143 P. 1123 | Or. | 1914
delivered the opinion of the court.
The main contention of the defendant upon this appeal is that there is no' evidence to support the finding made by the trial court that the value of a one-half interest in the patent rights was $8,500. The question of fraud is not contested upon this appeal.
“Where the value of property owned by a party is in issue it is held, as a rule, that his declarations may be proved by the opponent. * * While an offer of the owner of property to sell it at a certain price is not conclusive evidence of the value of the property, yet such an offer is. competent evidence against him as an admission in fixing the value at or near the time when the offer was made. ’ ’
See, also, Springer v. Chicago, 135 Ill. 552 (26 N. E. 514, 12 L. R. A. 614); Findlay v. Pertz, 74 Fed. 681 (20 C. C. A. 662); Joy v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 83 Iowa, 12 (48 N. W. 1049).
It appears to be the contention of the defendant’s counsel that an offer of sale by the owner tends only to show that the property is of no greater value. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in considering the question in Watson v. Milwaukee M. R. Co., 57 Wis. 332 (15 N. W. 468), said:
“This evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing that the land was in fact of greater value after the road was located across it than the value placed upon it by the appellants’ witnesses. We think the evidence was competent, not only as tending to prove its real value after the railroad was located across it, but as an admission on the part of the appellants of such value.”
“As evidence bearing upon the value of this property, Ranck’s own declarations were certainly competent when offered by the company. His offer of it at a fixed price, and the sale of a portion of it, were facts proper to go to the jury as constituting his estimate of its value. It is true the sale of a portion of the property does not fix with certainty its market value as a whole, but it is an element fair to be considered by the jury.”
It does not appear that the sale made by the defendant to Messrs. Chapin and Read was in any manner a forced sale, or that they purchased the patents on a basis of any more than they were really worth. The offer of sale made by the defendant near the time of the alleged conversion, and the actual sale made by him on the day after the purchase from the plaintiff, according to the defendant’s testimony, or according to the evidence on the part of the plaintiff before that time, was competent for the court acting as a jury to consider in determining the value of the property. It seems that the arrangement between Hurley and Chapin and Read in regard to the manufacture and sale of the patented wrench pertained only to the payment of the price fixed, and not to the price itself.
As against the seller, the price at which property is sold is generally recognized, not only as competent, but as the best, evidence of its value. The United States Supreme Court in The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240 (44 L. Ed. 751, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 595), held that the actual sale price of a one-half interest in a
Competent evidence being found in the record to sustain the findings of the trial court, they should not be disturbed; therefore, in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution (Article VII, Section 3),. which directs that “no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict, ’ ’ the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed. Rehearing Denied.