59 Vt. 408 | Vt. | 1887
The opinion of' the court was delivered by
The plaintiff denies that he is bound by his subscription, because, as he alleges, the conditions of it have not been fulfilled, and because they were modified by the letter of Burlón,, and the terms of that letter have not been complied with.
Neither of these claims can be sustained.
The subscription paper is not ambiguous but plain and complete in itself, and must be construed by itself independent of the letter. The letter was simply one of the preliminary negotiations to the subscription. To allow the letter to come in as
As to the other proposition of the plaintiff we put this construction upon the subscription contract: The only condition of the subscription was that Burton and Sowles and wife should convey the Tremont property to Foster as trustee of MacDonald. The phrase, “ on six thousand dollars being subscribed hereto,” was not a condition of the subscription strictly, but a condition in behalf of Burton and Sowles and wife upon which they should convey. They wbre not obliged to convey until so much was subscribed. The object of the subscription was to secure the Tremont property for the contemplated business and thereby promote the industry; and unless it was conveyed for the purpose the subscriptions would not be enforceable ; and if conveyed and MacDonald did not fulfill as therein provided, then the subscribers had security on the property. If the owners were satisfied to convey upon a subscription of less than six thousand dollars the primary object of the subscribers was attained and their security increased, the provision being that in case of default by MacDonald the trustee was to convey six-tenths of the premises to the subscribers; therefore-, the less the subscriptions the greater the proportion to go to each subscriber. The provisions in the subscription paper, in respect to MacDonald’s obligations, were conditions upon which he would become entitled to said premises, and not conditions of the subscription.
We think this construction of the contract is unmistakably correct; therefore, the plaintiff* is bound by it as between him and the defendants. His remedy, if any, is against the trustee and the property, or against Burton on the .promise in his letter, or both; but the questions that may arise in that direction are not for consideration here.
If the plaintiff’s subscription is to be held enforceable agamst
We think the contracts between MacDonald and the defendants, stated in the report, should not be construed as conferring upon the defendants respectively any authority to act for each other in borrowing money or pledging credit in the performance of their obligations to MacDonald, as provided in said contracts. The provisions of the first contract strongly tend to negate such authority. The second contract taken alone might possibly bear such construction ; but that contract does not appear to have been intended as a substitute for the first one, but rather as supplementary to it; and upon the point now under consideration, it does not appear why the two contracts may not properly be considered and treated as one. But in arriving at what is the legal effect of the facts found by the auditor, on the question of Sowles’ liability to the plaintiff, it is proper to consider them in the light of the contract. It is upon the whole report, which contains the contract, that we are to decide the point.
Although Burton and Sowles were plainly not made by the contract partners or proprietors in the shirt business, they became its reliance for money and material, and interested in all the property of the .concern as security for such support, and the subscriptions of all others were to go to them, and were so promised in the subscription paper which the plaintiff signed.
The proforma judgment is reversed, and judgment is rendered for the plaintiff to recover the amount of his account with interest, above the amount of his subscription, with costs.