Dаniel R. SMITH v. Phillip L. JOHNSON, Superintendent, and Timothy G. Collins, Publication Review Committee.
No. 03-2014.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Nov. 1, 2006.
David R. Smith, Appellant. Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) Oct. 26, 2006. Filed: Nov. 1, 2006.
547
Thomas G. Eddy, Office of Attorney Gеneral of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, for Phillip L. Johnson, Superintendent, and Timothy G. Collins, Publication Review Committee.
Before: SMITH, WEIS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Daniel R. Smith (“Smith“) is an inmate at thе State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“SCIP“). Smith commenced this civil action against appellees Philip L. Johnson, Superintendent (“Johnson“), and Tim G. Collins, Publication Review Committee (“Collins“), alleging that they denied him the ability to practice his religion of Yoruba/Palero/Vodun. Smith purchased by mail two volumes of a religious text entitled “El Libro,” by Carlos Montenegro, a Palero Priest, in November of 1999. Three months later, Smith received a fоrm notice from Collins informing him that the Publication Review Committee (“PRC“) had disapproved “El Libro,” in accordance with Pennsylvania Department оf Corrections (“DOC“) policy. The notice stated that “El Libro” fell into the category of publications that “advocate, assist or are evidence of criminal activity or institution misconduct.” Smith timely appealed the decision. Johnson replied that “El Libro” was “obscene.” Smith wrotе to Johnson
Smith continued to аppeal and secured additional review by the PRC. Johnson wrote to the DOC Executive Deputy in May of 2000, stating that “El Libro” contained “spells and rituаls” and that, “there are individuals within these settings who are capable of believing that such spells are possible.” Therefore, “conflict thаt could arise because of this aspect makes this publication inappropriate.” Smith was informed that his final appeals werе denied and that he could have “El Libro” returned to the publisher, mailed home, or destroyed. Smith informed Johnson and Collins that he wanted “El Libro” sent to Mrs. Chаrlotta Smith. Smith was instructed to provide a postage slip as well as a request to mail the text, which he did. In August of 2000, Smith asked Johnson about the status of his request and was informed that the texts had been destroyed because he had not provided the postage slips and mailing request in a timely mannеr.
Smith filed a standard form
Smith argues on appeal that the District Court should have construed his complaint as also stating a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA“).
The Magistrate Judge and District Court analyzed Smith‘s claim under the framework laid out by the Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The Turner Court articulated a “reasonablenеss” test for federal court review of First Amendment challenges to prison practices or regulation. Id. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. The Court stated that, “when a prison regula-
The Magistrate Judge and District Court correctly applied the Turner factors. We will affirm the District Court‘s judgment with respect to Smith‘s First Amendment claim. However, the District Court erred by not accounting for the heightened statutory prоtection prescribed by Congress in RLUIPA. See
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling gоvernmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Johnson and Collins contend that, because Smith did not allege a RLUIPA violatiоn in his pro se complaint, we should deem Smith to have waived his RLUIPA claim. However, this Court has often observed that “we have an obligation” to liberally construe pro se civil rights complaints. Holley v. Department of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir.1999). See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). We apply the relevant law, regardless of whether the pro se litigant has identified it by name. Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir.1996). We followed this approach for RLUIPA‘s predecessor statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA“). Id. We stated that because RFRA was then “in force and as it was the applicable law, the district court was required to apply the compelling interest test to the facts,” even though the parties had not brought RFRA to the Court‘s attention. Id. This approach is in accord with our sister Circuits. See Hammons v. Saffle, 348 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir.2003) (noting that pro se plаintiffs are only “required to allege the necessary underlying facts to support a claim under a particular legal theory,” and remanding tо the district court for consideration of a RLUIPA claim); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir.2004) (noting that, “when the plaintiff proceeds pro se, as in this case, a court is obliged tо construe his pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations,” and remanding to the district court for consideration of a RLUIPA сlaim). We will remand to the District Court for consideration of Smith‘s complaint under RLUIPA.