*82 MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plаintiffs Leola Smith and Dion ‘Franklin have sued the District of Columbia and various Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officers, 1 seeking to recover damages based on alleged constitutional violations and common law torts arising from the search of Smith’s home and Franklin’s apartment, at 1812 9th Street, NW, in Washington, D.C. Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all claims (Defs.’ Mem. of Supp. P. & A., Jan. 30, 2011 [“Defs.’ Mot.”]). For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
I. FACTS
A. The Property
At all times relevant to this case, Smith and Franklin lived at 1812 9th Street, NW (the “Property”). (Defs.’ Statement of Uncontested Material Facts [“SOMF”] ¶¶ 4-5.) Franklin rented an apartment from Smith, who owned the Property. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 14, Smith’s Resps. To Defs.’ Interrogs. [“Smith Resps.”], at 3.) The Property is a three-story, red brick building on the corner of 9th Street and Westminster Street. (Pis.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. [“Pis.’ Opp’n”], Ex. 13, Photоs of the Property [“Photos”], at 1.) Three gas meters are in the backyard of the Property, behind a fence. (Pis.’ Opp’n, Ex. 8, Dep. of Leola Smith [“Smith Dep.”], at 145.) At the time of the search, there were three occupied apartments in the building. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 2.) Smith’s apartment occupied the first floor of the Property and the floors above; the other two apartments were in the basement. (Smith Dep. at 131; Pis.’ Opp’n, Ex. 3, Dep. of Officer Thomas Ellingsworth [“Ellingsworth Dep.”], at 106.)
The basement apartments — one occupied by Franklin, the other by a pair of Russian students — were separated from the street by a gate with a bolt lock. (Smith Resps. at 3.) Behind the gate was a short hall that ended with doors to the left and right. (Pis.’ Opp’n, Ex. 7, Dep. of Dion Franklin [“Franklin Dep.”], at 76.) The doors both had locks. (Smith Resps. At 3.) According to Franklin, his door was painted with a “2,” indicating his apartment number. (Franklin Dep. at 81.) The fagade of the building did not list separate addresses for each apartment and the apartments did not have separate doorbells. (SOMF ¶¶7, 9.) Whether Franklin’s apartment had a separate mailbox is disputed, but plaintiffs assert that he had a “separate mailbox outside his apartment door accessible to the letter carrier.” (Compare Pis.’ Statement of Genuine Issues of Material Fact ¶ 2.G with SOMF ¶ 7.) According to Franklin, his apartment had a “totally different kitchen, bathroom, bedroom, living room than upstairs.” (Franklin Dep. at 114.)
B. The Warrant
On July 13, 2007, Officer Thomas Ellingsworth, a six-year veteran of the MPD, submitted an affidavit to a D.C. Superior Court judge as part of an application for a warrant to search the Property. (Defs.’ Mot., Ex. E, Search Warrant [“Search Warrant”], at 2.) The affidavit described the Property as a “reddish brick single family house with the numerals ’1812’ post *83 ed at the left of the front door in white on a dark background.” (Id.)
According to Ellingsworth’s affidavit, an MPD Confidential Informant (“Cl”) contacted him and told him that individuals were selling crack cocaine from within the house. (Id.) Ellingsworth traveled with the Cl to the house and watched “it” enter from an unmarked vehicle that was parked within eyesight of the front door and the entire house. (Ellingsworth Dep., at 31, 44.) According to Ellingsworth, once the Cl was “inside the building” (and presumably out of view), “it” knocked on the “house door.” (Search Warrant, at 2.) The Cl entered Smith’s apartment; Ellingsworth described the first floor entrance as a “wrought-iron gate” at the top of a stairway with a set of brown, “French-style” doors behind it. (Ellingsworth Dep., at 35.) After returning to the car, the Cl told Ellingsworth that an unknown person let “it” enter the Property and sold “it” crack cocaine. (Search Warrant, at 2.) Ellingsworth testified that after finishing his conversation with the Cl, he took another drive by the house “to get a good look at it” before returning to the office to type up his affidavit. (Ellingsworth Dep. at 66-67.) Ellingsworth testified that he only saw the gate and French-style doors at the top of the staircase and did not see any other door into the house. (Id.)
Ellingsworth testified that as part of the review of his affidavit, he had a paralegal in the U.S. Attorney’s Office check the records on the property. (Id. at 78 (“you go to a paralegal. She does a records check ...”).) The paralegal determined that a search warrant had been executed at the property and informed Ellingsworth of this fact. (Id.) A review of the warrant, which was issued in 1995, reveals the target of the search as 1812 9th St., NW, apartment number two. (Pis.’ Opp’n, Ex. 9, History of Search Warrants Issued.) It is unclear whether Ellingsworth personally examined this file, or if he was even told of the reference to “apartment number two.”
On July 13, Judge Robert Tignor approved the warrant for a search of the Property. (SOMF ¶ 2.)
C. The Search
On July 14, Sergeants Petz and Moye and Officers Ellingsworth, Pepperman, Yammine, Harris, and Baker arrived at the Property to conduct the search. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 2.) Smith was not in her apartment at the time, although her nephew, Robert Jones, was present. (Smith Resps. at 2.) Franklin was in his basement apartment. (Id.)
At about 6:55 p.m., the officers broke down the doors to Smith’s first floor apartment, breaking the locks and splitting the doors. (Smith Resps. ¶ 5.) Smith testified that during their search of her apartment, they crushed her antique vases, figurines and jewelry and destroyed approximately twenty-five pairs of shoes. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 32-34.) The officers then “went back outside and destroyed the door jambs and locks” of the basement apartments. (Am. Compl. ¶ 40. See also Franklin Dep. at 81.) It is unclear how long the officers were in Franklin’s apartment, although Franklin estimated that they stayed “about two hours” from 6:45 to 8:45. 2 (Franklin Dep. at 115.) According to Franklin, the police cut open his mattress, damaged his clothes, and scratched his watches. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 35-36.) Franklin also testified that the officers asked him “why your apartment ” so messy and *84 whether he knew “anything about any drug activity upstairs.” (Franklin Dep. at 113 (emphasis added).) He responded that he “live[d] down here” and “don’t know what goes on upstairs,” and was only upstairs “when I’m paying my rent or so on.” (Id.) The officers did not find cocaine or narcotic paraphernalia anywhere in the house, although they recovered two boxes of .45 caliber ammunition. 3 (SOMF ¶ 6.)
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 9, 2008, Smith filed a complaint against the District of Columbia, Cathy Lanier and the named officers. The District and Lanier filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court denied.
Smith v. Lanier,
Smith then filed an amended complaint that added Franklin as a plaintiff and included allegations that Officer Ellingsworth had either lied or acted with reckless disregard to the truth in preparing his affidavit. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-76.) The amended complaint included eight causes of action. Counts I — III allege that the named officers violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by executing a warrant based on a facially deficient affidavit (Count I), by executing a warrant that was facially deficient (Count II), and by conducting an unreasonable search (Count III). Count IV alleges a civil conspiracy on the part of the officers to violate § 1983. Count V alleges that the officers committed “intentional tortious destruction of property” during then' search. Count VI alleges negligence against the officers. Count VII alleges that the District was liable for the claims under respondeat superior; Count VIII alleges that Lanier and the District were liable for negligently training and supervising the officers.
Defendants filed a new motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which the Court denied in part, declining to dismiss plaintiffs’ intentional tort and negligence claims and holding that further factual development was necessary to resolve the constitutional and conspiracy claims. (Dkt. No. 35.) The Court did, however, dismiss Count VII in its entirety and Count VIII as to Lanier. (Id.) Discovery closed on January 15, 2011, and defendants now move for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits filed pursuant to discovery show that, first, ‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and, second, ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ”
Pardo-Kronemann v. Donovan,
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
The individually-named police officers will not be liable for damages if they are entitled to qualified immunity, which shields “government officials performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
Although the issue of whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is “a pure question of law tо be decided by the Court,” pretrial “resolution of the qualified immunity defense ... may be thwarted by a factual dispute.”
Halcomb v. WMATA,
ANALYSIS
I. CLAIMS UNDER § 1983
A. Count I — Unconstitutionally Insufficient Affidavit
Defendants argue that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I because the Court has already held that
*86
Ellingsworth’s affidavit is sufficiently detailed to support the search warrant (Defs.’ Mot. at 6) and, therefore, the law of the case doctrine applies. (Defs.’ Reply at 7-8.) This Court has indeed held that “probable cause existed to justify the search” and that the affidavit was sufficient to “render the officers’ belief in its validity” reasonable.
Smith,
However, the only “evidence” plaintiffs have introduced to support this claim is based on speculation аnd innuendo. They have submitted no affirmative evidence that Ellingsworth concocted a fake informant, but have argued only that the absence of police records relating to the informant creates a genuine question as to whether the informant ever existed. 5 (Pis.’ Opp’n at 7-10.) Plaintiffs have provided no case law suggesting that missing police records alone are sufficient to transform the existence of a Cl into a genuine question of fact. Because plaintiffs have provided only unsupported allegations for this claim, there is no issue of material fact as to the plausibility of the affidavit. Therefore, the warrant is supported by probable cause, and defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count I will be granted.
B. Count II — Facially Deficient Search Warrant
Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment on Count II because plaintiffs have “failed to establish” that the officers violated an actual constitutional right when they executed the warrant. (Defs.’ Mot. at 5.) However, as plaintiffs note (Pis.’ Opp’n at 10), the “general rule” is that a warrant that authorizes the search of a multi-unit dwelling without noting the “precise unit” to be searched is invalid.
United States v. Per
*87
ez,
Defendants next argue that the Officer Ellingsworth reasonably believed that the Property was a single family home, and therefore the warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
7
(Defs.’ Mot. at 10-11.) A search warrant for a multi-unit dwelling that fails to note the precise unit to be searched will be valid if the officer “reasonably believed that the premises had only a single unit.”
Perez,
Defendants argue that Ellingsworth observed the exterior of the property prior to preparing his affidavit and, based on these observations, he could reasonably believe it was a single family dwelling. (Defs.’ Mot. at 9.) Plaintiffs argue that he should have done more than observe the exterior of the Property, such as cheсking utility records.
(Id.
at 17.) The Seventh Circuit has held that surveillance of a property, combined with observations of a controlled buy by a Cl and an interview of the Cl, constitute a reasonable inquiry.
See United States v. White,
Plaintiffs also argue that Ellingsworth either knew or should have known that the Property was a multi-unit structure because the U.S. Attorney’s office had files stating that the police had executed a search warrant on “Apartment 2” on the Property in 1995. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 16.) There is no speсific “checklist that must be adhered to in all investigations;” rather, the “reasonableness of law enforcement’s total inquiry is at issue” here.
United
*88
States v. Fennell,
C. Count III — Unreasonable Search
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count III presents two separate issues: whether the officers should have realized that the dwelling was not a single family unit at some point before or during their search and, if so, whether the officers appropriately limited their search in light of this realization. “That the warrant be properly issued ... is only half of what the Fourth Amendment requires.”
Guzman v. City of Chicago,
Plaintiffs argue that the police should have realized that the warrant was invalid before they even began their search. They suggest that the officers should have known that the Property was a multi-unit building because there were three gas meters in the backyard
(id.
at 21), and because the house had two mailboxes and two separate entrances.
(Id.
at 22.) “Indicia of a separate residence include separate entrances, separate doorbells, separate house numbers, name plates, and mail boxes.”
Fennell,
496
*89
F.Supp.2d at 281.
See also Birthwright v. City of New York,
No. 01-Civ-3940,
Plaintiffs also argue that the police officers should have known that the Property was a multi-unit dwelling because they were familiar with the location. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 19.) However, simple familiarity with or prior visits to a building do not necessarily put an officer on notice that the building is a multi-unit dwelling.
See Mena v. City of Simi Valley,
The Court thus finds that there is insufficient evidence that the police knew or should have known that the warrant was unconstitutionally broad before or during their search of Smith’s apartment. “The officers’ conduct and the limits of the search [are] based on the information available as the search proceed[s].”
Garrison,
Franklin’s claim, however, survives. Even if the officers reasonably believed that the warrant was valid when they began the search and during thеir search of Smith’s apartment, they were required to stop searching “as soon as” they were “on notice” of the risk that they might be in a unit “erroneously included within the terms of the warrant.”
Garrison,
There is also an issue оf material fact as to whether the police should have realized that their warrant was overbroad when they encountered locked and numbered doors in the basement hallway.
10
See Jacobs v. City of Chicago,
Because Franklin has shown genuine issues of material fact, it will be “for the trier of fact to determine, based on the credibility of the evidence before it, at what point the officers knew or reasonably should have known” that the search warrant was overbroad, and “to determine what searches and seizures occurred after that.”
Pray,
II. CONSPIRACY (COUNT IY)
Defendants argue that Smith and Franklin have failed to sufficiently support their conspiracy claim with facts.
12
(Defs.’ Mot. at 14.) To survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs need not “produce a ‘smoking gun’ to establish the ‘understanding’ or ‘willful participation’ required to show a conspiracy,” but they must at least “show some evidence of agrеement between the defendants” to violate their rights.
Rowe v. City of Ft. Lauderdale,
III. “INTENTIONAL TORTIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY” 14 (COUNT V)
Plaintiffs argue that the police offiсers are liable for “intentional tortious destruction of property” based on the damage to their apartments that occurred during the execution of the search warrant. 15 Defendants move for summary judgment because plaintiffs have failed to submit “documentary evidence” that there was actual damage to the antiques and other articles of property discussed in the Complaint, or, alternatively, because plaintiffs have failed to submit expert testimony to prove that defendants improperly executed the warrant. (Defs.’ Mot. at 15.)
Plaintiffs have introduced extensive testimony to support their claim that their property was destroyed. (Smith Resps. at 2-3; Smith Dep. at 327, 375; Franklin Dep. at 81, 116.) Moreover, plaintiffs have introduced photographic evidence of the Property in the aftermath оf the search. (Pis.’ Opp’n, Ex. 13, at 8-10.) Plaintiffs have therefore submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of damage.
Plaintiffs further argue that expert testimony is unnecessary and that a jury should decide whether the officers acted reasonably. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 36.) “Officers executing a search warrant may damage property if it is reasonable under the circumstances to do so.”
Youngbey,
IV. NEGLIGENCE (COUNT VI)
Defendants move for summary judgment on Count VI because plaintiffs have produced no expert testimony to support their claim that the police officers negligently prepared the affidavit and conducted the search. (Defs.’ Mot. at 16-17.). To show negligence, plaintiffs must show an “applicable standard of care,” a “deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiffs injury.”
Scales v. District of Columbia,
V. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY (COUNT VIII)
Plaintiffs fail to respond to the District of Columbia’s argument that it cannot be liable for negligent training and supervision resulting in a Fourth Amendment violation because plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of a policy or custom resulting in the constitutional violation. “It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”
Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of Global Ministries,
*94 VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Defendants finally argue that plaintiffs have failed to plead or demonstrate the “evil motive” or malice required to justify an award of punitive damages against the police officers under Count V. (Defs.’ Mot. at 20.) Under District of Columbia law, “punitive damages are warranted only when the defendant commits a tortious act accompanied with fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful disregard of the plaintiffs rights, or other circumstances tending to aggravate the injury.”
19
Pitt v. District of Columbia,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 92) is granted in part and denied in part. The Court grants defendants’ motion as to plaintiffs’ claims under Counts I, II, IV, VI, and VIII. The Court denies defendants’ motion as to plaintiffs’ claims under Count V and as to plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages. The Court will grant defendants’ motion as to Smith’s claim under Count III, but will deny defendants’ motion as to Franklin’s claim under Count III. The District will be dismissed with prejudice. An Order consistent with this *95 Memorandum Opinion is also being issued this date.
Notes
. Plaintiffs initially sued Cathy Lanier, the MPD Chief of Police, but all claims against her have been withdrawn or dismissed.
. The Complaint alleges that the officers searched Smith's apartment before Franklin’s. (Am. Compl. ¶ 40)
. It is unclear in which apartment the police found the ammunition.
. Defendants have not argued that the constitutional right at issue is not clearly established. Nor could they, because “[a] reasonable officer would know that such warrantless searches and seizures would violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights.”
Pray v. City of Sandusky,
. Although defendants concede that the working file and unit file relating to the Cl are missing, they have produced documentation showing that a Cl performed a controlled drug buy at the Property, including documents demonstrating that Officer Yammine obtained funds for use in a controlled buy around this time and that a white rock substance was obtained by the Cl as a result of the controlled buy.
(See
Dist. of Columbia’s Notice of Filing Decls.
Ex Parte
and Under Seal [Dkt. No. 83] at 1; Defs.’ Reply at 8.) The identity of a Cl is generally privileged.
Washington
v.
District of Columbia,
. The Court has already determined that there was constitutionally sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
Smith, 573
F.Supp.2d at 10. However, the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment
also
requires that a warrant “particularly describe 'the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ ”
United States v. Ritter,
. Defendants also argue that the officers did not "knowingly” violate the law and therefore cannot be liable. (Defs.' Reply in Further Supp. of Summ. J. Mot. [“Defs.’ Reply”] at 2.) However, as they themselves concede in their Opposition, the standard is whether the officers reasonably believed the warrant was valid.
. As defendants note, plaintiffs incorrectly claim in their Opposition that Ellingsworth testified he saw the file. (Defs.' Reply at 3.) Although defendants admit that he "communicated” with the paralegal at the U.S. Attorney's office (id.), there is no evidence that he ever saw the file or knew anything more than that a search had previously been conducted on the Property.
. Even if the officers had noticed or reasonably should have noticed the meters, this fact “standing alone,” would probably not be "sufficient for Fourth Amendmеnt purposes to apprise them that the house contained separate dwelling units.”
United States v. Clark,
No. 10-62-P-S,
. Defendants again argue that plaintiffs must show that the officers knew that the house was a multi-unit dwelling and, therefore, "knowingly” violated the law. However, as noted, the question is whether the officers knew
or should have known
that the warrant was inaccurate.
See Ritter,
. In
Jacobs,
police executed a warrant as to the entire building.
Jacobs,
. Because plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to support a conspiracy claim, the Court need not consider the applicability of the “intracorporate conspiracy” doctrine. (Defs.’ Mot. at 13.)
. Plaintiffs’ opposition also refers to a supposed conspiracy to “cover up” Ellingsworth's alleged fraudulent confidential informant after the search. (Pis.’ Opp’n at 2-3.) However, their Complaint refers only to a conspiracy to execute the search warrant and enter the Property. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 106-110.) Even if plaintiffs had properly alleged this in their complaint, they have also failed to provide any evidence supporting the conspiracy's existence. Moreover, as discussed in Part I.A, supra, the Court has satisfied itself as to the existence and identity of the confidential informant. (Defs.' Reply at 8.)
. So far as the Court can determine, this claim appears to fall into the category of a claim for damage to real property and personal property. Under D.C. law, damage to the realty (including damage to doors and locks) constitutes a trespass, and the damage to personal property constitutes a trespass to chattels and conversion.
See Youngbey v. District of Columbia,
09-CV-596,
.Defendants suggest that plaintiffs' common-law claim for intentional destruction of property is a constitutional claim. (Defs.’ Mot. at 14.) However, plaintiffs have never suggested that their claim for destruction of property is linked to their Fourth Amendment claims. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 111-116; Pis.’Opp'n at 31-36.) Count V appears to only allege an intentional common law tort against the officers who conducted the search.
.D.C. precedent supports
Youngbey.
In D.C., expert testimony is not required to prove a claim of assault and battery arising out of an arrest. A police officer has a "qualified privilege to use reasonable force to effect an arrest, provided that the means employed are not in excess of those which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary.”
Evans-Reid v. District of Columbia,
. While plaintiffs do not need to offer expert testimony, they will have to introduce testimony and documentary evidence at trial "pertinent to the reasonableness of police” action in searching the Property, as well as "applicable standards governing” execution of search warrants.
Smith,
. As a result, defendants have no outstanding claims against the District of Columbia. The Court therefore finds it unnecessary to *94 consider defendants' arguments that Franklin failed to satisfy the notice provision of D.C.Code § 12-309 or their arguments that punitive damages against the District are unavailable.
. Defendants have only cited the punitive damages standard under District law, and have not cited any case law or made any specific arguments against an award of punitive damages under § 1983. Even if they had, their argument would fail because the issue cannot be resolved here. Punitive damages against individuals in a § 1983 action are available if their conduct is “shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.”
Smith v. Wade,