Smith v. Johnson-Battle (In re Johnson-Battle)Smith v. Johnson-Battle (In re Johnson-Battle)
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the Opinion of the Court following the August 29, 2018 trial on the remaining count of the amended adversary complaint (the "Complaint") filed by Jimmy Smith, plaintiff pro se (the "Plaintiff"). The Complaint seeks to except from discharge under
The Plaintiff and Debtor entered into the Stipulation following a dispute between Plaintiff as landlord and Debtor as tenant. In the Stipulation, the parties compromised Debtor's alleged obligation to the Plaintiff from $ 11,289 to $ 6,000 and agreed that the Debtor would pay $ 500 per month for twelve months, with
The issue for this Court is whether Debtor induced the Plaintiff to enter into the Stipulаtion based on representations and omissions as to her marital status and her husband's financial contributions so that the debt should be excepted from discharge under
II. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under
III. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS/FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The State Court Landlord Tenant Proceedings
The landlord-tenant history and related litigation history between and among Plaintiff, Debtor and Debtor's non-debtor, sometimes-estranged spouse, Marvin Battle, [Sr.] ("Mr. Battle"), is convoluted and somewhat obscure. The Plaintiff provided a copy of the parties' lease (the "Lease") as an exhibit to his response to Debtor's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but the Lease was not entered into evidence at trial.
Plaintiff commenced the collection action/landlord-tenant action that gave rise to the underlying debt in or about 2007 based on the failure to pay three months' rent and alleged damage to the premises.
On April 13, 2015, the Plaintiff, represented by counsel, and Debtor only (not Mr. Battle), appearing pro se, entered a Stipulation that settled the State Court Action. Both parties indicated that a mediator assisted Plaintiff and Debtor with the settlement.
On September 21, 2015, Debtor advised the Plaintiff (and his wife) in writing that she had missed the August 16, 2015 payment because:
I did not have the money because of my unemployment status over the summer (I only work ten months a year).13
Debtor's September 21, 2015 letter indicates that she tried to contact Plaintiff earlier ("I sent out a letter to inform you of this prior to the check due date, unfortunately I now know that you did not receive it").
After Debtor's default, Plaintiff pursued collection in the State Court Action in August and in September 2015 obtained a judgment and sought to garnish her wages.
I, Linda Battle, request a hearing on the wage application in the above matter because,
I was unable to make a payment due to being unemployed. I have since returned to work and have already mailed a payment to the defendant. (Please see attached letter ).18
It is not clear what occurred in the State Court Action between Debtor's September 24, 2015 "Request for Wage Application Hearing" and the March 29, 2016 petition date, although Plaintiff acknowledged three payments of $ 500 pursuant to the Stipulation (prior to the default in August 2015) and then garnishments totaling $ 1,700.77, resulting in a total credit of $ 3,200.77.
B. The Bankruptcy Case and this Adversary Proceeding
Debtor filed the instant, voluntary, no-asset Chapter 7 case on March 29, 2016. Debtor scheduled the Plaintiff as a general unsecured creditor on Schedule E/F for $ 9,788 out of $ 25,324 in general unsecured debt. On Schedule I, Debtor stated that she had been employed as a teacher by the Irvington Board of Education, Irvington, New Jersey for six years. Debtor scheduled a wage garnishment of $ 754 but did not identify the garnisher. The Debtor identified her residence as 84 North 19th Street, East Orange, New Jersey 07017 (the "Property") and scheduled her interest in this Property as "Joint tenant," even though she also inconsistently stated that she is the sole owner.
The Chapter 7 Trustee, Barbara A. Edwards, Esq. (the "Chapter 7 Trustee"), issued a Report of No Distribution on July 28, 2016 and also abandoned Debtor's one-half interest in the Property.
The Plaintiff was active in the bankruptcy case. He attended the April 28, 2016 meeting of creditors conducted by the Chapter 7 Trustеe and asked the Debtor:
PLAINTIFF: Do you know where [Mr. Battle] lives?
DEBTOR: No. I don't have his address, no, but he doesn't live with me anymore.
PLAINTIFF: Do you know where he works?
DEBTOR: No. He changed jobs since we separated so I don't know.
PLAINTIFF: What was his previous job?
DEBTOR: I think it was Kearny Tire Company.
...
PLAINTIFF: Was he a truck driver at one point?
DEBTOR: Yes.
PLAINTIFF: And what was the name of that company?
DEBTOR: That's the company, Kearny Truck Driving. It's a tire company but he drove the trucks.25
Plaintiff also obtained an Order on July 26, 2016 compelling Debtor to answer discovery; an Order on August 15, 2016 to attend a Rule 2004 deposition; and an Order on October 13, 2016 extending time to file the Complaint.
Plaintiff timely filed the Complaint on September 19, 2016 during the pendency of his motion to extend time.
C. The State Court Landlord/Tenant Proceedings as to Mr. Battle
During Debtor's bankruptcy case, the Plaintiff separately sought a wage garnishment against Mr. Battle. On September 26, 2016, the State Court held a hearing on Mr. Battle's objеction to wage garnishment. Plaintiff appeared by telephone.
At Mr. Battle's September 26, 2016 wage garnishment hearing, Mr. Battle was questioned extensively by the State Court as to various matters, including the status of his marriage (Mr. Battle said Debtor and he were separated since 2014 or 2015) and the level of contact he maintained with the Debtor.
THE COURT: If you're separated, why are you using a joint checking?
MR. BATTLE: Because I still pay the mortgage where I live at. Me and her have an agreement -- we have an agreemеnt. I'm not -- so we don't have any type of issues that we have to go to court, we have --
THE COURT: Oh, no, but you have a joint checking account.
MR. BATTLE: Yes, -- Yes , Judge. Because we --
THE COURT: Why?
MR. BATTLE: Yes, Judge. We do. The reason why he have a joint -- because we still have an --
THE COURT: She filed bankruptcy? You guys are still living together under the same roof. Aren't you?
MR. BATTLE: No. We're not living the same -- no. We're not. No. We're notliving together. 38
Mr. Battle also testified on September 26, 2016 that he lived at 9 Kenmore (no city given) and that Debtor lived at 84 North 19th Street,
That [84 North 19th Street] is my mailing address. 84 North 19th Street is still my home. I use that as my primary mailing address. My license and everything is still to 84 North 19th Street because that's my primary mailing address.43
Mr. Battle then testified that Debtor and he separated "about three years ago" but filed no legal separation.
D. The August 29, 2018 Trial
The Court conducted a one-day trial on Plaintiff's
(i) whether Debtor made any fraudulent misrepresentations to Plaintiff while negotiating their April 13, 2015 Stipulation of Settlement withthe intent that Plaintiff rely on them; and
(ii) whether Plaintiff justifiably relied on these аllegedly fraudulent misrepresentations when he reduced Debtor's debt in the April 13, 2015 Stipulation of Settlement.
These misrepresentations were expected to involve:
(i) whether Debtor was a single parent separated from her husband and in a one-income household; and
(ii) whether Debtor was unemployed at the time of the Stipulation.
1. Debtor's Employment Status
At the beginning of trial, Plaintiff questioned the Debtor about her marital and employment status and whether she stated that she was unemployed at the time of the settlement negotiations on April 13, 2015, as described in the following testimony:
PLAINTIFF: Do you remember saying that you was separated from your husband?
DEBTOR: Yes, I do.
PLAINTIFF: Unemployed?
DEBTOR: That I was unemployed?
PLAINTIFF: Yes.
DEBTOR: I've never been unemployed, sir.
PLAINTIFF: You never said you were unemployed?
DEBTOR: No.47
At this point, Plaintiff provided Debtor with a copy of her "Request for Wage Application Hearing" dated September 24, 2015 and admitted into evidence as P-3. In that application, Ms. Johnson-Battle represents to the State Court that she was unable to make a settlement payment [in August 2015] "due to being unemployed." Thus, the Debtor's trial testimony that she never said she was unemployed was directly contradicted by her statement to the State Court.
While being examined by her counsel, Ms. Johnson-Battle attempted to explain this inconsistency by testifying that as a teacher, she has a ten-month employment period and is off or "unemployed" during the summer. She also testified that she normally had temporary employment in the summer months, but that the funding for her temporary job ran out in August 2015 and she was unemployed for that month. The Court understands the explanation but notes that being a full-time teacher is not the same as being unemployed, whether the pay period is ten months or twelve months. Further, Ms. Johnson-Battle's testimony while being examined by Mr. Smith was unequivocal - "I've never been unemployed, sir" - but her statement in the application to the State Court was directly to the contrary, and her explanatory testimony in this Court was less than satisfactory or compelling.
In sum, the Debtor's statement to the State Court that she was "unemployed" was at least incomplete and misleading, as she was employed as a full-time teacher then, as she is now. Thus, this testimony raises additional credibility issues for the Court.
Putting credibility issues aside for the moment, later testimony as to the timing of her representation about "unemployment" by both Plaintiff and Defendant made clear that this statement was made to the State Court (and Plaintiff) after the Stipulation was entered into and therefore could not have been relied upon by Mr. Smith in entering into the Stipulation. In this regard, upon questioning from the
THE COURT: [O]ne question that I ... wanted to ask Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith, at the time that you entered into this stipulation of settlement what were the -- I know you talked about certain representations that you say were made by [Debtor], can you just summarize them for me again?
PLAINTIFF: Well, [Debtor] said she was living in a household with one income. [The Plaintiff digresses].... Because she was -- only had one income coming in and because I wanted to give her a break and get some of my money, I decided to enter into the consent agreement.
THE COURT: So, the point about being unemployed came up after that meeting?
PLAINTIFF: That came up after.48
The Court notes that Plaintiff's early testimony at the August 29, 2018 trial appeared to be as to Plaintiff's understanding of Debtor's employment at the time of the settlement negotiations on April 13, 2015, but was inconclusive. Plaintiff's subsequent testimony that the Debtor's statement of her "unemployed" status was made "after" the settlement clears up that issue and is consistent with the timing of the default (August 2015) and $ 500 check date (September 10, 2015), which were both after the April 13, 2015 settlement. Thus, Plaintiff did not and could not have relied on any representation by Debtor that she was unemployed in the summer of 2015 when he entered into the April 13, 2015 Stipulation. Accordingly, that representation cannot form the basis of Plaintiff's nondischargeability claim.
2. Debtor's Marital Status and Sources of Income
What remains is the asserted representations and omissions by the Debtor conсerning her marital status and sources of income. Debtor initially testified that she told Plaintiff during the settlement negotiations that she was separated from her husband.
Debtor further testified that Mr. Battle and she first separated in November 2011 and that "it has been on and off ever since. He's there, he's not there but it officially started November 2011."
As to sources of income, the Debtor also testified that Mr. Battle gives her money as needed and in varying amounts:
PLAINTIFF: How much money does your husband give you on a weekly or monthly basis for support of the household?
DEBTOR: He does not give me any money on a weekly basis and he gives me money monthly as needed. The first year that he left, he paid half of the mortgage every month. That was just the first year. Now he gives me money as I ask. We don't have as many children in the household as we did when he left.
...
As I just stated, the first year he paid half of the mortgage because when he left, we had six children in the home with me. He paid half of the mortgage which would have been $ 1,000 every month but that was it. He didn't give me anything towards the bills, the food, the clothing, any expenses, just the thousand for the mortgage.
After that, half of the children have left, they're grown. There's only three children left. He gives me money as needed. It may be $ 500 this month, $ 600 next month. I don't get a legal child support and he does not pay half the mortgage anymore.
PLAINTIFF: During the 2004 examination hearing you and Mr. Witherspoon communicated that your husband did not provide you with money. Is that accurate?
DEBTOR: I don't recall saying that. I just explained he has to give me money. He's legally married to me. We had six children.55
At this point, Plaintiff had Debtor read into the record, and the Court admitted into evidence, the following excerpt from a January 18, 2017 response by Debtor's counsel (labeled "Certification") in support of his motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint:
As discovery for the 2004 examination, [Debtor] stated that Mr. Battle moved back into the same household three months after filing of the petition. She testified that they sleep in separate rooms, consider themselves to be a separate couple. [Debtor] has indicated that they have separated several times and is not sure how long Mr. Battle will be residing in her home. While Mr. Battle helps with certain bills, it's speculation on how long he will be staying in her home before he moves out again.56
The Debtor then resumed her testimony, acknowledging that Mr. Battle and she have never sought legal separation:
but my husband has lived with me. The last six years he's maybe lived there a year-and-a-half and that would consist of sleeping downstairs. Our youngest child is 15 years old. My husband has a three-year-old and a five-year-old because he's moved out and left me numerous times.57
I stated at one point we had no contact so that's how he would get me the money.
...
He would put it into the account and I would pay the bills --58
Debtor elaborated on Mr. Battle's contact with her and his contributions:
So, when we had -- like he would come to the home but we really -- like I didn't have much to say to him at that point. That's how he handled his part. And I guess in his case it was also his way of documenting that he was giving me something if I took him to court. The joint account is still there. At this time it has a dollar and some change but at that time that was my only account so that was my primary account which is not now, but it was and it just so happens to be an account we shared.59
The Plaintiff also caused the Debtor to read into the record portions of the September 26, 2016 State Court hearing transcript in which the State Court was troubled by Mr. Battle's testimony about his residence.
The Plaintiff testified on direct examination that, when the Debtor and he met with a mediator on April 13, 2015, the parties discussed "that I take a lesser amount than the judgment because of what Mrs. Battle had said in regards to her finance, her marriage status."
Well, I wanted to recoup some of my money and if it was so that she was living on one income, then I'd agree to take less.64
As noted, the trial testimony revealed that Mr. Battle did make contributions to the Debtor, even though they may have been sporadic and in varying amounts. The testimony also confirmed that Mr. Battle lived with the Debtor at certain times, that they were still married, that they shared a joint checking account, that Mr. Battle contributed to the household exрenses "as needed" and that he used the Debtor's address as his. Thus, the Debtor was not a single parent with one source of income.
In sum, the Court is confronted with the inconsistent, sometimes conflicting and often-changing testimony of the Debtor as to whether Mr. Battle lived with her and/or provided her with financial support -- and even whether she made any such statements during the settlement negotiations -- as contrasted with Plaintiff's consistent testimony that he entered into the settlement agreement and compromised his debt with the Debtor because she represented that she was a single parent with one income during those discussions.
Accordingly, in deciding this issue, the Court credits Plaintiff's testimony that he entered into this settlement on the basis of the Debtor's representations that she was a single parent with one income to support her household. Neither statement was true as she was married and Mr. Battle provided at least some support to the Debtor, lived with her from time to time and they shared a joint checking account. Plaintiff's reliance on those statements, after being unable to collect аnything from the Debtor from 2007 to 2015, was understandable and justifiable in the circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. The General Standards
Count One of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges that the debt of Debtor to Plaintiff is nondischargeable because it was "obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud within the meaning of ... § 523(a)(2)(A)." Specifically,
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt --
...
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by -
(A) false pretenses, false representation or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;65
The burden is on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a debt is nondischargeable. See Grogan v. Garner ,
Although section 523(a)(2)(A) does not define the terms "false pretenses," "false representation" or "actual fraud," these are "common-law terms" that "imply elements that the common law has defined them to include." Field v. Mans,
As to a false pretense, the courts have held that:
A false pretense is usually, but not always, the product of multiple events, acts or representations undertaken by a debtor which purposely create a contrived and misleading understanding of a transaction that, in turn wrongfully induces the creditor to extend credit to the debtor. A "false pretense" is established or fostered willfully, knowingly and by design; it is not the result of inadvertence.
In re Polaschek ,
A false representation is somewhat different; i.e., a "false or misleading statement about something, usually with the intent to deceive." Holden v. Altieri (In re Altieri),
Similar to and essentially combining the elements of false pretenses and false representation, an actual fraud "consists of any deceit, artifice, trick or design involving direct and active operation of the mind, used to circumvent and cheat another -- something said, done or omitted with the design of perpetuating what is known to be a cheat or deceрtion." In re Purington ,
B. Application of the Law to the Facts of this Case
In applying these standards in this case, the Court determines that the Debtor's obligation to Plaintiff under the Stipulation is nondischargeable. First, Plaintiff entered into the Stipulation on the basis of Ms. Johnson-Battle's misrepresentations and omissions as to material facts; i.e., that she was a single parent with one income to support her family. The facts established at trial demonstrate that Ms. Johnson-Battle was continuously married to Mr. Battle during the relevant time period; that he made cоntributions to the Debtor's household expenses, often on a monthly basis, although the time and amounts of these payments varied; and that they shared a joint checking account from which various household expenses were paid, including the mortgage on Ms. Johnson-Battle's then-residence and at least one of the $ 500 settlement payments made to Plaintiff. Mr. Battle also lived with the Debtor from time to time
The trial testimony further demonstrated that the Debtor knew that those statements and omissions were material and not aсcurate when she made (or did not make) them and evidence an intent to deceive. Their materiality is plain (and her omissions were misleading) as they were the basis of Plaintiff's compromise and they paint a sympathetic picture, combined with an inability to pay. Here, the Court finds that Ms. Johnson-Battle's inconsistent testimony as to these matters, along with her at least misleading and incomplete statement to the State Court that she was "unemployed," evidences her propensity to make statements in a light more favorable to her when it benefits her position and then attempts to explain them away when an inconsistency is exposed. Ms. Johnson-Battle's denial that she made these statements rings hollow, especially given the inconsistences noted above, including her fаilure to include the contributions from Mr. Battle on her submissions to the Bankruptcy Court.
Having determined that Ms. Johnson-Battle made these misrepresentations and omissions, the Court also finds that Ms. Johnson-Battle intended that Plaintiff rely on them in entering into the Stipulation and that Plaintiff was justified in doing so. In re Melendez,
As to justifiable reliance, Plaintiff testified that he relied on Ms. Johnson-Battle's statements as to her single parent, single income status in entering into the Stipulation; Plaintiff entered into the Stipulation "[b]ecause she ... only had one income coming in and because I wanted to give her a break and get some of my money...."
Finally, there is no doubt that Plaintiff was damaged by the misrepresentations as he compromised his claim by over $ 5,000 (almost 50%) and agreed to accept payments over time in entering into the Stipulation. However, the amount of these damages is less than straightforward in the circumstances of this case because the underlying
In deciding this issue, the Court relies on In re Biondo ,
In holding that the entire debt was nondischargeable (even though the original debt for legal fees would have been dischargeable), the Fourth Circuit determined that the fraud was in connection with the settlement agreement, which was akin to a novation, rather than the original agreement to provide legal services. Thus, the settlement constituted a refinancing or extension of credit which was obtained by the fraud and was therefore nondischargeable in its entirety.
This Court agrees with the reasoning of Biondo and the similar cases cited above. Accordingly, the Court finds that the entire debt of $ 11,289 of the Debtor to Plaintiff under the Stipulation, less payments of $ 3,200.77, or a balance of $ 8,088.23, represented an extension of credit and is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A) because Plaintiff entered into the Stipulation on the basis of Debtor's material misrepresentations and omissions as to her marital status and sources of income, on which Plaintiff justifiably relied to his detriment.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, thе Court determines that the entire debt of the Debtor to Plaintiff under the Stipulation, or $ 11,289, less payments of $ 3,200.77, for a remaining total of $ 8,088.23, is nondischargeable under
Notes
After trial, the parties requested that they be permitted to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Various extensions of the related deadlines were requested and granted. As a result, post-trial submissions were not completed until December 2018. (Trial Tr. 92:8-16, Aug. 29, 2018, Dkt. No. 44.)
(Pl.'s Resp., Ex. A, Dkt. No. 52.)
(Id. )
(Id. )
(Id. )
(Pl.'s Opp'n to Debtor's Mot. to Dismiss ¶¶ 9-10, Dkt. No. 7.) By Order entered on January 31, 2017, Plaintiff's opposition was treated as an Amended Complaint, and certain counts of the Amended Complaint were dismissed. (Dkt. No. 10.)
(D-3, Stip. of Settlement in State Ct. Action); (Pl.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Pl.'s Opp'n to Debtor's Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 10, Dkt. No. 7.)
(Id. at ¶¶ 11-14.)
(Id. at ¶¶ 15-16; Trial Tr. 9:20-22. See also Trial Tr. 95:7-13. Debtor's testimony to same effect and acknowledging the confusion as to the timing of the representations as to her employment status.)
(D-3, Stip. of Settlement.)
(Id. )
(D-4, Letter, Sept. 21, 2015.) At trial on August 29, 2018, the Debtor clarified her employment status. She has been a public school teacher for Irvington public schools since 2005 at a current salary of $ 62,000 (which she evidently draws over ten months) but works in the summer months for the City of East Orange in the food service department and has done so for the past ten years (Trial Tr. 33:3-17; 47:12-48:12). Debtor testified that, in 2015, her summer job ended early, and she telephoned Plaintiff at that point to tell him that she could not make the August payment of $ 500 on the Stipulation (Trial Tr. 43:13-44:23.)
(D-4, Letter, Sept. 21, 2015.)
(Id. )
(D-1, Check. No. 197 for $ 500, Sept. 10, 2015.)
The Plaintiff certified, in opposition to the Debtor's motion to dismiss this adversary proceeding, that he obtained a default judgment against Debtor and Mr. Battle in 2008 but that that Judgment was vacated for imprоper service (Pl.'s Obj. ¶¶ 10-15, Dkt. No. 7). Plaintiff testified in a September 26, 2016 hearing in the State Court Action (Hr'g Tr. 6:6-9:16) that he obtained a judgment "first" in 2008 and again in 2015 (Pl.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, Dkt. No. 49); (see also Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, ¶ 9, Main Dkt. No. 14.)
(P-3, Wage Appl. Hr'g, Sept. 24, 2015. The September 21, 2015 letter is in evidence as D-1.)
(P-7).
(Pet., Sch. A/B, Main Dkt. No. 1.)
(D-2, Deed, Aug. 27, 2010.)
(Id. )
(Main Dkt. No. 33.)
(Order Discharging Debtor, Main Dkt. No. 55.)
(Pl.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. A, 341 Mtg. Hr'g Tr. 10:2-15, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Order, July 26, 2016, Main Dkt. No. 31); (Order, Aug. 15, 2016, Main Dkt. No. 40); (Order, Oct. 13, 2016, Main Dkt. No. 51.)
(Pl.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. B, Hr'g Tr. 2:9-10 and 2:19-23, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Pl.'s Mot. to Compel ¶ 11, Main Dkt. No. 14.)
(Order, Oct. 13, 2016, Main Dkt. No. 51.) Order acknowledges that the Plaintiff timely filed his Complaint during the pendency of his motion to extend time.
(Dkt. Nos. 6, 7, 8.)
(Order, Jan. 30, 2017, Dkt. No. 10.)
The parties initially stipulated at trial that the amount due at the time of the Stipulation was $ 11,289 and agreed that subsequent credits (for payments made after the Plaintiff and Debtor entered the April 13, 2015 Stipulation) totaled $ 3,200.77, leaving a balance of $ 8,088.23. But during the discussion of the credits at trial, the parties used a different starting figure of $ 11,596.64, against which applicаtion of the $ 3,200.77 credit leaves a balance due of $ 8,395.87, a difference of $ 307.64. That difference is not material to this decision and the Court will use the slightly lower stipulated amount.
(Dkt. No. 35.)
The Court notes that Plaintiff again seeks recovery of collection costs under the Lease in his post-trial submissions. The Court previously ruled that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney's fees because he was not represented by an attorney and the Stipulation does not provide for the recovery of collection costs. (See Order, Oct. 11, 2017, Dkt. No. 37.) That ruling does not change because the Lease was not in evidence and, in any event, was superseded by the Stipulation. The Stipulation does not provide for the recovery of collection expenses. Accordingly, the Court confirms its ruling that Plaintiff is nоt entitled to any collection costs.
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 3:1-25, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Id. at 4:20-5:9 and 10:14-11:12.)
(Id. at 10:1-11:25.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 14:15-15:5, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 15:6-17, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 16:6-17:5, Dkt. No. 49.) ("She handles all the finances when it came to the house. I just give money and she handle [sic] the bills." State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 17:4-5.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 18:5-19, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 18:20-19:14, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 20:20-24, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 21:13-25, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 22:19-22, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Def.'s Proposed Findings, Ex. D, State Ct. Hr'g Tr. 22:1-25:16, Dkt. No. 49.)
(Trial Tr. 10:18-11:1.)
(Trial Tr. 94:5-22.)
(Trial Tr. 10:18-20.)
(Trial Tr. 95:7-22.)
(Trial Tr. 14:20-22.)
(Trial Tr. 14:16-15:3.)
(Trial Tr. 16:2-7.)
(Trial Tr. 18:24-19:7; also filed as Debtor's Resp. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 4, Dkt. No. 8.)
(Tr. 16:9-17:10 (emphasis supplied)). Debtor testified that the six children are: her daughter from a prior relationship; Mr. Battle's three sons from a prior relationship; and two children that Debtor and Mr. Battle had together (Trial Tr. 48:13-49:1). The six children stayed with the Debtor after Mr. Battle left the Property (Trial Tr. 48:25-49:1).
(Trial Tr. 18:24-19:7; also filed as Debtor's Resp. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 4, Dkt. No. 8.)
(Trial Tr. 20:11-15.)
(Trial Tr. 28:19-22.)
(Trial Tr. 29:7-15.)
(Trial Tr. 29:16-33:2.)
(Trial Tr. 36:5-14.)
(Trial Tr. 65:16-18.)
(Trial Tr. 65:21-22.)
(Trial Tr. 66:1-2.)
In re Showalter,
(Trial Tr. 94:16-18.)