ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. No. 96
Plaintiffs allege that the Healthcare Defendants
I BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
The Healthcare Defendants operate websites that publish information about medical conditions and treatments. Compl. ¶¶ 2-3, 107-206, Dkt. No. 1. For instance, visitors to http://www.cancer.net/ (operated by Defendant American Society of Clinical Oncology) can.read articles on topics.like cancer treatment, types of cancer, and recent research in the field.
Facebook is a “free social networking service that -allows people to connect and share content.” Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD”) 1, Dkt. No. 96. It makes money by letting third parties show adé to its users. Id. To improve ad targeting, it “collects information about people’s browsing activities, mainly on Facebook but also on third-party websites that host Facebook tools and features,” Id.
Plaintiffs are registered Facebook users who visited the Healthcare -Defendants’ websites. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 6-8.
B. How Visitors Communicate with the Healthcare Defendants’ Websites
To access one of the Healthcare Defendants’ websites, a visitor might type www. cancer,net into the address bar . of her web browser and click the “Go” button. The browser then sends a message called a “GET request”
The web server responds with code that tells the visitor’s browser how the page should appear. For example,' the code might 'instruct the browser to display the phrase “timely, comprehensive, oncologist-approved information” as italic white text
The user might click a link to visit another page. That click triggers a second GET request that is similar to the first, but it requests a page at a new URL — for instance, it might ask for http://www. cancer.net/caneer-types/ instead of http:// www.cancer.net/. The second request includes a “referer header” that contains the address of the first page.
C. How Facebook Tracks Visitors’ Web Browsing Activity
Website owners can add Facebook functionality to their sites using tools that Fa-cebook provides. Id. ¶¶78, 84; see also Social Plugins, Facebook for Developers, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/ plugins/ [https://perma.cc/NL8B-859K/] (last visited April 25, 2017). For example, sites can add “Like” or “Share” buttons that let visitors share content on Face-book. Someone reading an article about cancer treatment could click a “Share” button to post the article to Facebook.
To display a Facebook button, a website owner embeds a code snippet that Face-book provides. When someone visits a page where a Facebook button is embedded, the visitor’s browser makes two GET requests. First, it makes an ordinary request to load the page, as explained above. Second, the Facebook code snippet triggers a background request to Facebook’s servers. The Facebook server responds with code that makes the button appear on the page. The communication with Face-book happens silently; a savvy user could use tools to watch her browser exchange information behind the scenes, but the connection to Facebook’s servers is invisible by default. The request to Facebook includes a referer header containing the address of the page where the Facebook button is embedded. So, when someone reads a page on cancer.net that contains a Facebook “Like” button, Facebook knows which page that person visited.
Facebook uses these background requests to uniquely identify people. It uses at least three identification techniques. First, a visitor will likely have a unique IP address
Using these techniques, Facebook can identify individual users and watch as they browse third-party websites like cancer.net.
Plaintiffs allege that Facebook used the techniques described above to. uniquely identify Plaintiffs (and class members) and track the pages they visited on the Healthcare Defendants’ websites. Id. ¶¶85, 97, 102. Based on this conduct, they bring causes of action against Facebook and the Healthcare Defendants for violations of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (id. ¶¶ 249-94), the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 631(a), 682 (id.. ¶¶ 305-21), and privacy protections under the California Constitution (id. ¶¶ 322-31), as well as common-law tort claims for intrusion upon seclusion (id ¶¶ 295-304) and negligence per se (id. ¶¶ 332-37). They also bring causes of action against Face-book (but not the Healthcare Defendants) for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing (id. ¶¶ 348-62), fraud (id. ¶¶ 363-68), and quantum meruit (id. ¶¶ 396-72). Finally, they bring causés of action against the Healthcare Defendants (but not Facebook) for negligent disclosure of confidential information (id. ¶¶ 338-42) and breach of the fiduciary duty -of confidentiality (id. ¶¶ 343^7).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A.Rule 12(b)(1)
Dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch.,
B.. Rule 12(b)(2)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) alows dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. When the motion to dismiss is a defendant’s first response to the complaint, the plaintiff need .only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc.,
C. Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency' of claims alleged in the complaint. Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington,
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because (among other reasons) this Court lacks personal jurisdic
A. This Court lacks personal juris* diction over the Healthcare Defendants.
Neither Plaintiffs nor the Healthcare Defendants are. California residents (Compl. ¶¶ 6-9, 10-16), but Plaintiffs, contend that the Healthcare Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in California because -they participate in sending Plaintiffs’ data to Facebook. Pis,’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Opp’n”) 12, Dkt. No. 105 (arguing that the Healthcare Defendants “continuously and systematically send users’ sensitive medical information to Facebook; which is headquartered in California, each and every time a user sends a GET request to the health care Defendants’ respective websites”).
When no applicable federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, a district. court applies the law of the state where the court sits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen,
i. Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when (1) the non-resident defendant purposefully directs activities to the forum or purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum; (2) -the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Schwarzenegger,
Purposeful availment and purposeful direction are distinct concepts. Id. “A showing that a defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in a forum state typically consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions in the forum, such as executing or performing a contract there.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
By contrast, a “showing that a defendant purposefully directed his conduct toward a forum state ... usually consists of evidence of the defendant’s actions outside the forum state that are directed at the forum, such as the distribution in the forum state of goods originating elsewhere.” Schwarzenegger,
Nothing in Plaintiffs’ allegations suggests that the Healthcare Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of doing business in California. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that the Healthcare Defendants “purposefully directed their activity to California” by “sendpng] users’ sensitive medical communications to Facebook every time a user sends a GET request to the health care Defendants’ respective websites.” Opp’n 12.
To evaluate purposeful direction, courts in the Ninth Circuit apply the three-part test from Calder v. Jones,
Plaintiffs have satisfied the first prong (“an intentional act”). The Healthcare Defendants acted intentionally when they embedded Facebook code on their websites.
Under the second prong (“expressly aimed at the forum state”), Plaintiffs’ theory is that the Healthcare Defendants , expressly aimed their conduct at California by “continuously and systematically sendpng] users’ sensitive -medical communications to Facebook .... ” Opp’n 12.
Facebook’s tracking is indeed continuous and systematic. Every time someone views a page containing a Facebook button on one of the Healthcare Defendants’ sites (or elsewhere on the internet), Facebook logs that visit and correlates it with the visitor’s other activity. Systematic tracking is the point: Facebook improves its ad targeting, and makes more money, by gathering comprehensive information about its users’- browsing habits.
But the comprehensiveness of Face-book’s tracking does not establish that the Healthcare Defendants “send” information to Facebook, as Plaintiffs suggest. More accurately, they embed code that creates a new connection between a visitor’s browser and a Facebook server. The website’s decision to embed the code allows that connection to occur, but the connection happens independently. Besides triggering a second GET request in the user’s browser, the Healthcare Defendants play no part in the exchange of data between Facebook and Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs also admit that they do not know whether the Healthcare Defendants were aware that Facebook used embedded buttons' to track their visitors. Compl. ¶ 105. Personal jurisdiction cannot be based on the possibility that 'the Healthcare Defendants’ acts could have foreseeable effects in California. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc.,
But even if the Healthcare Defendants knew that Facebook tracks users via “Share” and “Like” buttons, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support the conclusion that the Healthcare Defendants targeted
Because they did not purposefully direct activities to California or purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business in California (Schwarzenegger,
ii. General Personal Jurisdiction
General personal jurisdiction exists when a corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -,
iii. Forum Selection Clause
Plaintiffs argue that “Facebook users, including web developers and operators like the health care Defendants, submit to this Court’s personal jurisdiction for the purpose of all claims related to Facebook.” Opp’n 13. Their argument is based on the forum selection clause in Facebook’s Terms of Service:
You will resolve any claim, cause of action or dispute (claim) you have with us arising out of or relating to this Statement or Facebook exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state court located in San Mateo County, and you agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction of such courts for the purpose of litigating all such claims.
Compl. Ex. A at 3.
This clause applies only to disputes between the Healthcare Defendants and Facebook. See id. (stating that the forum shall be the Northern District of California for “any claim, cause of action or dispute ... you have with us”) (emphasis added). It does not create personal jurisdiction in California over the Healthcare Defendants when they are sued by third parties, even if Facebook is also a defendant.
B. Plaintiffs consented to Face-book’s tracking activity.
Plaintiffs agreed to several Facebook policies when they signed up for accounts (Compl. ¶¶ 58-78), including Facebook’s Data Policy:
We collect information when you visit or use third-party websites and apps that use our Services (like when they offer our Like button or Facebook Log In or use our measurement and advertising services). This includes information about the websites and apps you visit, your use of our Services on those websites and apps, as well as information the developer or publisher of the app or website provides to you or us.
Compl. Ex. A at 2. Facebook’s Cookie Policy also contains several broad disclosures, including information about how Fa-cebook tracks users to improve its ad targeting:
Cookies are small files that are placed on your browser or device by the website or app you’re using or ad you’re viewing. Pixel tags (also called clear GIFs, web beacons, or pixels) are small blocks of code on a webpage or app that allow them to do things like read and place cookies and transmit information to us or our partners. The resulting connection can include information such
as a device’s IP address, the time a person viewed the pixel, an identifier associated with the browser or device and the type of browser being used.
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Things like Cookies and similar technologies (such as information about your device or a pixel on a website) are used to understand and deliver ads, make them more relevant to you, and analyze products and services and the use of those products and services.
For example, we use cookies so we, or our affiliates and partners, can serve you ads that may be interesting to you on Facebook Services or other websites and mobile applications.
Compl. Ex. C at 1-2.
Plaintiffs give several reasons why they believe these policies do not adequately disclose that Facebook collects information about its users when they visit third-party websites. First, Plaintiffs argue that Facebook’s disclosure is “buried in a Terms of Service or Privacy Policy that may never be viewed.” Opp’n 19 (quoting Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp.,
Plaintiffs suggest that because “sensitive medical information” is involved, Facebook must meet a stricter disclosure standard under the Health Insurance Portability. and Accountability Act (“HI-PAA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (and under similar state-law provisions in Gal. Civ. Code § 1798.91). Opp’n 14-17. Under HIPAA, “protected health information” is defined as “individually identifiable” information that is “created or received by a health care provider” (or similar entities) that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual,” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. To disclose protected health information about a person, a the disclosing party must obtain the person’s signed, written consent (among other requirements). 45 C.F.R. § 164.508. According to Plaintiffs, the disclosures in Facebook’s policies do not meet HIPAA’s heightened authorization requirements.
Plaintiffs’ argument fails because Face-book did not collect “protected health information.” As discussed above, requests to Facebook’s servers can include several types of information about the user, including browser settings, language, operating system, IP address, and the contents of cookies that Facebook has set. But that same information is transmitted to Face-book every time a user visits any page on the internet that contains a Facebook button. Nothing about that information relates specifically to Plaintiffs’ health. The only difference between those requests is the referer header, which contains the URL of the page where the Facebook button is embedded. The URLs at issue in this case, point to pages containing information about treatment options for melanoma,
Plaintiffs’ consent bars their statutory causes of action against Facebook. Plaintiffs’ claim under the Wiretap Act fails because “consent of one of the parties to the communication [is] sufficient to preclude liability under the Wiretap Act.” Backhaut v. Apple, Inc.,
Plaintiffs’ consent also bars their common-law ‘tort claims and their claim for invasion of privacy under the California Constitution. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3515 (“He who consents to an' act" is not wronged by it.”); Kent v. Microsoft Corp., No. SACV13-0091 DOC ANX,
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
Courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); In re Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd.,
In this case, no consistent amendment could support a finding of personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants. Both the Plaintiffs and the Healthcare Defendants reside in other states. Plaintiffs’ theory of personal jurisdiction is that the Healthcare Defendants embedded Facebook tools on their websites, which allowed some of Plaintiffs’ browsing data to be sent to Facebook. This activity is insufficient as a matter of law to confer jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants in California. No further allegations consistent with the original complaint could change this conclusion.
Likewise, no amendment could change the fact that Plaintiffs consented to Facebook’s conduct. Facebook’s policies disclose the precise activity at issue in this case. See, e.g., Compl. Ex. A at 2 (“We collect information when you visit or use third-party websites and apps that use our Services (like when they offer our Like button or Facebook Log In or use our measurement and advertising services).”); id. Ex. C at 1-2 (disclosing that Facebook uses a variety of techniques to track users on third-party sites, and explaining that the “resulting connection [to Facebook’s servers] can include information such as a device’s IP address, the time a person viewed the [site], an identifier associated with the browser or device and the type of browser being used”). Plaintiffs admit that they understood and agreed to Facebook’s policies. No further allegations could allow Plaintiffs to bring claims “arising out of conduct which they consented to.” Kent,
Because amendment would be futile, the Court will dismiss the complaint without leave to amend.
V. CONCLUSION
This Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Healthcare Defendants because Plaintiffs have not established that the Healthcare Defendants have minimum contacts with California. Plaintiffs’ claims against Facebook fail because Plaintiffs consented to Facebook’s conduct. As such, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. The Clerk shall close this file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. ■ The “Healthcare Defendants” are seven hospitals and healthcare organizations: American Cancer Society, Inc.; American Society of Clinical Oncology, Inc.; Melanoma Research Foundation; Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation; BJC Health System d/b/a BJC Healthcare; Cleveland Clinic of Texas; and University of Texas — MD Anderson Cancer Center.
. The mechanics of GET requests are described at Compl. ¶¶ 21-52 and MTD 3-5; see also R. Fielding et ah, RFC 2068; Hypertext Transfer Protocol — HTTP/1.1, Internet. Engineering Task Force (Jan. 1997), https://www. ietf.org/rfc/rfc2068.txt [https://perma.ee/2X3E-SYQV/d.
. However, IP addresses can be shared among several users. For instance, users on the same Wi-Fi network will have the same public IP address.
. http://www.cancer.net/cancer-types/ melanoma/treatment-options (Compl. ¶ 132),
. .http://www.shawneemission.org/find-adoctor?doctor=Scott-E-Ashcraft-MD-1407822869#.U77dgKhRa-k (Compl. ¶ 161).
. http://my.clevelandclinic.org/search/results? q=intestine% 20transplant (Compl. ¶ 188).
. https://www.mdanderson.org/publications/ cancerwise/2012/06/ metastatic-melanoma-a-wife-reflects-on-husbands-shocking-diag-nos.html (Compl. ¶ 202).
.Plaintiffs note that Facebook "knows the contents of communications between users and websites” because, every 30 days, it scrapes the contents of pages containing Fa-cebook buttons. Compl. ¶ 86. This allegation only highlights the fact that the Healthcare Defendants’ websites do not contain individualized health care information: Facebook’s scraper only collects publicly available information on the Healthcare Defendant's websites, regardless of whether Plaintiffs (or others) visited those sites.
