51 Tenn. 250 | Tenn. | 1871
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the 5th February, 1859, complainant recovered a judgment before a Justice against Meriday Hin-son for $76.50 and costs, upon which execution was regularly issued on the 13th, and levied 23rd July, 1859, by a constable, on a tract of land, as the property of Hinson, containing by estimation one hundred and thirty-seven and three-quarters of acres, and fully described in ■ his returns. The original papers were filed in the Circuit Court of Henderson county, where the land is situate, and judgment there, irregularly, rendered in favor of the plaintiff at July Term, 1859, for $78.60, and the land condemned and ordered to be sold; and an order of sale having issued to the sheriff, the same was sold at public sale, to the complainant, on the 28th November, 1859, for $88.32. He raised his
The deed from Stewart to John M. and George
In the progress of the cause, leave was granted complainant to amend his bill, by asking that the satisfaction of the judgment be set aside: that a lien be declared in his favor by virtue of the levy; that the land be sold, and the deed from Stewart annulled, and that if mistaken in the relief prayed for, such other and further relief may be granted as the nature of his case may demand.
It is stated in the transcript that this amendment was accordingly made of record, and the cause continued.
The cause was heard 9th April, 1870, upon the answers, proofs, and exhibits, and the Chancellor being of opinion that complainant is not entitled to relief, dismissed his bill, and complainant appealed to this Court.
It appears from the evidence that Meriday Hin-son was the owner of a tract of land on Cane Creek, which he exchanged with Stewart for the tract of land in controversy, of which he took possession in 1854 or 1855, according to the statement of one witness, or in 1858, as stated by another; that he has resided upon it ever since, having erected buildings, and made other valuable improvements thereon, to the value of about one thousand dollars; that when the deed from Stewart was executed, one of the sons was about seven, and the other about twelve or fifteen years of age;
Meriday Hinson admits that judgment was rendered against him, but denies in his answer that he had any notice of the sheriff’s sale. The latter statement is fully disproved. He states that he is not claiming the wrongful and forcible possession of
He says that “be is not advised, and does not know of tbe said John M. & George ~W. Hinson ever having paid any part of said consideration money to said Stewart, and that be never paid any part of tbe consideration money, as mentioned in tbe bill of complainant, and as charged.” He does not even pretend tbat the land was an advancement to bis children. He states that valuable improvements were made upon tbe land, but does not disclose by whom or at whose cost, although the proof abundantly shows that he made them.
In these and other particulars, tbe answer is exceedingly vague, evasive and unsatisfactory, and is fully disproved; and there is not tbe slightest doubt that Meriday Hinson, in tbe view of a court of equity, is tbe true owner of the land, and caused and procured the conveyance to be made to his sons, for tbe fraudulent purpose of hindering and delaying tbe complainant and other creditors in tbe collection of their just demands.
The complainant is not entitled to the relief prayed for in Ms original bill. Tbe legal title to the land was in John M. & George "W. Hinson, at the time of tbe levy and sale, and no title was communicated to the complainant by the sheriff’s deed.
It is not necessary to discuss all tbe positions assumed for defendants, but it is adjudged that upon familiar and well established principles, the complainant is entitled to a decree, declaring tbe conveyance to John M. and George W. Hinson fraudulent and void, and directing the land to be sold for tbe satisfaction of his debt, unless tbe debt and costs are fully satisfied and discharged within sixty days from tbe da'te of the decree.
Reverse tbe Chancellor’s decree, and let tbe costs of this cause, in this Court and tbe Court below, be paid out of tbe proceeds of sale.
See cases cited ante 250 in note.