132 Wis. 177 | Wis. | 1907
The decision of the trial court that plaintiff did not, by signing the written subscription, tender himself as a subscriber to the capital stock of the defendant corporation as finally organized is not assailed and is, therefore, the starting point, back of which it is not necessary to go; except so far as previous transactions color events subsequent to about November 13th, when the corporate articles were signed. The question, of course, then arises: By what act of his did the plaintiff become a member of such corporation or become es-topped to deny his membership therein or to recall the money which he had paid into Workman’s hands for another purpose, and to refuse to complete payment for ten shares ? Confessedly, he never, hy express words, declared his willingness
The doctrine of waiver has been the subject of much looseness of expression. When considered as a means of imposing upon one a contract obligation, it is, however, subject to all the general principles which control the making of contracts. A true contract can arise only by the actual meeting of minds, and no true contract arises from the act of one apparently assenting to terms to which he has not in words agreed, unless a court can with certainty draw the conclusion from such act that his mental attitude was in fact that of assent and concurrence. 1 Page, Cont. § 50. But the term “waiver” is also applied to deprive one of a right or immunity when, having a right to assume either of two inconsistent positions, his acts unambiguously indicate an intention to adopt and avail himself of one. In such case the law holds him to have effectively waived his right to claim the other, whether or not he consciously intended such waiver. Rasmusen v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co. 91 Wis. 81, 88, 64 N. W. 301; Monroe W. W. Co. v. Monroe, 110 Wis. 11, 85 N. W. 685; Smeesters v. Schroeder, 123 Wis. 116, 101 N. W. 363; Pabst B. Co. v. Milwaukee, 126 Wis. 110, 105 N. W. 563; West v. Platt, 121 Mass. 367, 372.
It has not been found by the court, and is not seriously contended by the respondents, that the plaintiff ever consciously assented to become a member of this corporation, to which, from the first moment of authentic information as to its scope and purposes, he raised objection; but it is contended, and was concluded by the trial court, that he did knowingly and intentionally so avail himself of rights and
Great wéight is placed by respondents upon the fact that the same two men were signers of the articles of association. But it must be borne in mind that, while the fact that they were both subscribers and one an officer of the subscribers’ organization was known to substantially every subscriber, the fact that they had signed these articles .of association, or that
Taking the view which we do of the natural construction and significance of the notice, the conclusion obviously results that the action of one in attending that meeting by no means unequivocally disclosed a purpose to surrender his attitude as a subscriber under -the original writing and his right to protest against a change in the purpose of the corporation, and to refuse, himself, to join the new and different organization in case his associates decided so to do. If plaintiff believed, as we think he well might, that this was primarily a meeting of the subscribers to listen to and consider something which was novel to the great majority of them, although not to him, then he, as a subscriber, intending to abide by and carry out his original subscription, not only had the right, but, by reason of his prominence in the movement, al
If he might have properly believed that he was invited to attend a meeting of those who had subscribed to the plan defined by the subscription paper, his act in attending and participating, at least so far as the actions and deliberations were within the proper field for consideration by such subscribers, did not necessarily evince a purpose to join the corporation organized by the articles. Did he proceed beyond that point % Eirst, it being announced that none but those who had paid twenty-five per cent, of their subscriptions should have a vote at the meeting, he acted on a committee to ascertain who they were. This was by no means inconsistent with the supposition that the subscribers to the original project were still in conference; certainly no more inconsistent than with the idea that those who had been already accepted as stockholders in the new corporation were meeting as such. It can hardly be questioned that subscribers under a paper such as this, when gathered together, may lay down such rules as they please regulating voting privileges at their meetings — this for the very good reason that no one is concluded by any vote taken to which he does not personally assent. But a meeting of the accepted stockholders of a corporation has no right to place any such restriction upon the franchise. A subscriber for stock who has been so accepted is completely a stockholder, whether he has paid his subscription or not. Helliwell, Stock & Stockh. § 41; Franey v. Warner, 96 Wis. 222, 231, 71 N. W. 81; Rehbein v. Rahr, 109 Wis. 136, 147, 85 N. W. 315. And our statutes prescribe that in the meeting of stockholders each shall be entitled to vote according to the stock held by bim. Sec. 1760., Stats. (1898). Hence we can ascribe no
Our conclusion is that no act of the plaintiff is shown so unequivocally evincing an intention to accept membership as a stockholder in the defendant corporation, or inconsistent with his right to insist that the money deposited with defendant Workman should be applied only to purposes within the limits defined by the original subscription paper, that he is, or at the time of his demand was, precluded from insisting on return of that money either from Workman or from the corporation which had received it with full knowledge of all
By the Court. — Judgment reversed, and canse remanded with directions to enter judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.