Smith v. FontesSmith v. Fontes
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Lopez, Timmer, Bolick, Beene, Montgomery, King, Brutinel
COUNSEL:
Roy Herrera, Daniel A. Arellano, Jane W. Ahern, Austin T. Marshall, Herrera Arellano LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for April Smith, Nira Lee, and Joshua Davidian
Andrew Gould, Drew C. Ensign, Dallin B. Holt, Brennan A.R. Bowen, Daniel Tilleman, Holtzman Vogel Baran Torchinsky & Josefiak PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Arizona Free Enterprise Club, Susan Garvey, Kathleen Liles, and John Shadegg
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Kara Karlson, Karen J. Hartman-Tellez, Kyle Cummings, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Adrian P. Fontes
Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden III, Katlyn J. Divis, Fusion Law, PLLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Warren Petersen and Ben Toma
Mary R. O‘Grady, Andrew G. Pappas, Travis C. Hunt, Emma Cone-Roddy, Osborn Maledon, P.A., Phoenix, Attorneys for Make Elections Fair PAC
Timothy Sandefur, Scharf-Norton Center for Constitutional Litigation, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Goldwater Institute
Stephen W. Tully, Tully Bailey, LLP, Scottsdale, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Stephen I. Richer
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General, Hayleigh S. Crawford, Nathan T. Arrowsmith, Joshua G. Nomkin, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorney General‘s Office
Joseph Kanefield, Charlene A. Warner, Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Ken Bennett and Helen Purcell
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, JUSTICES BOLICK, BEENE, MONTGOMERY, KING, and BRUTINEL (Ret.) joined.*
VICE CHIEF JUSTICE LOPEZ, Opinion of the Court:
¶1 We explain today the reason for our prior decision order dismissing the challenge to Proposition 140—the “Make Elections Fair Act” initiative (the “Initiative“)—for the November 2024 general election ballot. The thrust of the Initiative was to comprehensively change candidate elections in Arizona by replacing partisan primaries with an open primary. Although this Court‘s dismissal of the challenge permitted the Initiative to remain on the ballot, Arizona voters ultimately rejected the measure.
¶2 We hold that
BACKGROUND
¶3 Beginning in November 2023, the Make Elections Fair PAC (the “Committee“) circulated a statewide initiative petition seeking to amend the Arizona Constitution‘s partisan
¶4 On July 3, 2024, the Committee filed an estimated 584,124 signatures with the Secretary of State, Adrian Fontes (the “Secretary“). The Secretary determined that 559,379 of these signatures were eligible for verification pursuant to
¶5 That same day, April Smith, Nira Lee, and Joshua Davidian (“Smith Plaintiffs“) and the Arizona Free Enterprise Club, Susan Garvey, Kathleen Liles, and John Shadegg (“AFEC Plaintiffs“) filed separate complaints against the State, the Secretary, and the Committee challenging the Initiative. The trial court consolidated the two cases. Together, the Smith and AFEC Plaintiffs (collectively “Plaintiffs“) alleged the Initiative violated the Arizona Constitution‘s separate amendment rule, see
¶6 Faced with an August 22 ballot printing deadline, the trial court set an expedited case schedule and bifurcated Plaintiffs’ challenges. First, the court ordered Plaintiffs to brief and argue their legal challenges concerning the separate amendment rule and petition summary. Then, the court scheduled a two-day trial on Plaintiffs’ fact-intensive signature challenges. The court also appointed a special master to address some of Plaintiffs’ objections to the Initiative signatures.
¶7 On August 9, the trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ separate amendment and petition summary challenges and denied injunctive relief. Plaintiffs appealed, and we affirmed the trial court‘s ruling on August 22, leaving only the signature challenges.
¶8 On August 15, after a two-day hearing, the trial court issued a final judgment concerning the signature challenges. First, the court categorically overruled Plaintiffs’ duplicate signature challenges (“Objection 21“), finding that the voluminous summary exhibits used to prove these challenges were inadmissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 1006. Consequently, the court ruled that Plaintiffs categorically failed to prove any duplicate signatures by clear and convincing evidence. Second, based on prior evidentiary rulings, the court determined that the Committee presented sufficient valid signatures to satisfy the 383,923 constitutional minimum and ordered the Secretary to certify the Initiative for the ballot once the remaining counties reported their final certifications. Plaintiffs immediately appealed. On August 19, after the county recorders had completed their signature verifications, the Secretary certified the Initiative for the ballot.
¶9 On August 21, we reversed the trial court‘s Objection 21 ruling that categorically rejected Plaintiffs’ duplicative signature challenges. We remanded to the trial court to examine the exhibits and determine whether Plaintiffs proved any duplicate signatures. If the trial court found any duplicates, we instructed it to recalculate the number of valid signatures and make a new ballot eligibility determination.
¶10 The next morning, the trial court held a status conference with the parties. In the hearing, the court learned that the ballot-printing deadline changed from 11:59 p.m. that day to 6:00 a.m. the following morning—August 23. With the printing deadline looming, Plaintiffs asked the court to rule on the Objection 21 exhibits that day. The court refused, citing the practical impossibility of the task. Plaintiffs filed an emergency special action petition with this Court that evening arguing the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to review the exhibits before the printing deadline.
¶11 On August 23, this Court accepted jurisdiction. We rejected the Committee‘s argument
¶12 On remand, the trial court appointed a new special master, who completed his review of the Objection 21 alleged duplicate signatures on September 17. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing the following day. The parties briefed their positions concerning the current signature counts and validity of the Initiative. At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from the parties’ experts, and argument on the mootness of Plaintiffs’ challenge and the court‘s remedial authority. The court also heard the Committee‘s new argument that the statute directing the Secretary‘s final calculation—
¶13 On September 19, the trial court entered its final judgment. The court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Initiative challenge for three reasons. First, the lapsed August 23 printing deadline rendered the challenge moot. Second,
DISCUSSION
¶14 We review de novo the “interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions regarding initiatives.” Molera v. Reagan, 245 Ariz. 291, 294 ¶ 8 (2018).
¶15 The trial court rejected Plaintiffs’ Initiative challenge on three grounds: mootness, unconstitutionality, and lack of remedial authority. We hold that
I.
¶16 We begin by examining the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the signature requirements for constitutional initiatives.
A.
¶17 “The right to initiate constitutional amendments and propose statutes was retained by the people when delegating legislative authority to the Arizona legislature.” Stanwitz v. Reagan, 245 Ariz. 344, 346 ¶ 2 (2018). To proffer a constitutional initiative, the interested party must submit signatures “equal to” 15% of all qualified electors.
¶18 The founders of the Arizona Constitution deliberately selected a 15% signature threshold to qualify initiatives for the ballot—nothing more, nothing less. During the
B.
¶19
¶20 At this final stage, the Secretary calculates the total number of valid signatures based on a three-step statutory formula. The Secretary begins with the total number of eligible signatures.
¶21 Second, the Secretary subtracts “[a]ll signatures that were found ineligible by the county recorders” but not previously subtracted.
¶22 In the third and final step of the formula, the Secretary subtracts from the remaining signatures the number determined by applying the invalidity percentage rate. See
¶23 Given the difficulty of conveying this mathematical equation linguistically when such concepts are typically best illustrated visually, we offer the following summary of
Total eligible signatures: X
Step 1: Subtract all signatures removed pursuant to
§ 19-121.01(A) paragraph 1 by the Secretary, county recorders, or by individual challenges.Step 2: Subtract other signatures disqualified by county recorders or adjudicated ineligible by individual challenges.
Step 3: Multiply the remaining signatures by the validity rate.
= total valid signatures
¶24 Notably, this formula mandates a double counting of some invalid signatures. This occurs when “deducting signatures found invalid by county recorders” in step two “and then using the same number as the numerator in determining the invalidity rate” in step three. See Mussi, 255 Ariz. at 404 ¶ 51; id. at 408 ¶ 67 (Timmer, VCJ., concurring and dissenting in part) (“By deducting the signatures disqualified by the county recorders and also applying the invalidity percentage rate to the total number of eligible signatures initially identified by the Secretary, disqualified signatures are counted twice.“); City of Flagstaff v. Mangum, 164 Ariz. 395, 404 (1990) (“We recognize that the method we have set forth will still result in a percentage of the invalid signatures in the random sample being deducted twice.“). Both parties’ experts testified to the illogic of this calculus. The Committee‘s expert testified that “when the county recorders remove signatures from the 5% sample as invalid, subtracting those signatures from the Population and then applying the validity rate to the Population is mathematically indefensible.” Plaintiffs’ expert conceded this point.
¶25 Double counting of invalid signatures occurs because the invalidity rate represents both the signatures actually disqualified by the county recorders and the projected ineligible signatures in the total population; it is duplicative to deduct both. Logic suggests that the Secretary should not subtract the signatures disqualified by the county recorders and instead use that number merely to determine and apply the validity rate. But in Mussi and Mangum, we concluded that
II.
¶26 We now consider
¶27 To equal or exceed the 15% constitutional signature threshold, the Committee had to produce 383,923 valid signatures to require the Secretary to place the Initiative on the November 2024 general ballot. The Secretary began with 559,379 eligible signatures, which was reduced after subtracting signatures invalidated by the counties, the trial court, and the special master pursuant to
¶28 The Initiative‘s ballot eligibility turned on whether the court double counted the 6,616 signatures invalidated by the counties as required by
¶29 The Committee argues that
¶30 We conclude that effectively increasing the signature threshold in this case from 15% to 15.2% violates the Arizona Constitution for three reasons. First, the increase is not insignificant—it is dispositive. Here,
¶31 Second, the legislative leaders’ attempt to justify the “small” increase to the 15% threshold as “negligible,” despite its fatal effect on the Initiative, overlooks the founders’ concerns regarding the initiative signature requirement. See Goff, supra ¶ 18, at 690. We cannot so readily dismiss the founders’ express constitutional requirement that signatures equate to “a number of qualified
¶32 Finally, we find Turley v. Bolin, 27 Ariz. App. 345 (1976), pertinent and persuasive. In Turley, the court of appeals invalidated a statute that accelerated the constitutionally established filing date for initiative petitions. Id. at 350. There, the circulators submitted their petitions by the Arizona Constitution‘s filing date (four months before the election) but failed to meet the controlling statutory deadline (five months before the election). Id. at 347. In defense of the statute‘s deadline, the challengers argued that the founders would have permitted a five-month filing deadline to account for the increased demands of population growth. Id. at 348–49. They also argued that the constitution merely established a filing schedule floor—not a ceiling—because it provided that a petition must be filed “not less than four months preceding the date of the election.” See
[W]e necessarily reject appellants’ contention that by using the words ‘. . . not less than four months . . .’ the framers of the constitution intended to provide a flexible filing standard subject to change at will by the legislature, whenever changing conditions might appear to the legislature to justify a departure from the initially mandated constitutional standard.
Turley, 27 Ariz. App. at 350. The court also reasoned that this filing requirement was “not subject to future derogation by the legislature” in light of the “important legislative rights reserved in the people” (i.e., the initiative powers) which are not “subordinate to any legislative rights vested in the legislature.” Id.
¶33 The principle voiced in Turley applies with even greater force here. Unlike in Turley, the 15% signature threshold for constitutional initiatives is express and is not even arguably flexible because it is a fixed point. Article 21, section 1‘s text—“equal to“—and the records of the constitutional convention establish the unambiguous meaning and purpose of the 15% signature requirement. Because the right to present a constitutional initiative rests with the citizens’ constitutionally reserved legislative powers, the legislature cannot invoke its own authority to deviate from the 15% standard. See id.
¶34 In sum, we hold that
CONCLUSION
¶35 Although every statewide constitutional initiative is subject to