148 F. 792 | 9th Cir. | 1906
Lead Opinion
Thi.s is an action brought for the purpose of obtaining a decree that the plaintiffs are the owners and entitled to the possession of a certain mining claim situated on Cleary creek, in the Fairbanks mining district, Alaska, located on January 3, 1904, and described in the complaint as No. “13, below, on the second tier of benches on the right
1. It will be seen from the foregoing statement that the location under which the appellees claim was madé prior to that of appellants, and must prevail, if valid; and, whether it was valid or not, is the general question presented by this appeal. The appellants contend that such location was not made in accordance with the laws of the United States, first, because the boundaries of the claim were not marked upon the ground, as required by the provisions of section 2324 of the Revised Statutes (30 U.S.C.A. § 28) ; and, second, because the recorded notice of location was insufficient, in that it did not describe the claim located in such a manner that it could be identified. Whether this mining claim was properly marked upon the ground presents a pure question of fact, and in our opinion the finding of the District Court to the effect that the same was properly marked is sustained by the evidence.
2. The remaining contention of appellants, that the recorded notice of the location under which the appellees claim is insufficient, presents a more difficult question. It is provided in section 15 of the act of June 6, 1900, “making further provisions for a civil government for Alaska, and for other purposes” (chapter 786, 31 Stat. 327 [48 U.S. C.A. § 382]), that “notices of location of mining claims shall be filed for record wi'thin ninety days from the date of the discovery of the claim described in the notice,” and section 2324 of the Revised Statutes (30 U.S.C.A. § 28) provides that all records of mining claims “shall contain the name or names of the locators, the date of the location, and such a description of the claim or claims located by reference to some natural object or permanent monument as will identify the claim.” The object of this statute, as stated by the Supreme Court in Hammer v. Garfield Mining Co., 130 U.S. 291, 9 S.Ct. 548, 32 L.Ed. 964, is “to secure
It is conceded by appellants that, under the system of locating mines in Alaska, the one first discovered “is generally called and known as the ‘Discovery Claim,’ and when the same is within a gulch or on a stream the claims are marked or numbered from ‘Discovery-Claim’ up or down the gulch or stream.” Cleary creek is a natural object; and there is no. evidence tending to show that the Discovery claim referred to in the above notice was not a well-known and clearly defined mining claim on Cleary creek, and, in the absence of evidence showing that it was not, it must be presumed that the same was a well-known claim, with definite boundaries, and therefore a natural object or permanent monument, within the meaning of section 2324, of the Revised Statutes (30 U.S.C.A. § 28). Hammer v. Garfield Mining Co., 130 U.S. 291, 9 S.Ct. 548, 32 L. Ed. 964.
The question then, is whether, in view of the customary mode of describing mining claims- in the Fairbanks district in Alaska, a person with the information which this recorded notice gives could find the location of this particular claim on the ground with reasonable certainty by going to the natural and permanent objects referred to in the notice. If he could, the notice is sufficient. North Noonday Mining Co. v. Orient Mining Co. (C.C.) 1 F. 522. The answer to this question, it is thought, must depend upon the local meaning of the words “13 A. Below Discovery on Cleary creek”; and what that meaning is may be shown by parol evidence. The land in controversy is not a claim bordering upon Cleary creek, but is in the first tier of bench claims —that is, there is one claim between it and the creek, and that claim is known as “13 Below Discovery” — but the ref
“What is the custom, if you know of any, in staking a claim off, a creek claim that carries a number ? How do you identify such a claim? A. Just give them a different name, either side claim, or name them by letters.
“Q. Have you seen it done in any other parts? A. Yes, sir; I have seen it done in Goldstream.”
The only evidence which can be said to conflict with this is that of the witness Long, a deputy recorder of the Fairbanks recording district. He testified that’he was acquainted with the custom in that district in regard to staking bench or side claims, and he was then asked:
“Q. I will ask you to state how they are designated in notices of location? A. In regard to bench claims, they are known as bench claims in first tier, or side claims adjoining creek claims, if they are further than that, as second' tier or third tier.
“Q. I will ask you if you know of any custom or usage whereby side claims or. bench claims are designated by the letters of the alphabet? A. Well, only in fractions — for instance, if No. 1, appears to be greater than the law would permit of, it may be called as ‘Discovery A.’ or ‘No. 1 A.’ or ‘No. 1 A. above or below,’ just as it may occur.”
Upon cross-examination, however, the witness said:
“Q. Do you know Goldstream ? A. Yes, sir. * * *
“Q. Is it not a fact that there are some side claims with the number and the letter ‘A’? A. Yes, sir; there is. Sometimes they designate them by the letter A, and sometimes as side claims and describe them as such.
*663 “Q. What is the custom in that respect? A. Well, I presume there are more claims described by the lines than by the use of the letter A.”
The testimony of this witness is certainly to the effect that side or bench claims are sometimes described by the use of the letter “A,” as was done in the appellees’ notice. The fact that such claims are more often described by lines and as side claims is not controlling, so long as in practice they are described in both ways, and this is known in the district where the claims are situated.
Our conclusion is that the recorded notice is sufficient, and the decree appealed from is affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The record shows without conflict that in the Fairbanks mining district, Alaska, where the piece of mining ground here in controversy is situated, there are what are called “creek” claims — that is to say, placer locations made on and along a creek — and next to them bench claims, called “first tier” or “side” claims, and next to them second tier bench claims, and so on. The evidence in the case further shows without conflict that the particular piece of ground in controversy is not in fact within any of the creek claims, but is on a bench and within one of the first tier or side claims. It is within the boundaries of the Owl mining location made on the 3d day of January, 1904, under which the appellants claim. The validity of this location does not seem to be questioned except on the ground that the particular piece of mining ground in dispute, was included in a prior location made by the appellee Cascaden in 1902, and was not, therefore, open to location when attempted to be included in the Owl location. Therefore the principal question in the present case relates to the Cascaden location.
The court below held it to be valid. Was it right in so holding? Assuming that the notice posted by Cascaden on the ground was sufficient, was the record of it sufficient for the identification of the claim? Neither the act of Congress of 1866 nor of 1872 required such notices to be recorded, and in respect to the acts of the locator upon the ground the requirement of the United States statute is
It is plain, therefore, that inasmuch as in the District of Alaska notices of mining locations are by a statute of the United States (31 Stat. 321, c. 786 [48 U.S.C.A. § 382]), required to be recorded within 90 days from the date of discovery, which record is also required by a United States statute to contain a description of the claim located “by a reference to some natural object or permanent monument as will identify the claim,” it is essential to the validity of such a location in Alaska that the record thereof contain
This notice is much more indefinite and uncertain than those involved and sustained in the case of McKinley Mining Co. v. Alaska Mining Co., 183 U.S. 563-570, 22 S.Ct. 84, 46 L.Ed. 331. There the creek was identified, the notice posted on a stump in the creek, in which the locator declared that he claimed 1,500 feet running down the creek and 300 feet on each side of the center of the stream. That was the notice posted on the ground. No record of the location appears to have been made in the case, nor to have been there required. Therefore the Supreme Court in that case neither determined nor considered the sufficiency of the description as a record of the location. In the case now before us, however, we have to consider and determine the sufficiency of the record of a location, in which, if it can be properly assumed that Cleary creek was a well-known stream or otherwise identified, there is nothing to indicate whether the ground claimed is on both sides of the creek or on one side of it only, and, if on one side only, then which side. It claims “1,320 feet up and down stream and 330 feet each side of center stake”; but nothing is said to indicate the location of the stake either with reference to Cleary creek or any other natural object or permanent monument or in any manner whatever. But, even if this record could be held to be a valid notice of location of a creek claim, it would not aid the appellees, for the reason that the undisputed evidence shows that the particular piece of ground in controversy is not within any creek claim, but is within the first tier of bench claims. This clearly appears from Cascaden’s own testimony. Yet no one, in my opinion, can read the record of his location without coming to the conclusion that he was thereby claiming what is known as a “creek” claim; for the notice expressly states that the ground he claims is “on Cleary creek, 1,320 feet up and down stream and 330 feet each side of center stake.” The additional statement in the record notice that the claim
“Q. I will ask you whether or not you are acquainted with the custom prevalent in the Fairbanks recording district, District of Alaska, in regard to staking bench claims, or ‘side’ claims, as they are commonly called? A. Yes, sir; I am. .
“Q. I will ask you to state how they are designated in notices of location. A. In regard to bench claims, they are known as ‘bench claims on first tier’ or side claims adjoining creek claims. If they are further than that, as" ‘second tier’ or ‘third tier.’
“Q. I will ask you if you know of any custom or usage whereby side claims or bench claims are designated by the letters of the alphabet? A. Well, only in fractions. For instance: If No. 1 appears to be greater than the law would permit of, it may be called as ‘Discovery A.’ or ‘No. 1 A.’ or ‘No. 1 A. above or below,’ just as it may occur.”
The record further shows that the Owl claim, including the piece of ground in controversy, was located in the name of the appellant Smith by Pyne acting for him. There is evidence to the effect that Pyne was a mining partner of Smith. Afterwards Pyne, as “agent for and also including” Smith, entered into an agreement with the appellant Robarts and one Beers by which Robarts and Beers agreed to sink a shaft upon the Owl claim to bedrock for an undivided one-half interest therein. They started a shaft on the particular piece of ground in dispute, and Beers’ interest in the contract then passed to the appellant Sorenson. When the shaft was down about 40 feet, Cascaden notified Pyne that the shaft was being sunk on his ground, and that, if the work was not stopped, he would commence suit to enjoin its prosecution. As a result a written agreement was entered into between Cascaden and Pyne and Robarts, and which was also signed, “W. R. Smith, by C. C. Pyne,” in which Cascaden’s right to the ground in controversy was, among other things, acknowledged, which acknowledgment, however, Pyne, Robarts, Smith, and Sorenson undertook within a few days by written notice to Cascaden to withdraw and cancel. On behalf of the appellees it is contended that the acknowledgment so made of Cascaden’s right to the disputed ground operates as an estoppel against the appellants. There are several reasons why that is not so. First, because no such estoppel was pleaded by the defendants. Hanson v. Chiatovich, 13 Nev. 395; Clarke v. Huber, 25 Cal. 594; Davis v. Davis, 26 Cal. 40, 85 Am.Dec. 157; McKeen v. Naughton, 88 Cal. 462, 26 P. 354; Page v. Smith, 13 Or. 410, 10 P. 833; Conway v. Hart, 129 Cal. 487, 62 P. 44; Encyclopedia of Pleading & Practice, vol. 8, p. 7. Secondly. Because no written or other authority was shown in Pyne to disclaim any title that appellant Smith might have. The statute of Alaska in respect to such a matter is that “an agreement concerning real property made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, unless the authority of the agent be
In respect to the question of possession, the case shows that the appellants were in the possession of the ground in controversy, actually and actively engaged in sinking the shaft, at the time of bringing the action.
I think the judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded to the court for a new trial.
