8 Ga. App. 262 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1910
Lead Opinion
(After stating the foregoing facts.) • The conduct of the defendant relied upon by the plaintiff as constituting a trespass may be eondensedly stated as his acts in entering the house without warning and in the absence of the bankrupt, taking possession of the house and the household effects therein, and taking possession of the trunk, removing it from the house, having it opened, and taking therefrom the $1,940 in currency. The plaintiff claimed that the house was her home, which the trustee had no right to enter; that the household effects and the money belonged to her, and the trustee had express notice of her title; and she insists that the acts and conduct of the trustee above stated were tortuous and entitled her to damages, — not only to actual damages for the value of the property which it is alleged the trustee unlawfully took possession of, but also to punitive and exemplary damages arising from circumstances of aggravation in connection with the alleged trespass. The pivotal question, therefore, around which every other question revolves, and upon the decision of which depends the right of recovery, is: In whom was the right of possession, at the time the
We conclude that when it appeared from the facts proved before the trial court that there was nothing in the suit but the question of title to the res, which was in the rightful possession of the bankruptcy court, and that the defendant was not guilty of trespass, a verdict should have been directed for the defendant, and the plaintiff left, without prejudice, to pursue her remedy in the court of bankruptcy, to recover therefrom the res to which she claimed title. Judgment reversed.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specialty. Errors in the charge of the court (which are not referred to in the opinion, but as to the quality of which we all agree) require the grant of a new trial; and hence I admit that there must be a reversal of the judgment refusing a new trial. However, I do not assent to the reasons upon which the reversal is predicated. Conceding that the State court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the title, or right of property, as against the bankrupt, and that if the bankrupt had even a constructive possession of the persónal property in question it would
Concurrence Opinion
concurring specially. I agree with the Chief Judge in the main, but do not go quite so far as he does as to some of the salient points of the case.
There is no question that the trial court’s jurisdiction in this ease rests on possession, and not on title. The petition presented a prima facie case of possession unlawfully invaded by the trustee in bankruptcy, and was not subject to demurrer; the question is, how far did the proof sustain the petition?
In order for the plaintiff to recover, it was necessary for her to show not merely that she had title to the personal property, but
Under the bankruptcy act, 30 Stat. 544 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3418), as construed by authoritative decisions, all possession of property held, actually or constructively, by a bankrupt, at the time of the filing of the petition, passes to the bankruptcy court and confers on it exclusive jurisdiction to settle contests as to the ownership. So that the possession of the bankrupt becomes the possession of the trustee in bankruptcy whenever the latter qualifies — the possession of the trustee being constructive or legal possession until he reduces' the propert}1, to his actual detention and corporeal control.
In the case at bar, therefore, if the bankrupt, at the time of the adjudication, had the possession (actual or constructive) of the property involved, the subsequent transaction which gave rise to the present action was not a taking of possession by the trustee, but .the mere retention and enforcing of a possession which in the eye of the law he already had.
As to the house, and as to the household furniture, it is clear that the bankrupt had the possession, and that the possession passed to the trustee. The court plainly erred in submitting to the jury any right of the plaintiff to recover because the trustee went into the house (though the plaintiff, being the wife of the bankrupt, was using it as a home), or because he took the furniture, irrespective of whether in point of fact it was the wife’s furniture or not.
As to the money: While the husband is prima facie in possession of the family home, where he and his wife jointly reside, and of the things located therein, yet this presumption is rebuttable. A wife may, even as against her husband, maintain such exclusive corporeal control of property that he will not in law he regarded as having possession of it, either actual of constructive. In this case, if the plaintiff, notwithstanding she was the wife of the bankrupt and notwithstanding she resided in the house with him,
As to the punitive damages I am inclined to agree with Judge Hill. The alleged invasion of the house and the seizure of the household goods being out of the case, for lack of jurisdiction in the State court, the question is, did the defendant’s act in taking and keeping the money indicate such wantonness as to authorize the assessment of punitive damages? I think not. Any prudent man under similar circumstances would have kept it till the title to it could have been decided; and it must be remembered, so far as the mere taking of it is concerned, that the defendant did not even know that there was any money in the trunk when he took and carried it away from the defendant’s possession. It is true that the trustee and the bankrupt had an altercation in the presence of the plaintiff, and that in the course of it the defendant used profane language to the bankrupt, but this was a separate affair and not a part of the damage of taking the trunk and the money, which the trustee did not even decide to take until after this' altercation was ended. Besides, it is impossible for an impartial mind to overlook the glaring fact that the bankrupt and his wife were acting very suspiciously and in apparent bad faith. The money and the furniture may have belonged to the plaintiff (personalty, I think that the money and most of tire furniture'probably did belong to her), but, with all that, there are many things which would have fully justified the trustee in believing that the property belonged to the estate in bankruptcy and that the plaintiff and her husband were about to move it away to another State. However, as the question of punitive damages is dependent purely on the facts, which may vary in the different trials, we deem it unnecessary to malee an authoritative ruling on this point at this time.
The judgment of the court below must be reversed, but I concur specially upon the points mentioned above.