MARJORIE M. SMITH, Appellant, vs. FORREST HILL, Appellee.
No. 34540
Supreme Court of Illinois
January 24, 1958
588 Ill. 588
Orders affirmed.
MARJORIE M. SMITH, Appellant, vs. FORREST HILL, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 24, 1958.
WILSON & CARNAHAN, of Sycamore, (WAYNE WILSON, and KENNETH L. CARNAHAN, of counsel,) for appellant.
FRANCIS E. CASH, of De Kalb, for appellee.
Mr. JUSTICE HERSHEY delivered the opinion of the court:
This cause comes here on direct appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County sustaining appellee‘s motion to dismiss an amended complaint for breach of promise, and from a judgment entered upon the counts so dismissed, upon which appellant elected to stand.
The said amended complaint consisted of three counts. The first count alleged the promise to marry and the date the ceremony was to be performed; that confiding in said promise the plaintiff has remained unmarried and is still ready and willing to marry the defendant, but that defendant refused and continues to refuse to marry the plaintiff, and that plaintiff did send а notice to the defendant stating these facts in compliance with the statute relating to breach of promise, to plaintiff‘s damage in the sum of $20,000.
Count II realleged all of the allegations of count I and further alleged, in paragraph 5 thereof, that after the exchange of mutual promises to marry the plaintiff per-
Count III adopted all of the allegations of count II of the amended complaint and further alleged in paragraph 7 thereof that as a result of defendant‘s breach of his promise to marry her, she has suffered mental anguish and injury to her health, humiliation and degradation in the eyes of her friends and members of the community in which she resides, that she has lost the advantage of the worldly position she would have attained if defendant had complied with his promise and she has lost hеr opportunity, while engaged, to meet other suitors in marriage and arrange a marriage for herself.
By the 8th paragraph of said count she alleged that the defendant should be required to pay her full and complete compensatory damages for the injuries she suffered at his hands, and aggravated damages, and in addition punitive and exemplary damages in an amount as may be determined to be just and fair. She then prayed for damages in the sum of $30,000.
The defendant then moved to strike count I of the complaint, paragraphs 5 and 6 of count II of the amended complaint, and paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 of count III of the amended comрlaint. The reasons assigned by the defendant were that there is no similar cause of action in the State of Illinois in a female for her own seduction and ensuing pregnancy; that seduction and pregnancy are not valid elements of actual damages in a suit for breach of promise but are aggravated damages not recoverable under
Thereafter the plaintiff moved the court to dismiss count I of the amended complaint and elected to stand on counts II and III and further moved the court to enter final judgment in the cause so that an appeal might be taken to this court. The court thereupon did dismiss count I of the amended complaint and ordered the entire cause dismissed at plaintiff‘s costs.
Constitutional issues having been presented by the plaintiff‘s oral motion to dismiss the defendant‘s motion, and the court necessarily having ruled thereon, a constitutional issue is presented and the appeal is properly taken to this court. The questions presented by this appeal are whether the act of the General Assembly relating to breach of promise, (
Our review of the law in Illinois fails to reveal any case in the courts of Illinois wherein a female has been permitted to bring an independent action for damages for her own seduction. There are cases, however, where damages from seduction and ensuing pregnancy have been allowed in an action of breach of promise, wherein the seduction was alleged and proved to have been accomplished as a result of the trust and confidence placed in the seducer by virtue of his previous promise to marry the woman. It is the general rule and supported by the
The measurement of such aggravated damages is for the jury under the evidence, but it is a question of law when the facts in the particular case bring it within the rule in which punitive damages may be assessed. (Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192.) It is true that the lеgislature cannot pass an act depriving a citizen of any vested right, but to be a vested right, “It must be something more than a mere expectation, based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law. It must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property or to the present or future enjoyment of the demand, or a legal exemption from a demand made by another. If, before rights become vested in particular individuals, the convenience of the State induces amendment or repeal of the laws, these individuals have no cause to complain.” (People ex rel. Foote v. Clark, 283 Ill. 221.) Of like im-
What a plaintiff is entitled to is a cause of action for damages actually sustained when he has suffered injury, and a vested right to punitive, exemplary, vindictive or aggravated damages arises only when such damages have been allowed by a judgment in the plaintiff‘s favor. This statute does not take away the cause of action for breach of promise or the right to the damages actually sustained by the aggrieved party. What the statute does deny is a right in the plaintiff to aggravated or exemplary damages for a seduction and pregnancy alleged to have been induced in consequence of the trust and confidence imposed in the defendant by reason of his previous agreement to marry. The legislature could properly restrict the allowance of such damages without denying a constitutional right to them.
The trial court therefore was not in error insofar as it ordered those parts of counts II and III relating to the
Notwithstanding the fact that the damages for seduction, pregnancy and childbirth can be eliminated from a breach of promise action, without denying any constitutional right to them, the plaintiff nevertheless relies upon other constitutional principles as indicative of the invalidity of the breach of promise statutes.
Appellant urges that the act of 1947 relating to actions for breach of promise or agreement to marry is uncon-
Appellant relies on Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, wherein this court held a previous act known as the “Heart Balm” act in violation of
The legislature in adopting the act in question has merely held as public policy that punitive damages cannot be recovered under the action in question; and, in thus denying such damages as a basis of recovery, the act cannot be in contravention of
It is further contended that the act violates
The public policy of a State is to be found in its constitution and statutes (Smith v. Board of Education, 405 Ill. 143), and unless palpably arbitrary is not subject to judicial review. People v. Loitz, 412 Ill. 313; Spalding v. City of Granite City, 415 Ill. 274.
The act affecting all members of the same class, and being established as the public policy of the State, on the question involved, and not being arbitrary or unreasonable, does not violate
With reference to the act violating
The judgment of the circuit court of DeKalb County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. JUSTICE BRISTOW dissenting:
I cannot agree with the majority opinion on the con-
Primarily, I cannot accept the premise of the majority opinion that “The legislature in adopting the act in question has merely held as public policy that punitive damages cannot be recovered under the action in question.” That statement is in direct conflict with the terms of the act, and also with the prior portion of the opinion holding that the statute bars damages for the seduction and pregnancy, since such damages are not punitive, but rather compensatory in character, designed to recompense the injured party for the injury she sustained. (Fidler v. McKinley, 21 Ill. 308; Fitzinger v. Ahrens, 151 Ill. App. 396.) Furthermore, since the act does bar some compensatory damages, the statement in the majority opinion that the “actual damages” allowed by the statute are synonymous with “compensatory damages” is also inaccurate.
Moreover, after labelling the damages relating to the pregnancy and seduction as “aggravated,” and therеfore barred by the statute, the opinion approves the remaining prayers for relief in counts II and III, except the prayer in count II for aggravated damages. Yet count II deals entirely with the damages in consequence of the seduction and pregnancy, and count III claims a variety of elements of damage which are affected by the terms of
Before presenting my own conclusion with rеspect to the construction and validity of the statute in the light of its avowed purpose and legislative history, I shall review plaintiff‘s common-law right of action in order to properly evaluate the extent of the modification effected by the controverted statute.
The common-law action for breach of promise of marriage has been recognized in this State since the early case of Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446, decided in 1851. Illinois, in accordance with the weight of authority, (11 C.J.S. 808-812,) has allowed damages in such actions for such elements as mental anguish, injuries to plaintiff‘s health, reputation, future marriage prospects, loss of financial and social advantage which would have resulted from the marriage, (Jacoby v. Stark, 205 Ill. 34; Douglas v. Gausman, 68 Ill. 170; Witton v. Nelson, 294 Ill. App. 612,) as well as damages for any seduction or pregnancy under the promise of marriage, (Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446; Fidler v. McKinley, 21 Ill. 308; Judy v. Sterrett, 153 Ill. 94; Poehlmann v. Kertz, 204 Ill. 418; Nelson v. Sutton, 232 Ill. App. 93,) and exemplary or punitive damages if defendant were guilty of fraud or deceit, or was moved by evil motives in making the promise or breach thereof. McQuillen v. Evans, 353 Ill. 239; Jacoby v. Stark, 205 Ill. 34.
With respect to these elements of damage, it is significant to note that damages for seduction have been allowed in this action since its inception, as a recompense to plaintiff for her injury, rather than to punish the defendant. (Tubbs v. Van Kleek, 12 Ill. 446; Fidler v. McKinley, 21 Ill. 308;
In 1935, however, the action for breach of promise was abolished by the Heart Balm Act, (
Similar statutes were enacted at the same session respecting actions for alienation of affections (
This section sets forth the legislative concern over abuses of the action, the conviction that the award of monetary damages in such actions is ineffective as a recompense for genuine mental or emotional distress, and the declaration of public policy that the best interests of the people will be served by limiting the damages in such actions, and by leaving the punishment of wrongdoers guilty of seduction to proceedings under the criminal laws of the State, rather than by imposing punitive, exemplary, vindictive or aggravated damages.
Although the statute is by no means unequivocal, it appears that the foregoing section evidences a legislative intent not merely to abolish punitive and exemplary damages, as found by the majority opinion, but also to restrict the compensatory damages by excluding damages for the greater injury of seduction and pregnancy, and for the mental and emotional distress caused by the breach of a promise of marriage, all of which have been integral elements of damage in such action since its inceptiоn at common law. Holcroft v. Dickinson, 124 Eng. Rep. 933 (1672); 4 Sutherland, Damages, 3662.
It must be determined next whether these modifications infringe the constitutional guaranties of
“Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation; he ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly, and without delay.”
Although the controverted statute does not completely abolish plaintiff‘s right to bring an action for breach of promise, as did the statute condemned in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, the “certain remedy” afforded plaintiff under this act does not compensate her for the injuries sustained. The mоnetary loss, for which damages are allowed, is small in actions of this character, as compared with the loss of community respect, injury to reputation, and mental distress, for which damages are barred.
I am cognizant that the legislature, pursuant to the police power, may modify or abolish such nonvested rights to damages, (Grasse v. Dealer‘s Transport Co. 412 Ill. 179; People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367,) and that the act in question was enacted in the exercise of this power. However, the legislative determination of what constitutes a lawful exercise of the police power is not conclusive, and it is the province of the courts to determine whether the measure has any real substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety or welfare, or is essentially arbitrary and unreasonable. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 563; Thillens, Inc. v. Hodge, 2 Ill. 2d 45; Klein v. Department of Registration and Education, 412 Ill. 75.
The police power is invoked herein because of the legislative concern over the potential abuse of the breach of promise action, and to prevent spurious suits. These grounds, however, have been rejected by this court as a justification for the exercise of the police power in Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, since “Almost any common-law cause of action may be used, and at times is used by black-
Although the statutes in the Schupp and Wilder cases abolished the action entirely, the exercise of the police power does not become more reasonable or appropriate where the action remains available, but with the greater part of the recovery barred. For it is patent from the terms of this act, whereby plaintiff is precluded from recovering for the real injury which she sustained, and its legislative history indicating that it was enacted immediately after the statute abolishing breach of promise actions was held unconstitutional, that this statute was designed to accomplish essentially the same result by so restricting plaintiff‘s right to damages that the remedy would be nominal. Such chimerical rights do not satisfy constitutional guarantees, for the legislature cannot accomplish by indirection that which it cannot do directly. People ex rel. Bell v. New York Central Railroad Co. 10 Ill. 2d 612.
Moreover, it is not clear just how the legislative purpose of barring spurious breach of promise actions may be effectuated by allowing plaintiffs who are seduced under a prom-
Nor can the damage restrictions imposed by the act be justified as an exercise of the police power because of the difficulty of their computation, since it is equally difficult to compute the money value of pain and suffering for which damages are allowed by juries each day in personal injury actions, and the same elements barred herein are allowed in suits for slander (Moore v. Maxey, 152 Ill. App. 647); for malicious prosecution (Walker v. Martin, 52 Ill. 347); for fraud and deceit in aggravated cases (Laughlin v. Hopkinson, 292 Ill. 80); and for seduction of a minor daughter (Garretson v. Becker, 52 Ill. App. 255). In fact, the difficulty of computing certain types of compensatory damages has been recognized and rejected as a ground for their denial. In People v. Schwartz, 151 Ill. App. 190, 193, the court statеd: “In order to entitle a party to have damages estimated as an equivalent for the injury sustained, the loss to be compensated need not always be distinct and definite, capable of exact description or of exact measurement in dollars and cents. Damages are, in proper cases, allowable for injured feelings, bodily pain, grief of mind, injury to reputation, and for other suffering which it would be impossible to make subject of exact proof and computation in respect to the amount of the loss sustained.”
Therefore, since the damage restrictions imposed by the controverted act cannot be deemеd to constitute a lawful exercise of the police power, the deprivation of plaintiff‘s rights thereunder violates
It is further argued that the act violates
Defendant argues that the statute is not special because it affects all those having causes of action for breach of promise to marry. As hereinbefore noted, there is no rational distinction for limiting the elements of damage in such actions, any more than in any other common-law actions, since the same elements of damage are allowed in other actions, which, in turn, are also subject to abuse by unprincipled plaintiffs. Therefore, insofar as the limitation of damages in this act relieves defendants of liability for a substantial portion of the injury they have inflictеd, whereas other wrongdoers must recompense plaintiffs for injuries to reputation, seduction and mental anguish, this statute creates a special privilege for defendants guilty of breach of promise actions in violation of
It is argued further that the constitutionality of this act could be sustained if the statute were deemed to bar merely exemplary and punitive damages, and the term “actual damages” were construed to be completely synonymous with “compensatory damages,” so that plaintiff could recover for the mental anguish, humiliation, injury to reputation, loss of worldly position and opportunity to meet other suitors, seduction and pregnancy, and the expenses and loss of wages incurred thereby, all of which, plaintiff claims, were the actual and real results of defendant‘s breach of his promise to marry. (4 Sutherland, Damages,
Furthermore, to divide the cohesive legislative design to give plaintiff but a nominal remedy in these cases, by holding that thе restrictions of punitive and exemplary damages are a proper exercise of the police power, but that the restrictions of compensatory damages for the seduction and the mental and emotional distress offend the constitution, as hereinbefore noted, would be tantamount to the enactment of a law which the legislature never intended. Its scheme for restricting this action must be adjudged in its entirety.
It is my judgment, therefore, that inasmuch as the controverted statute is not a proper exercise of the police power and consequently violates