SMITH v CALVARY CHRISTIAN CHURCH
Docket No. 204661
233 MICH APP 96
Submitted June 9, 1998, at Lansing. Decided December 4, 1998, at 9:20 A.M.
Leave to appeal sought.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. A court ceases to have jurisdiction when it faces issues requiring the application of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. Here, the manner in which the defendants decide to discipline the members of the church and the religious doctrine that underlies the discipline are matters of ecclesiastical polity.
2. Disciplinary practices involving members of an ecclesiastical association that do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order are unquestionably among the First Amendment rights with which the government cannot interfere. The pastor‘s announcement to the congregation did not constitute a threat to public safety, peace, or order that would justify state interference.
3. There is a genuine issue of material fact whether the plaintiff had left the church congregation and was not a member of the church when his confession was disclosed. An examination of Byers’ discipline of the plaintiff is precluded only if the plaintiff
4. The orders granting summary disposition must be affirmed with respect to the breach of contract and statutory claims and reversed with respect to the intentional tort claims. The matter must be remanded for further proceedings.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
O‘CONNELL, J., dissenting, stated that the orders of summary disposition should be affirmed in their entirety. The question whether the plaintiff was a member of the church at the time of the disclosure has no bearing on the resolution of this case because there is no dispute that the dissension between the plaintiff and the defendants arose from events that occurred while the plaintiff was a member of the church. The First Amendment provides ecclesiastical organizations with a shield covering all disciplinary practices involving their members that do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. If church doctrine authorizes a sanction, the constitutional shield should remain in place even if the subject of the discipline has ceased to be a member, if the actions relate to church doctrine. Because this dispute involves church doctrine, the disciplinary measure at issue is protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, even if it was imposed after the plaintiff severed his membership. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS — FREEDOM OF RELIGION.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits government regulation of religious beliefs; the government, however, may impose an incidental burden on otherwise protected conduct where necessary to protect important societal interests, such as where a state interest of significant magnitude exists to override the interest allegedly protected under the Free Exercise Clause (
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS — COURTS — JURISDICTION.
Both federal and state courts are severely restricted in resolving disputes between a church and its members absent conduct that negatively affects the public interest in public safety, peace, or order; jurisdiction over these matters is limited to determining property rights that can be resolved by the application of civil law; courts do not have jurisdiction to resolve issues requiring the application of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity (
The First Amendment prevents government interference with disciplinary practices involving members of an ecclesiastical association where the disciplinary practices do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order (
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — RELIGIOUS CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS — DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES — GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION.
A church has authority to prescribe and follow disciplinary ordinances against its members without fear of interference by the state as long as the discipline does not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace or order; the Free Exercise Clause affords a shield from interference by secular inquest when the target of civil litigation is simply a church‘s implementation of discipline against a member; however, a different situation exists where the complaining party was never a member of the church or withdrew membership or was excommunicated before the offending act of church discipline occurred; once a person withdraws from membership and withdraws consent to obey church disciplinary policies, the church loses its power to actively monitor the person‘s spiritual life or impose overt disciplinary actions on the person (
William S. Stern, P.C. (by William S. Stern), for the plaintiff.
Bigler, Berry, Johnston, Sztykiel & Hunt, P.C. (by Witold Sztykiel), for the defendants.
Before: JANSEN, P.J., and MARKEY and O‘CONNELL, JJ.
MARKEY, J. Plaintiff appeals by right the trial court‘s summary disposition order entered pursuant to
This case involves plaintiff‘s confessions in the mid-1980s to defendant Mark Byers, pastor of defendant
Plaintiff filed his complaint against defendants alleging that they breached their explicit and implicit duty of confidentiality to him by disclosing personal, sensitive information to the church congregation. Plaintiff also alleged that
The trial court issued a written opinion granting defendants’ motions for summary disposition, determining that
I
Plaintiff asks this Court to determine whether the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution‘s First Amendment prevents him from asserting a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy where defendant Byers disclosed to the congregation personal information about plaintiff that plaintiff confidentially revealed to defendant Byers. Assuming that plaintiff is a member of defendant church, and because this question requires judicial review and interpretation of defendant church‘s doctrine, we answer in the affirmative.
Our review of constitutional issues and motions for summary disposition under
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion.
Absent conduct that negatively affects the public interest in peace, safety, and order, both federal and state courts are severely restricted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and
In Maciejewski, supra at 414, this Court affirmed the trial court‘s grant of summary disposition in favor of the defendants regarding the plaintiffs’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress based on alleged misconduct by church leaders. We found that
[i]t is beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts to determine rights to communion, qualification of members and privileges of membership which are necessary to decide the issues in this case. The trial court is not equipped or empowered to make such inquiries and was obliged therefore to grant summary disposition. [Id. at 416.]
Here, the manner in which defendant church and defendant Byers decide to discipline the church‘s members and the religious doctrine that underlies the discipline are matters of ecclesiastical polity. In his affidavit, defendant Byers stated that plaintiff‘s discipline was consistent with article III, § 3 of defendant church‘s bylaws, entitled “Discipline,” which states that members wilfully absent from services for an extended period or who are “under charges” are temporarily suspended from active voting membership pending investigation of the case. The section also states that “[u]nscriptural conduct or doctrinal departure from the tenets of faith held by this assembly shall be considered sufficient grounds upon which any person may be disqualified as a member,” citing several biblical passages underlying these bylaws, including Matthew 18:15-18; this biblical passage spe-
Despite the civil tort language that plaintiff applies to defendants’ actions, we cannot say that the facts in this case either permit or require judicial intervention into defendants’ decision to discipline the church‘s members because this exercise will necessarily involve interpreting religious doctrine. Accord Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America & Canada v Milivojevich, 426 US 696, 709-710; 96 S Ct 2372; 49 L Ed 2d 151 (1976). Even the cases from foreign jurisdictions that plaintiff cites do not consistently mandate judicial interference where a minister takes action that adversely affects and often publicly embarrasses members of the congregation.3
II
Plaintiff argues, however, that the Free Exercise Clause permits a tort cause of action to exist because plaintiff left the church congregation before defendant Byers’ disclosure of the confidential information to the congregation. According to plaintiff‘s affidavit, he was not a church member on the date in question. He
Because we find no case law on point in Michigan, we look to decisions from other state courts for instruction. Foreign jurisdictions addressing the question whether a church can discipline individuals without fear of judicial intervention focus on whether the complaining individual was a member at the time of the disciplinary action. Where the plaintiff is a member of the church at the time of the defendant church‘s alleged tortious activity and that relationship has not been freely severed, “the church has authority to prescribe and follow disciplinary ordinances without fear of interference by the state.” Hadnot v Shaw, 826 P2d 978, 987 (Okla, 1992); Guinn, supra at 773-774; see also Hester, supra at 559 (if the plaintiffs were members of the church and congregation, “they presumptively consented to religiously motivated discipline practiced in good faith“). The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Guinn, supra at 774, summarized the basis for this decision as follows:
When people voluntarily join together in pursuit of spiritual fulfillment, the First Amendment requires that the government respect their decision and not impose its own ideas on the religious organization. Under the First Amendment people may freely consent to being spiritually governed by an established set of ecclesiastical tenets defined and carried out by those chosen to interpret and impose them:
“The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, [4] and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government and are bound to submit to it.”
Under the First Amendment‘s Free Exercise Clause, Parishioner had the right to consent as a participant in the practices and beliefs of the Church of Christ without fear of governmental interference. . . . Under the Free Exercise Clause the Elders had the right to rely on Parishioner‘s consensual participation in the congregation when they disciplined her as one who had voluntarily elected to adhere to their doctrinal precepts. Parishioner‘s willing submission to the Church of Christ‘s dogma, and the Elders’ reliance on that submission, collectively shielded the church‘s prewithdrawal, religiously-motivated discipline from scrutiny through secular judicature. [Emphasis added; citation omitted.]
Similarly, where the plaintiff did not withdraw the plaintiff‘s church membership during the disputed conduct or activity, “the Church retained full subject matter and personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the . . . disciplinary cases against the parishioner[]. . . . [P]arishioners must positively act to withdraw membership if they intend church jurisdiction to cease. When the target of civil litigation is simply the
Where, however, the complaining party was never a member of the offending pastor‘s church, or he withdrew membership or was excommunicated before the offending act of church discipline occurred, a different situation exists. The church or its representatives might no longer permissibly impose their religious views and doctrine on the nonmember. These distinctions are explained in Hadnot, supra 989-990, as follows:
In the event of withdrawal or of post-excommunication activity unrelated to the church‘s efforts at effectuation of valid judicature, the absolute privilege from tort liability no longer attaches. Any action at this point, if it is to be protected, must be justified by others means. Under these circumstances conditional privileges may be applicable. The church may take such steps as are reasonable to protect itself and to complete the process occasioned by the withdrawal or other termination of the consensual relationship with a member.
See also Guinn, supra at 775-782; Hester, supra at 559-560; cf. Hadnot, supra at 987-988.
In Guinn, supra at 768, the plaintiff parishioner withdrew her membership from the church and informed the church‘s elders that they should not disclose to the congregation, which comprised five percent of her town‘s population, that she was engaging in fornication with a man from another church. She told the elders that, if the elders made the public disclosure, she would be forced to take legal action. The elders told her it was doctrinally impossible to with-
The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the elders’ disciplinary actions taken before the parishioner‘s withdrawal from membership was exempt from judicial scrutiny, but it upheld the jury‘s findings that the elders committed the charged intentional torts after the petitioner sent the letter withdrawing her membership. Id. at 774-782. The court affirmed that both the freedom to worship and “the liberty to recede from one‘s religious allegiance” are protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 776 (emphasis added). “[H]ere, it is the Collinsville Church of Christ that, by denying Parishioner‘s right to disassociate herself from a particular form of religious belief, is threatening to curtail her freedom of worship according to her choice.” Id. at 777. Thus, unless she waived her right to withdraw consent to be bound by the church‘s disciplinary practices, the parishioner‘s resignation from the church was a constitutionally protected right. Id.
While the First Amendment requires that citizens be tolerant of religious views different from and offensive to their own, it surely does not require that those like Parishioner, who choose not to submit to the authority of any religious association, be tolerant of that group‘s attempts to govern them. Only those “who unite themselves” in a religious association impliedly consent to its authority over them and are “bound to submit to it.” Parishioner voluntarily joined
the Church of Christ and by so doing consented to submit to its tenets. When she later removed herself from membership, Parishioner withdrew her consent, depriving the Church of the power actively to monitor her spiritual life through overt disciplinary acts. No real freedom to choose religion would exist in this land if under the shield of the First Amendment religious institutions could impose their will on the unwilling and claim immunity from secular judicature for their tortious acts. [Id. at 779 (emphasis added).]
The Guinn court recognized that the parishioner‘s case involved a congregation‘s concern with the sins of a former member who had no interest in continuing her association with the church and “posed no threat of continued adverse influence” on any church member. Id. at 782. Here, plaintiff‘s alleged protests against defendant Byers may constitute a threat of adverse influence on defendant church members, but we are unable to make that decision in this appeal from the order of summary disposition regarding this issue.
The result in Guinn was also reached in Hester, supra at 550, 555-560, 563-564, where the plaintiffs were not members of the defendant pastor‘s church, but the defendant pastor defamed them in front of his congregation and reported them to child protective services after the plaintiffs told the defendant pastor that their children had behavioral problems. Because the plaintiffs were not members and their pleadings supported several tort causes of action against the defendants, the Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the dismissals of the plaintiffs’ claims for alienation of affections, defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference of contract. Id. at 564.
First, if plaintiff was a member of defendant church on December 8, 1996, then judicial examination of defendant Byers’ discipline against plaintiff is precluded by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Summary disposition in favor of defendants would therefore be affirmed.
If, however, plaintiff was not a member of defendant church in December 1996, then a closer look at plaintiff‘s intentional tort claims is justified because once he removed himself from membership and with-
Unlike the negligence torts, which require a legal duty as part of the prima facie case, the intentional torts alleged in plaintiff‘s complaint do not require a specific legal duty. To establish a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must show four elements: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress. Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 234; 551 NW2d 206 (1996). “Liability for such a claim has been found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id. Common-law invasion of privacy protects against four types of invasion: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff‘s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, (3) publicity that places the plaintiff in a false light, and (4) appropriation of the plaintiff‘s name or likeness. Doe v Mills, 212 Mich App 73, 80; 536 NW2d 824 (1995). Although not specifically pleaded, plaintiff‘s complaint alleges a cause of action for public disclosure of embarrassing pri-
Plaintiff‘s complaint, although minimal in its allegations and compliance with
We therefore affirm the grant of summary disposition with respect to the breach of contract and statutory claims, reverse the grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants with respect to claims for intentional torts, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
JANSEN, P.J., concurred.
O‘CONNELL, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority‘s conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment shields churches and their ministers from judicial review of any disciplinary practices involving members that do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order, I depart from the majority in that I do not believe that any part of present plaintiff‘s case hinges on whether plaintiff was a member of defendant church at the time of the disciplinary action in question. Because there is no dispute that the dissension between plaintiff and defendants arose from events that occurred while plaintiff was a member of the church, whether plaintiff was still a member at the time of defendants’ resulting disciplinary action, or had just resigned, or was in the process of being excommunicated, or was being “marked” (as
The principle that a court must be vigilant in respecting the limits of its jurisdiction, see Straus v Governor, 230 Mich App 222, 227; 583 NW2d 520 (1998), lv gtd 458 Mich 865 (1998), applies especially where the controversy at hand implicates the Free Exercise Clause. All parties to this litigation and the majority concede that the central issue in this case is a dispute involving matters of religious doctrine, practice, and polity.1 Where the central issue involves a matter of religious doctrine or church discipline, civil courts may not assume jurisdiction over the controversy.2
“The civil courts will not enter into a consideration of church doctrine or church discipline, nor will they inquire into the regularity of the proceedings of the church judicatories having cognizance of such matters. To assume such jurisdiction would not only be an attempt by the civil courts to deal with matters of which they have no special knowledge, but it would be inconsistent with complete religious liberty untrammeled by State authority.” [Berry v Bruce, 317 Mich 490, 501; 27 NW2d 67 (1947), quoting Borgman v Bultema, 213 Mich 684, 703; 182 NW 91 (1921), quoting
Morris Street Baptist Church v Dart, 67 SC 338, 342; 45 SE 753 (1903).]
The First Amendment provides ecclesiastical organizations with a shield covering all disciplinary practices involving their members that do not pose a substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. Guinn v Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P2d 766, 779 (Okla, 1989). If church doctrine authorizes a sanction, the constitutional shield should remain in place even if the subject of the discipline has ceased to be a member, if the actions relate to church doctrine.4 Any other rule would involve the state in determining what is or is not a legitimate ecclesiastical disciplinary measure.5
In the present case, the parties and the majority agree that the dispute involves a matter of religious doctrine that arose while plaintiff was a member of the church. Because the dispute involves church doctrine, the disciplinary measure at issue is protected under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
This Court, in Maciejewski v Breitenbeck, 162 Mich App 410; 413 NW2d 65 (1987), stated as follows:
It is well settled that courts, both federal and state, are severely circumscribed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and
art 1, § 4 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963 in resolution of disputes between a church and its members. Such jurisdiction is limited to property rights which can be resolved by application of civil law. Whenever the court must stray into questions
of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity the court loses jurisdiction. [Id. at 413-414, citing Berry, supra; First Protestant Reformed Church v DeWolf, 344 Mich 624; 75 NW2d 19 (1956); Berkaw v Mayflower Congregational Church, 378 Mich 239; 144 NW2d 444 (1966); Bennison v Sharp, 121 Mich App 705; 329 NW2d 466 (1982); Beulah Missionary Baptist Church v Spann, 132 Mich App 118, 125; 346 NW2d 911 (1984) (H.R. GAGE, J., concurring)].
For these reasons, I conclude that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve this dispute.7 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the trial court in its entirety.
Notes
“whenever the questions of discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.” If members of religious organizations could freely pursue their doctrinal grievances in civil courts, or legislatures could pass laws to inhibit or enhance religious activities, ecclesiastical liberty would be subjected to governmental interference and the “unmolested and unobstructed” development of opinion and belief which the First Amendment shield was designed to foster could be secularly undermined. [Id. at 771-772 (citation omitted).]
Thus, even though the dispute was not immune from judicial scrutiny because it concerned the tortious nature of religiously motivated acts and not the orthodoxy established by church doctrine, the court found that the defendants’ disciplinary action against the plaintiff did not constitute a threat to public safety, peace, or order justifying state interference. Id. at 773-774. Because the defendants had the right to rely on the plaintiff‘s consensual participation in the congregation when they disciplined her as one who had voluntarily elected to adhere to their doctrinal precepts, the court found that under the Free Exercise Clause, the defendants’ religiously motivated discipline was free from secular judicial scrutiny. Id. Although Berry and Borgman are admittedly old Supreme Court cases, they are still good law and, unlike the sister-state cases on which the majority relies, binding on this Court.
The rule stated in this Section gives protection only against unreasonable publicity, of a kind highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man. . . . It is only when the publicity given to him is such that a reasonable person would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it, that the cause of action arises. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 652D, comment c, p 387.] I would liken this to a state‘s continuing personal jurisdiction over a former citizen concerning matters arising while that person resided within the state. Just as one cannot evade a state‘s jurisdiction over such matters simply by the expedient of taking up residence in another state, a parishioner should not be able to constrain continuing church practices stemming from and immediately following the parishioner‘s affiliation simply by severing ties with the church.