121 N.E.2d 920 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1954
This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court, affirming an order of the Board of Liquor Control, which revoked the D-1 and D-3 liquor permits of Ernest P. Smith, the appellant herein. The revocation was based upon a finding by the board that the permit holder or his employee knowingly and willfully allowed improper conduct and immoral activities on the permit premises.
The record reveals that the appellant is the operator of a three-story hotel, consisting of eight rooms, known as the Terminal Hotel and that it is located near the Union Terminal in Cincinnati, Ohio. In addition to the guest rooms located on the second and third floors of the premises, there is a bar, kitchen and lunchroom on the first floor. On or about 9:30 p. m. on August 2, 1952, police officers of the city of Cincinnati visited the premises and found three of the rooms occupied *398
by unmarried couples who were engaging in immoral acts. Appellant does not question such activities of the hotel guests, but urges that the record does not support the conclusion that the appellant had any knowledge that such guests, when registering at the hotel, intended to indulge in any improper conduct. Knowledge, either actual or constructive, is one of the essential elements which must be proven in order to sustain the charge.Sata v. Board of Liquor Control,
The appellee cites the case of Wittenberg v. Board of LiquorControl, 52 Ohio Law Abs., 65, 80 N.E.2d 711, a case decided by this court, but which we think is distinguishable on the facts from the case at bar. An examination of the cited case discloses that from the facts the court found that the permit holder should have known that the premises were to be used for immoral purposes.
On page 73, Judge Hornbeck said:
"The facts appearing here, in our judgment, amply supported the conclusion that the licensee had reasonable cause to know that the place which he was operating was to be and was used for lewdness and the licensed premises was a disorderly place which should have been known by the appellant, even though the specific purposes and acts admitted by the occupants of the rooms may not have been shown to have been directly brought to his attention."
In our case, we think the evidence is insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the permit holder had constructive knowledge of any misconduct to be performed upon the premises.
The order is, therefore, not supported by the degree of proof required by Section 154-73, General Code. The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.
Judgment reversed.
WISEMAN, P. J., and HORNBECK, J., concur. *400