263 P. 1069 | Kan. | 1928
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The action was one against the mayor and council of the city of Liberal to enjoin the issuance of bonds, the proceeds of which were to be used to build a swimming pool in a city park. A demurrer to plaintiffs’ petition was sustained, and they appeal.
Plaintiffs alleged substantially that they were resident citizens and taxpayers of the city; that the city is of the second class; that the defendants were respectively mayor and councilmen and members of the park board; that a petition containing the signatures of
That is to say, the plaintiffs contend that bonds for park purposes can only be voted at a special election when the city council itself deems it expedient; that the governing body of the city did not in its judgment deem the building of a swimming pool expedient, but called the election only because of the filing of the petition, and that bonds cannot be issued by a city for the purpose of building a swimming pool.
Nor was there anything illegal in the action of the mayor and council in giving consideration to the petition as presented. The mayor and council are representatives of the people to carry out their will. It is not an unusual practice for the people through petition or otherwise to advise their legal representatives what action they desire, and it is commendatory rather than otherwise for such representatives to give conscientious consideration to and to endeavor to carry out the wishes of their constituents.
A contention that the proclamation calling the special election is illegal and void because published on the same day of the first publication of the ordinance authorizing the election, cannot be sustained. (State v. Clay Center, 76 Kan. 366, 91 Pac. 91.)
The contention that the city council called the election because of the filing of the petition and did not itself deem such action expedient, is without merit. The fact that the ordinance was considered by the council, was passed, and that the council is defending this action, is conclusive that the council deemed such action expedient. Having decided to make the improvement in the city park, the ordinance was passed authorizing the mayor to issue a proclamation calling the special election to vote on the question as to whether or not bonds in the sum of $12,000 should be issued for that purpose.
It is for the governing body of a city alone to determine whether or not the passage of such an ordinance is expedient. . The court will not substitute its judgment and discretion for that of a legislative
Nor does the statute require the city council to show in its records that it deemed the making of the improvements expedient. (Nelson v. School District, 100 Kan. 612, 164 Pac. 1075.)
The contention that a swimming pool (under proper conditions) is not a proper park improvement is without merit. In fact, a somewhat exhaustive examination of the authorities discloses no case in which one has heretofore had the hardihood to make such a contention. A city park is a place for recreation, rest and amusement, and in a semiarid district such as that in which the city of Liberal is located, where adequate watercourses and other bodies of water are lacking, and opportunities for participation in the pastime of swimming and bathing are lacking, it is hard to conceive of a more appropriate improvement for a city park than a well-constructed modem sanitary swimming pool. In discussing the reasons why a tourist camp is properly part and parcel of the modern municipal park, in State, ex rel., v. Dodge City, 123 Kan. 316, 318, 255 Pac. 387, it was remarked that "its maintenance as a part of the modern municipal park is not different in principle from maintenance of a swimming pool therein about which there is no longer contention.” In Bailey v. City of Topeka, 97 Kan. 327, 329, 154 Pac. 1014, bathing was recognized as a common recreation. It was said:
“Clearly, it is not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by the donor of the property that visitors to the park should be afforded facilities for obtaining refreshments, for boating and for bathing. No reason exists why they should not pay a fair price for what they eat or drink or for the boating or bathing equipment they use. The city might, through its employees, furnish these conveniences, directly collecting reasonable charges therefor.”
In Gilliland v. City of Topeka, 124 Kan. 726, 262 Pac. 493, where the court considered the question as to whether a swimming pool in a public park with its usual accessories is a nuisance, it was said:
”The swimming pool was doubtless attractive to children but it was not a nuisance, producing public annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or hurt. It was a feature of the park, tending to promote public health, happiness and welfare.”
Swimming is a universal recreation of the highest order. It is a most healthful, invigorating and agreeable exercise. It has an economic as well as a social value in conserving health. It strengthens
We conclude that cities with propriety may have parks with modern sanitary pools to which its citizens may resort for the benefit of their health. Whatever encourages or induces the ordinary “city shut-in” to seek exercise, relaxation, recreation or healthful amusement is a means redounding to the public welfare and should be approved. (See City of Wichita v. Clapp, ante p. 100, 263 Pac. 12, and authorities cited ante.) The proposed swimming pool is a park improvement of the highest type. The plaintiffs present no legal obstacle to such improvement.
The judgment is affirmed.