43 Ga. App. 210 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1931
Mrs. Belle Smith brought her action for damages against Georgia Power Company, to-recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her ten-year-old son, William Howard Smith, by reason of the negligence of the defendant. The only exception is to the judgment sustaining a general demurrer to the petition. The substance of so much of the petition as we deem necessary to illustrate the question raised by the general demurrer appears from the following statement: In 1929, at a time when the foliage was off the tree hereinafter mentioned, the defendant “purchased the entire electrical system of the City of Cedartown,” well knowing that the insulation was off a large portion of the wires of that system. As a part of said system, there was a “high-powered wire running from . . Broad Street into the ginning property of A. E. Young & Son.” Said wire “was connected with a pole near the office of said Ginning Company, and ran over the top of the little office building, which was right on the sidewalk, and through the foliage of a cottonwood tree adjacent to the north
The plaintiff invokes the doctrine of the “turn-table” cases, which is that one who sets before young children a temptation he has reason to believe may lead them into danger must use ordinary care to protect them from harm. Clary Maytag Co. v. Rhyne, 41 Ga. App. 72, 74 (151 S. E. 686); So. Cotton-Oil Co. v. Pierce, 145 Ga. 130, 132 (88 S. E. 672); Underwood v. W. & A. R. Co., 105 Ga. 48, 50 (31 S. E. 123); Manos v. Myers-Miller Furniture Co., 32 Ga. App. 644 (124 S. E. 357). This doctrine will not be extended to eases which do not come strictly within the principle upon which they rest. A. C. L. R. Co. v. Corbett, 150 Ga. 747 (105 S. E. 358); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Pierce, supra; S., F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Beavers, 113 Ga. 398, 413 (39 S. E. 82, 54 L. R. A. 314). The case last cited contains air exhaustive and instructive discussion of the principles underlying “turn-table” cases.
Having set out somewhat fully the pertinent parts of the petition in this case, we deem it unnecessary to make further reference to them. There can not be actionable negligence without breach of legal duty (S., F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Beavers, supra); and we are satisfied that the petition does not disclose the breach by the defendant of any such duty owed the injured child by it. A case quite similar to the one at bar is Bridges v. Ga. Power Co., 39 Ga. App. 400 (147 S. E. 589).
Judgment affirmed.