Joyce Crump, appellee, sued James Smith, Jr., appellant, in the State Court of DeKalb County on March 9, 1995, for injuries received in a motor vehicle collision which occurred on November 17, 1994. Appellant was timely served on March 16, 1995, and answered on April 14, 1995, demanding a jury trial.
*53 The case came up on the jury calendar on February 9, 1996. Appellant filed a timely motion in limine, seeking to exclude the qualification of the jury with appellant’s insurance carrier. The case was called for trial on February 20, 1996, when the motion in limine was heard and denied.
The jury returned a verdict for the appellee on February 22, 1996, in the amount of $1,050,597, and judgment was entered on February 28, 1996. A motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial was filed on March 7, 1996. The motion was heard and denied on May 6, 1996. Notice of appeal was filed on June 4, 1996.
At trial, the evidence showed that appellee received significant soft tissue and neurological injuries to her spine, and following spinal surgery to remove discs and fuse her cervical spine, her medical expenses totaled $36,148.91. Appellee’s complaints involved severe headaches, neck pain, radicular pain from the neck down the arm, low back pain, left knee injury, right ankle injury, inability to sleep, depression, and associated short temper. Dr. Saba, appellee’s neurologist, found right ankle swelling, weakness in the left knee, decreased sensation at the right C-7 vertebra, 30 percent reduction in range of motion in the neck and low back, and muscle spasms in the neck and low back. Dr. Saba’s diagnosis as of January 10, 1995, consisted of post concussion syndrome, depression, headaches, strained knee and ankle, and severe injury to the low back and neck, indicating multiple disc herniations. After an M.R.I. had been performed, Dr. Saba diagnosed a displaced L5-S1 disc, a disc problem at C3-4, and herniated discs at C4-5, C5-6, and C6-7. Dr. Goodman, appellee’s neurosurgeon, saw her on June 20, 1995, and performed a myelogram on her on June 28, 1995, which confirmed that she had large disc herniations at C4-5 and C6-7, with likely herniation at C56. On August 28, 1995, Dr. Goodman performed a cervical spinal fusion after surgically removing the affected discs. As late as November 1995, Dr. Goodman found postoperative muscle spasms and pain, which prevented appellee from being able to work. Dr. Saba, on October 31, 1995, found that appellee had headaches and chronic sleep problems. Prior to surgery, appellee’s disability rating to the body as a whole had been at 19 percent; after surgery the rating was reduced to 17 percent.
Appellee had limited education and job skills, having previously worked in the hotel/motel industry as a housekeeper, earning $4.25 per hour. She was totally disabled from returning to this or any other physical work by her injuries. She was 38 years of age at trial and her injuries were permanent, with future pain and suffering expected.
1. Appellant’s first enumeration of error contends that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to be qualified as to appellant’s *54 insurance liability carrier, causing prejudice to appellant.
The first qualification of a jury as to insurance occurred in
City of Sandersville v. Moye,
In
Bibb Mfg. Co. v. Williams,
The Supreme Court held that it was reversible error not to voir dire and to remove all jurors who were employees or stockholders, or related by blood or by marriage to a stockholder or employee, of an insurance company interested in the case. In
Atlanta Coach Co. v. Cobb,
This Court, not unmindful of the incidental effect of qualifying the jury as to the insurance carrier, has consistently held that it would be reversible error not to do so, because, presumptively, such failure would be harmful to the plaintiff in obtaining a fair and impartial jury. In
Shepherd Constr. Co. v. Vaughn,
In
Weatherbee v. Hutcheson,
Only after
Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express,
Chief Judge Beasley made a well-reasoned special concurrence in
Franklin v. Tackett,
supra. It is highly seductive in its logic: “Without the link of knowledge, there is no disqualifying interest, because the interest will not affect the decision-making.” Id. at 453. Ignorance is purifying of interest; so long as the juror remains in ignorance and never suspects that there is an interest, what harm can there be.
*56
However, what if they were not truthful in their voir dire to disclose employment or stock ownership on purpose; what if during the trial they suddenly become aware of their interest; or what if, more insidious, someone reveals the common interest between the juror and the party on trial by a company logo on a lapel pin, stationery, file folder or anything that would make the association in the juror’s mind? The issue is not whether or not the juror can be fair and impartial while having the interest; if this were the issue, then ignorance would prevent prejudice. The issue is the per se disqualification under OCGA § 15-12-135, as a matter of law, with the presumption of prejudice. See
Patterson v. Lauderback,
This Court is bound by such precedent to hold that the trial court did not err in having the jury qualified as to the insurer. See
Strickland v. Stubbs,
2. The second enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in denying the motion for remittitur or, in the alternative, a motion for new trial, on the grounds that the verdict was excessive and that it manifestly appears from the record that the verdict was the result of prejudice, bias, corruption, or gross mistake.
OCGA § 51-12-12 does not empower the trial judge to reduce an award, but empowers the trial judge to seek the parties to accept an additur or remittitur upon the threat of a new trial and allows the judge to order a new trial on the issue of damages only; refusal by either party to accept leaves the judge with the power only to grant or to deny a new trial and to decide what issues will be retried. See
Spence v. Hilliard,
The motion alleges “[t]hat the verdict was based on passion, undue bias, gross mistake, or prejudice.” However, the trial transcript reveals no improper arguments, inflammatory testimony, prejudicial evidence with no probative value, or appeals to prejudice such as to excite “passion, undue bias, gross mistake or prejudice.”
The evidence at trial showed a plaintiff who received serious permanent injuries to her cervical spine, requiring surgery to remove multiple discs and to accomplish the fusion of her neck. Appellee is a woman of limited education and job skills; thus the permanent physical impairment on her ability to lift, bend, twist, stoop and perform other physical activities has permanently precluded her from securing any job that she was previously capable of handling; and has also limited her other life activities. At 38 years of age, appellee has a long life of foreseeable medical problems related to her injuries, as well as mental pain and suffering. The chronic depression and sleep problems are part of the pain and suffering.
Under Georgia law, pain and suffering in the past, present, and future are measured by the enlightened conscience of a fair and impartial jury. There exists no rule or yardstick against which damages for pain and suffering are to be measured, as suggested by the appellant, who would have such damages as some multiple of special damages for medical expenses and lost wages. The reason is simple; if such an objective yardstick is applied, then the young, the old, the sick, the disabled, the rich, the poor, the unemployed, and the underemployed would be treated differently than the fully employed when having such special damage cap would apply. See
Atlanta &c. R. Co. v. Wood,
“ ‘Before the verdict will be set aside on the ground that it is excessive, where there is no direct proof of prejudice or bias, the amount thereof, when considered in connection with all the facts, must shock the moral sense, appear “exhorbitant,” “flagrantly outrageous” and “extravagant.” “It must be monstrous indeed and such as all mankind must be ready to exclaim against at first blush.” It must carry its death warrant upon its face.’ ”
Seaboard System R. v. Taylor,
In
Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Austin,
The verdict was within the evidence; appellant concedes in his brief that, with the maximum loss of future earnings and all other special damages, such sum would come to $409,119.31. This would leave approximately $600,006 in damages for a lifetime of pain and suffering with a permanent physical disability, chronic depression, headaches, and sleep problems. The jury, in their enlightened conscience, gave a verdict which the trial court declined to disturb; nor will this Court find error.
Judgment affirmed.