*1 HUBBARD, RAYMOND F. JR. SMITH STANLEY (2d)W. 91 N. 37,304.
July 1958 —No. *2 Deinard, Leonard, Benedict Deinard and Street & for S. appellant. Burke, Miley, Miley, James P. Swensen & and Thomas J. for respond- ent.
Dell, Justice. Chief
In this action seeks to recover for damages compensatory and personal injuries mental and pain suffering damages punitive have been committed alleged an assault battery as the result of the bim a verdict for The returned defendant. jury $2,500 damages. $5,000 damages punitive compensatory sum of alternative motion for an order denying appeals Defendant for a new trial. the verdict or notwithstanding judgment m., defendant, 7, 1956, then 23 at about p. October On Sunday, St. the Croix through village drove his automobile age, years of St. Point. Plain- village tо his home in Mary’s Beach on his way as tiff, that at that time in his age, capacity testified then years at the in his official car in St. Croix Beach he was parked constable Post”; car come around a that he first had seen defendant’s “Trading fast”; drive that he had then watched defendant corner nearby “pretty had where it away two blocks about sign to a stop a side road it on had that he fast” and off “very then started had defendant that stopped; “threw dirt car defendant’s turn right him; making that in followed over a hill had driven defendant that when the place”; all over and dust rear; as he went over that block to about a then he was crest right; a comer turning defendant he had observed crest same hill time blocks, at which two more after he continued that had block defendant turn; after another a made left one-half block he was then driveway; into private turned defendant’s rear and had followed him up driveway house.
At some defendant, described, while point plaintiff followed cars crossed the line which separated two but the record villages, does not establish when or where this occurred. Plaintiff testified that at times he had driven his car to 45 50 miles up an hour in the 30-mile- an-hour zones speed but'he did not that this was in St. testify Croix Beach.
Plaintiff testified further that after he had at defendant’s stopped residence he left his car and walked toward defendant and that at the same time defendant had left his car and walked toward plaintiff; defendant had then asked him in the h-e-1-1 “What wanted there” [he] and that law,” when he that defendant had “violated the replied latter “used some and ordered him profane language” get “to off his land” off”; and said that “he was to throw going that plaintiff [him] then informed him that he had “absorbed enough of his abuse and * * * arrest”; him under putting he took a few toward steps *3 defendant and the latter had him him the grabbed shirt and by pushed against a building; that he had then pushed defendant and that away defendant had called to his assistance; brother for that the latter came from the house and separated two parties; and that defendant then withdrew and entered the house. He admitted that defendant had not time, struck him at and it any is not that the disputed result of only the fracas was that buttons shirt; were torn from his two buttonholes thereon were and his ripped; badge had fallen to the ground and was broken in the scuffle. Defendant’s version of the was that dispute plain- tiff was the aggressor throughout.
Plaintiff testified that he then left the premises and thereafter shortly the office of the proceeded justice in St. peace Croix Beach he where had caused warrants to be against issued defendant on charges of a traffic violation assault. A few later days defendant procured from a warrant of justice of St. Mary’s charging Point plain- tiff with “assault in the third degree.” that,
Plaintiff testified following newspaper television publicity incident, relating he had been subjected good to a deal of “kidding” at Minnesota employees Mining and Manufacturing shift; to him hаd referred where he worked the day they
Company which had designations as “the law” and and other like Earp” “Wyatt embarrassment; whom he and that a traffic offender caused him much described. One had arrested had been insolent to him after publicity that he article the item that had said contained newspaper to file defendant in court in Still- charges against planned municipal water. At on the of second- charge defendant’s preliminary hearing 17, 1956, degree assault in court on October caused justice he had received calls he stated that two be read wherein аn affidavit to suggested in which the latter had Lord, general, attorney from Miles Jr., Hubbard, and further stated postponed, the trial of Stanley that, know of St. Croix Beach to the court and the people that he desired him, it was his kind exerted upon object regardless pressure without favoritism to as constable discharge any party. his duties received considerable following this affidavit publicity On day Plaintiff testified that about in the and St. Paul newspapers. Minneapolis later, Mr. Keith who was Mr. Lord’s Kennedy, days request he had general, in the state election for opponent forthcoming attorney with Mr. а television where he appeared program repeated on Kennedy affidavit, statements made in the affidavit. Mr. Lord replied stating that he had of defendant’s trial for suggested postponement “cooling-off” and that should not “use the court to settle period score”; personal a number of courts on investigated justice complaints that were income conducting “speed traps” monetary that the greatest of life and property than for protection rather charges come from St. Beach. These Croix of complaints number received substantial countercharges publicity. that on one occasion he had been followed testified further Plaintiff Mining at Minnesota and Manufacturing Company from his employment KSTP a man in an automobile television and radio belonging was vice and that he had talked president station of which defendant *4 car, but it does not that the latter made appear to thé driver of such or admission that he was at defendant’s pursuing plaintiff statement testified that other Plaintiff on occasions he had request suggestion. cars of the state department been followed and other by highway by cars, again nоthing there was to connect defendant but therewith. private He admitted that he was familiar with methods used by police depart- ments and that on one occasion he had been followed in connection with his commission of a traffic violation.
Some evidence was submitted that there had been antagonism between and members of defendant’s for over a family year prior present incident. Defendant stated that this during members of period had been family arrested or given tickets for traffic violations in St. Croix Beach on at least seven different occasions. Plaintiff admittеd he traffic given tickets to various members of defendant’s on at family least five different occasions for such offenses as car “leaving in keys like ignition”; “backing the onto a roadway”; charges. and (1) On defendant contends that the appeal trial court erred in his motion for dismissal the denying action the close of plaintiff’s and his motion for a directed verdict at testimony the close of the evidence, both based the ground on that the evidence failed to establish that defendant had committed an offense within plaintiff’s jurisdiction the village in of St. Croix Beach on October so as to justify plaintiff’s presence upon (2) the property; trial court that, erred in the instructing if it found that jury “had reasonable ground believing that the had violated the law in his presence” (italics then he supplied), was acting within the statutes and lawfully upon Hubbard (3) and premises; the awards for both compensatory damages punitive were damages not justified evidence, excessive, were given were under influence of passion and prejudice. constable,
A in fresh pursuit of a party who has committed a criminal offense within his jurisdiction, may go its boundaries beyond pursue person anywherе the state in order to apprehend and arrest him to the same extent that .the officer have effected might arrest within his own It is not jurisdiction.1 disputed was a constable; that he was in fresh of defendant pursuit to the time up when arrest; made that in the he went pursuit beyond boundaries Beach; of the village of St. Croix making arrest plaintiff armed with a warrant. Thus the question is whether presented 1 M. A. S. 629.40.
220 he for which committed within jurisdiction
an offense was plaintiff’s had the to make an arrest. authority warrant, in non- a a officer’s of arrest the absence of power
In his committed or in attempted cases is limited to offenses felony рublic offense” in and within his The terms jurisdiction.3 “public presence2 629.34(1) M. S. A. and “criminal include both offense” 629.40 § misdemeanors, even those which do not amount to breaches felonies and Our statutes that violations of the Traffic provide Highway peace.4 are, therefore, Act Regulation constitute misdemeanors5 and offenses which violators can be arrested without warrants officers by peace in whose are committed and who are in Two presence they fresh pursuit. (1) were violations attributed to defendant: at an excessive Driving rate of testified that he had clockеd at from speed (plaintiff 6), which, is unlawful and in a municipality, 40 to 50 miles an hour which he was (2) subsequently with careless offense driving, committed within the these offenses was if either of charged. Certainly Beach and in plaintiff’s presence, limits of the of St. Croix village right to arrest defendant is unquestioned. diagram a
Neither this saw fit introduce map action party Nevertheless, order to the exact location of the various events. pinpoint evidence from which from the record it that there was sufficient appears driving could of at least care- infer jury guilty Beach, had rounded within St. if not also of He lessly speeding. Croix fast”; corner had made a rather than “pretty rolling complete stop fast” —all again then had started off “very and highway; through aat turn, “dirt right throwing executed He later Beach. Croix St. within seen around and thereafter was “slewing the place,” all over dust 629.34(1). 2 § 910; 292, Cantieny, State v. Benson, 213 N. W. 171 Minn. v. 3 State 266-B-11, 18, General, 458; Attorney No. Dec. Opinions 24 N. W. Minn. 1, 1952, 4, 1947, 12, 785-B, 5, Sept. Sept. 1957. 1941, Mar. and No. 910; 292, Benson, Cantieny, 34 213 N. W. State v. 171 Minn. v. 4 State 506, 458; Walton, 16 N. 1, 30 Minn. W. 397. Wahl N. W. Minn. 169.02, and 169.89. 5 §§ subd. See, 169.14, 2(1). Engel, 243 68 N. W. Butler v. Minn. 6 § subd. (2d)
** * the record it not clear from right.” to the While is corner [another] Beach, it in St. neither is clear these latter acts occurred Croix community, which was drawn from local did not. The jury, decide, best absent in the verdict anything was in the position evidence, its should not be set aside. decision manifestly contrary observing Defendant’s assertion that was driving carefully did no limit more than create for the trier of facts to speed question resolve. it did not meet strict would Certainly requirement which have entitled defendant to directed verdict in his favor—that different *6 minds, the most favorable viewing light plaintiff, the in facts at but one result.7 arrive reasonably could in the instructing jury the trial erred
Nor do we that court agree if he “had under the statute reasonable was acting prоperly plaintiff violated the in his the defendant had law for ground believing whether an determining to be used in or not The standards presence.” the an officer been of attempted presence offense has committed Pluth, 145, 151, 789, 195 N. down in State v. 157 Minn. W. were laid 791, we where said: * *
“* It that a is in the cannot be said criminal offense committed officer, the of an unless the acts offense become constituting presence sight him at are his through the time committed sense of they known committing other a through Although person actually senses. may offense, officer a criminal it is not committed in the of an рresence And, statute, if does not know it. the officer of meaning within the act become cognizant observe nor not the officer could where senses, it could not be com- the use his the offense constituting by an arrest without a warrant.” as to authorize so his presence mitted in an offense is before committed must appear two elements Clearly a (1) aware of the acts as He must become of an officer: the presence (2) infer the acts he must perception, result of sensory Jensen, 58, Thus, v. Minn. N. Hilla 149 182 W. an offense. constitute case the officers believed аrresting In that 902, distinguishable. merely is 416, 425, (2d) Ry. Co. City 244 Minn. 70 N. W. Paul Waldo v. St. 7 205, 212, 295; Minneapolis Ry. 221 21 289, St. Co. Minn. LeVasseur 522, 526, cited in 6 therein. (2d) and cases note N. W. (149 that the 62, was 903) Minn. “an of a N. W. inmate ill-fame, house of and so was a a violating misdemeanor committing ordinance.” city of the Only where was arrested part building was used suspected being for that and he neither seen purpose nor heard officers, therefore, therein. The failed meet first set requirement forth above and were justified in taking plaintiff into custody.8 case, however, both
In the instant saw acts which and, in the exercise of his constituted the offense concluded judgment, (8 Garskе amounted to misdemeanor. In v. United States they Cir.) (2d) said: F. court “* * [*] crime, which they have probable cause to believe is being misdemeanor, committed in their it be a authorized presence, though duly officers make arrest without a warrant. The may probable cause which will arrest for a misdemeanor without a warrant must be justify based on judgment knowledge acquired through time personal senses, or inferences to be drawn from the properly testimony senses.” all
Therefore that is anof officer is that see required the acts and them infer that are sufficient to constitute the Upon оffense. it this has reasoning been held that a peace officer without warrant may arrest when the person latter gives the merely appearance being *7 even it intoxicated9 is though learned subsequently is not.10 The of the nature offenses may but so as vary all long of the acts are com- it mitted in his is within officer’s presence statutory authority and, are determine whether such as to constitute a misdemeanor if they so, to arrest the a warrant.11 violator without 337, Hopkins, App. (2d) v. City
8 Cf. of Evanston 330 Ill. 71 N. E. 209. 471, 615; Belcher, 9 Forsythe Ivey, 162 Miss. v. People v. 139 So. 302 529, 874; (2d) (D. N. Y. N. E. v. 99 Johnson Dist. Columbia Mun. C. (2d) App.) 119 A. 444. State, 682, v.
10 Goodwin
148 Tenn.
223 one, in the instances illustrates, this than does case better no Surely a mis- acts constitute believe that certain which cause to probable warrant, acts those provided an arrest without demeanor should justify against The statutory prohibition the officer’s presence. are committed in 169.13, 3, subd. which provides: is contained in driving careless § street or vehicle any “No shall or halt person operate upon rights safety in or disrеgard or highway heedlessly carelessly others, endanger, any in a manner be endanger, likely so or person property.”
Whatever standards
always
this
case it must
language conveys,
every
be the
judgment
officer in the
which deter-
first instance
mines whether or not a violation has occurred. Carelessness is synony-
thus,
instance where it is
in every
mous with ordinary negligence,12
al-
which an officer’s decision is
a fact
is raised
alleged,
question
more is re-
Nothing
decision of the trier of fact.
final
ways subject
that the officer infer from them
than that the acts
observed and
quired
The
are sufficient tо constitute a misdemeanor.13
rule applies
traffic
alleged
where the
violator is
in a
acquitted
even
subsequently
court,
that is
as the
of the arrest
consequence
of no
so far
validity
Therefore,
is concerned.14
since the acts were all committed in
itself
saloon);
(D. Minn.)
(conducting
Wiggins
A.
22 F.
636
United States v.
1001;
702;
(2d)
(E. Ky.)
Ingle
United States v.
D.
F.
v. Com-
Stafford
296
monwealth,
518,
1088;
State,
389,
Ky.
King
204
264 S. W.
v.
92 Okl. Cr.
773;
State,
(2d)
98,
223
(transporting
P.
Abbott v.
30 Okl. Cr.
plaintiff’s because he had cause to presence misdemeanor, believe that constituted a we conclude that he had the they right either to arrest in St. defendant Croix Beach or him pursue beyond its boundaries for to use whatever force was purpose so necessary doing.15 it were
Even if to be assumed some of the acts here involved were committed Beach, the borders of St. beyond Croix plaintiff’s to arrest power existed. still Section extends to 629.37 private citizens the right to arrest for offenses public committed or attempted within their presence and gives right 629.39 them the of doing § so while in fresh The pursuit. term “public offense” in cited sections which likewise embraces misdemeanors do not amount to breaches of Moreover, general’s office has often peace.16 attorney advised village officers when see peace offenses committed outside arrest village their limits still without warrants in the they may exercise right conferred them as private citizens.17 The result is that acting either as a officer or as a private citizen. In either he had the to arrest for a capacity power misdemeanor committed or to attempted him in order presence pursue to do so. It one role or the was in other that he saw both acts of speeding believed was, what he careless therefore, The arrest driving. justified. find no merit in
We
contention
629.31 fore
§
closed his arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor committed on
The
general has
Sunday.
attorney
held that an officer’s authority to
arrest
without warrant
is not limited by this section because it is
to relate
intended
to arrests for crimes committed in the arresting
position
think his
must be sustained.
We
other
Any
officer’s presence.18
negative the effect of the
would
statute
“fresh-pursuit”
interpretation
be an invitation to commit
on
and would
misdemeanors
Sunday. This
be the
the legislature
intent of
we should
does not
not read
appear
619.40(1).
15 §
Reardon,
(431).
16 Judsonv. General, 785-B, 5, 1947, 12, 17 OpinionsAttorney No. Sept. Mar. Sept. (by implication), and 1957. General, 605-A, 18 OpinionAttorney No. Jan.
it into the statute. however, the evidence does not sustain do that the agree,
We $5,000 damages as verdict. The compensatory awarded jury plaintiff $2,500 the nature and as The latter are in punitive damages. penalty the con record find that are reasonable. But we are upon we the vinced that former are excessive. It is undisputed shirt sustained no real harm. his was torn and Although physical only broken, this, his badge with the was coupled sufficient pushing, physical was, therefore, contact to constitute a It to recovery allow battery. proper for humiliation and mental suffering.19 That was suffering apparently “ribbing” coworkers, to “kidding” limited in his friends by him to some defiance other as “Wyatt Earp”; by referencеs to cluding of his and to his motorists; members family; strain placed cars from car and unidentified perhaps by followed a KSTP being about as a result publicity Highway Department the State —all the matter. $1,000 damages believe that these facts we compensatory
Upon him for which he sustained. Therefore any loss amply compensate would unless, ten be a trial on the within damages there should new issue below, the remittitur the court after filing days $3,500, the total file a written consent to reduction of verdict shall the verdict originally allowed thereon from the date was being interest condition, the order In event of with such compliance entered. is affirmed. be and shall appealed on condition.
Reversed (concurring specially). Gallagher, T. Justice Frank that the but believe punitive the majority with specially I concur are in the nature damages such Inasmuch as high. still too are damages $1,000 a substantial represent would me it seems to aof penalty, here. the record under amount Gallagher, (dissenting). Justice
Thomas establish that defendant failed to that plaintiff the opinion am of I of St. village his within the misdemeanor in presence committed had Salem, 185 N. 394. W. 150 Minn. 19 Smith Croix Beach. Hе testified he did not consider defendant’s first stop sign at in St. Croix Beach a traffic but stop violation felt it showed approach tendency carelessness so decided to follow him. There was no evidence that defendant sought escape that he was aware that he plaintiff, had violated He law. seen plaintiff at the parked Post” but not “Trading did know plaintiff following him until he turned into his The route driveway. home, followed was the normal route to his and he testified that his speed there had proceeding exceeded miles per hour. At some point while described, followed two cars crossed line which but separated villages, the record does not establish or where this occurred. when Plaintiff testified that times he had clocked his own car at to 45 miles up hour per *10 zones, did in but he not 30-mile-per-hour speed that this testify was Beach, in St. Croix or this was at which defendant speed it traveling. That was not is evident from fact that gained IV2 blocks on in a distance of about 1 mile.
As to careless driving, there was no evidence beyond plaintiff’s unsupported conclusion defendant was of this guilty charge. There was no that he or testimony operated halted his vehicle оr in carelessly disregard rights or or others in a safety manner endanger to any person or so as to be property in violation 169.13, of M. S. A. subd. 3. There was no evidence of other traffic or pedestrians on this graveled side road. Plaintiff’s indicated testimony that defendant was in his sight most of the during period in which plaintiff followed him, since he testified that he had lost defendant after the latter had gone over hill crest and viewed him subsequently only turning corners until almost to defendant’s and that on the up driveway, route four such were turns testified that required. He defendant’s car threw dust as it turns, made but the trial court stated: is “It common knowledge that if drive road graveled on that it is to you going raise dust.”
Under 629.34 no is vested ain authority police § officer to arrest another without of a warrant because mere belief that such has person Minn. Jensen, committed a misdemeanor. v. 58, Hilla 182 N. W. The aof officer authority to arrest without warrant outside 629.40, is jurisdiction 1, covered subd. by § which provides that: * * * * * * law, constable, sheriff, may case wherein any “In any charge for warrant, or person arrest any with or without either jurisdiction, the person within his offense committed criminal of any town, village, city, or is out of county, be escapes arrested anywhere arrested and apprehend person the officer may pursue (Italics supplied.) in this state.” 629.34, as set construction of hereinbefore this court’s §
Based upon 629.40, 1, subd. no is vested in forth, it is clear under authority § arrest without warrant the limits of his beyond officer to a peace within his jurisdiction committed offense a criminal jurisdiction Wells, & 134 Minn. Co. (Ehrhardt Fargo v. is involved a felony unless Leindecker, Minn. 721; ex rel. Olson v. State 58, 158 N. W. the commission of has witnessed 972), the officer or unless N.
97 W. misdemeanor and in within his jurisdiction to commit attempt the limits of his has passed beyond of the offender “fresh pursuit” lеnsen, supra; see, therefor.20 Hilla arrest offender jurisdiction 266-B-11, 18, 1941, General, and No. No. Dec. Opinions Attorney 4, 1957; Jur., 5, 1947, 12, 1952, 4 Am. 785-B, and Sept. Mar. Sept. Arrest, 51.§ involved, and, is under accordingly, the instant case no felony
In 629.40, was not authorized to pursue subd. 629.34 §§ the limits of St. Croix Beach and onto his property beyond him unless plaintiff arresting the purpose Point for St. Mary’s commit a mis- attempt of or commission witnessed “fresh Beach, and was in pursuit” of St. Croix the village demeanor 629.39, authorizing 629.37, 629.38, and §§ no claim 20 There is *11 applicable. Section are here complied with were or by private presons, arrests public another “For a person may arrest private a 629.37(1) provides that provides 629.38 presence.” Section attempted in his or committed offense person private person shall inform such making an arrest “Before that submit, except when to require him cause thereof to be arrested be arrested or when he shall of offense actual commission is in the he provides that Section 629.39 its commission.” pursuit immediately after on the commission another for person who shall have arrested “Every private shall, take before a delay, him unnecessary without public a offense to a officer.” magistrate or deliver him
of defendant to arrest him therefor.
But the evidence fails that a to establish such situation so prevailed toas defendant’s justify plaintiff’s presence Plaintiff upon property. conceded that defendant had not violated law prior time that any home; he left the his that stop sign he then followed proceed defendant, law, not because had defendant violated any but because he had a carelessness,” observed for not a “definite “tendency violation.” There is no ordinance that forbids an automobile driver from throwing dust, sand, gravel, and car pebbles wheels in turning corner. There is nothing that establish had plaintiff witnessed acts of that might regarded as public criminal offense within Beach. His that his the limits of St. Croix own testimony speed approxi- to a 45 to 50 miles hour was reduced per mated “controllable speed” did St. Further, he made turns at not relate to Croix as corners Beach. that, mñe, his which covered during he testified about he pursuit gained defendant from two blocks distance which separated them at the to a distance but sign one-half stop block defendant’s this not driveway. adequate is support finding Certainly that defendant had exceedеd the lawful rates of speed within St. Croix Beach or had otherwise committed a misdemeanor therein.
That did contend plaintiff seriously defendant had exceeded the lawful limits within St. speed Croix Beach and was being pursued offense is indicated the fact that by comment to defend- only ant when first him in approached the latter’s was that driveway defendant had “violated the law” (although later he added to this statement that he had also said that defendant “was speeding”), by the fact that the warrant signed by charged only “careless latter, driving.” As to the no evidence was presented to what con- defendant, stituted careless driving as to where within St. Croix Beach it had occurred. In my opinion such evidence falls far short of had witnessed sustaining commission finding of a of St. within limits Croix Beach and criminal offense was in “fresh therefor when he entered upon pursuit” premises.
It therefore would follow was not defend- lawfully upon
229 ant’s at the time he premises claims defendant assaulted him. It is well settled that the unauthorized of another entry premises upon Dunnell, (3 Dig. ed.) is trespass, and that the of owner § the premises force, undertake if may reasonable necessary, terminate another’s unlawful intrusion thereon. He has the and right defend his his protect person and against and he property aggression if believes that this reasonably can be done only by immediate inflic- intruder, tion force measure, he take such may lawfully force and, used is provided reasonable in case of trespass property, has or first the intruder to desist withdraw. This is requested right recognized Jur., all laws of civilized communities. Am. Assault 61; Restatement, Torts, 77. Battery, and § §
M. S. A. in part: 619.40 provides use,
“The or offer to use force or violence attempt, upon or toward another shall not be in the person unlawful following cases: $ ‡ ‡ * * * “(3) used to be When about by party injured preventing against person, trespass an attempting prevent his or a or other offense personal property with real or lawfully in his unlawful interference in case the force is possession, not more than shall necessary;” (Italics supplied.) cited,
Under this statute and the principles had right to demand that leave his and to premises use reasonable force thereon; to terminate plaintiffs intrusion and to resist plaintiff’s to take him into attempt The that, record custody. establishes in taking measures, he such did not act with more force maliciously than was admitted that no did Plaintiff time necessary. reasonably did was to him; the most defendant and grasp push strike result; that he sustained no as a building; physical injuries and against was the torn buttonholes on his shirt damage and the only He weighed therefrom. 180 pounds removed approximately buttons as a been trained boxer. Defendant felt compelled to call formerly assistance withdrew from immediately his brother for the scuffle after his house his brother had went into appeared separated parties. establishing his In failed to sustain burden opinion my him. battery upon that defendant of an assault аnd unjustified was guilty was and defendant within He unlawfully upon premises reasonable to terminate his rights using seeking presence force in *13 him in custody. thereon unlawful resisting attempts place I believe that defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at Accordingly, granted. close of the have been testimony should the majority verdict reduced by that the the opinion I am further sustained, since particularly far too excessive is still herein opinion with attendant embarrassment the publicity reveals that record the most due part as a result he suffered claims which plaintiff in the and statements proceedings activities own to plaintiff’s no physical injuries that he sustained actual the further fact view of whatever. NELSON CHURCH JOHN W.
MISSION COVENANT AND OTHERS. ANOTHER, AND APPELLANTS.
HERBERT GOLDT (2d) N. W. 37,487. July 1958 —No.