the defendants not have violated any of the provisions of the statute. The averment that they have acted contrary to the act, without setting forth in what manner, is not sufficient to entitle the plaintiffs to any.relief or redress. The court must see by the facts set forth-in the complaint, that the plaintiffs have sustained or are threatened with some legal injury. The objection is fatal to the complaint as it now stands.
But as, if that was the only difficulty in the plaintiffs’ way, they would no doubt amend their complaint on terms, it is proper
The provisions of the act to which I have referred are purely of a public character. They were designed to promote the interests of the state by securing a most meritorious class of our fellow citizens from injurious competition. Public statutes may undoubtedly have reference to individual rights or interests. They frequently grant additional security for the enjoyment of pre-existing rights, or confer new ones, or the power of obtaining them. Where the design is to give additional protection to a subsisting right, and a remedy is provided for its invasion, which is not necessarily exclusive of all others, it is considered as merely cumulative, and the party injured may resort to that, or to the means previously allowed, for redress. But where a new right, or the means of acquiring it, is conferred, and an adequate remedy for its invasion is given by the same statute, parties injured are confined to the statutory redress. When no remedy is given by the statute, in such cases, the party injured may resort to the means of redress given by the common law or any general statute in similar cases. % \3iwr $03
The statute in question is entirely prohibitory, and does not confer any individual rights. It is designed for the public good, and any infraction of it is a wrong to the public, for which the people in their collective capacity alone are entitled to redress. It is a principle of law, however, that where any one in the perpetration of a public wrong commits an injury upon another, peculiar to the injured party, in his individual capacity, and not simply as a member of the community, the party injured may sustain an action in his individual capacity for the damages which he may have sustained. This was always the rule in cases of misdemeanor, but it did not at common law extend to felonies, as the private wrong was merged in the felony. But by a provision of our new code, (§ 7,) when the violation of a right admits of both a civil and a criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other. Where the act complained of is purely a statutory wrong of a public character, a party aggrieved can only maintain an action where he sus
In the case under consideration, the plaintiffs do not complain of any special damage peculiar to themselves as individuals. The alledged injury consists in “ lowering the wages and seriously affecting the interests of the plaintiffs and others pursuing the trade of saw-malcers in the state.” True, the damage is more serious to the class to which the plaintiffs belong than to the rest of the community; but so long as it affects the whole class, it is general and not special to the plaintiffs. Individuals cannot sustain an action under such circumstances. In Lansing v. Smith and others, (8 Cowen, 146,) an action was brought against the commissioners under the statute for erecting the Albany basin, -for illegally constructing a bridge over a part of the Hudson river at Albany, by means of which the plaintiff was deprived of the profitable use of his dock, which was situated above the bridge. It appeared that the damage of which the plaintiff complained was common to himself and all the other proprietors of docks similarly situated. Judge Sutherland, in giving the opinion of the court, said, “ it must be conceded that there is nothing in the plaintiff’s case to distinguish it from that of every other owner of a wharf in the basin, and all the proprietors of docks above the temporary bridge have sustained an equal [he probably meant a similar] injury with the plaintiff in consequence of this erection. The injury, therefore, for which the plaintiff seeks remuneration is not peculiar to himself. It has been equally felt by a hundred others whose property is similarly situated.” In another part of his opinion he says, “ the legal character of a nuisance is not changed from public to private because its operation is more injurious to a particular individual, or class of individuals, than to the community at large.” In Butler v. Kent and others, (19 John. 223,) a suit was instituted by a vender of lottery tickets for damages sustained by him in the depreciation of such tickets by
It has been supposed, however (and I see that the supposition has received the sanction of one of my brethren for whom I entertain the highest respect,) that the allegations in the complaint would, if proved, present a proper case for the interposition of this court by way of injunction. Injunctions are never granted to prevent the perpetration or continuance of a public wrong (not leading to the special injury of individuals) unless it constitutes a nuisance imminently dangerous to the public or some considerable portion of it. In The Attorney General v. The Utica Insurance Company, (2 John. Ch. Rep. 378,) Chancellor Kent decided that a court of equity had no jurisdiction of an offense against a public statuté. He said very truly that the powers of injunction should be applied with the utmost caution. It is the strong arm of the court, and to render its operation benign and useful, it must be exercised with great caution, and when necessity requires it. It is an extremely rare casé, and may be considered if it ever happened, as an anomaly for a court of equity to interfere at all, and much less preliminarily by injunction to put down a public nuisance which did not violate the private rights of property, but only contravened the general policy. In The Mayor of Hudson v. Thorne, (7 Paige, 261,) Chancellor Walworth said that a court of equity does not interfere to enforce the penal laws of the state, by injunction, unless the act sought to be restrained is a nuisance. Besides, when
S. B. Strong, Justice.]
Limits to the powers of injunction have been prescribed by the wise and good men'who have presided in the courts of equity in this state and in the mother country, and I am not inclined to go beyond them. -
The complaint in this case does not in my opinion set forth enough to entitle the plaintiffs to damages for the alledged unlawful conduct of the defendants, or to an injunction to prevent its continuance. Consequently there must be judgment for the defendants on the demurrers severally interposed by them.