STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Lаrry J. Smith appeals from the trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence in his negligence action against Charles C. Beaty and Peake, Inc. (collectively "Beaty"). Smith's action arose out of a collision between a semi-tractor trailer, operated by Beaty in the course and seope of his employment with Peake, and a United Parcel Service van, operated by Smith. Beaty moved for judgment on the evidence at the conclusion of Smith's case-in-chief in a jury trial,. The trial court granted the motion, dismissed the jury and entered a general judgment against Smith. Smith appeals and Beaty cross-appeals. 1 Both raise the following issue for our review:
Whether the trial court properly granted Beaty's motion for judgment on the evidence.
We reverse and remand.
FACTS
At approximately 4:80 a.m. on July 3, 1990, Larry Smith was driving a United Parcel Service van on State Road 60 in Lawrence County when one of the tires on the right side of his van blew out. State Road 60 has two lanes and is relatively flat at this location. As the tire burst, the van veered off the right side of the roadway. Smith slowed the vehicle and attempted to return it to the roadway but the van rolled over twice. It came to rest upside down in the eastbound lane of traffic with the noge of the van pointed in a northeasterly direction.
Subsequently, Marti Wells 2 approached in her vehicle and stopped at the accident scene. Smith asked Wells for help and told her that he could not get out of the van. Because the van was upside down, Smith was trapped in the driver's seat by his lap belt and shoulder harness which would not release due to his weight hanging from the seat. Wells moved her vehicle behind Smith's van and parked it facing wеst in the middle of the road.
As Wells stepped out of her truck to help Smith, a semi-tractor trailer approached from the west on State Road 60. The semi was driven by Charles Beaty, who was employed by Peake, Inc. Beaty attempted to avoid Smith's van by swerving into the other lane, but the semi collided with Smith's van and then with Wells' truck. The van spun and twisted before it came to rest on its side. The impact from the collision caused Smith to slip farther down into the driver's seat and enabled him to put his feet on the passenger side door and to extricate himself from his seatbelt. Smith climbed out of the van through the windshield and found Wells lying in the roadway.
Meanwhile, Leon Williams had heard Smith's van crash from his home, which was located approximately 150 to 175 feet from the point where Smith's vehicle came to rest. Williams walked approximately 75 feet toward Smith's van so that he could look over: an embankment at the vehicle below. He *1032 began to return home to call an ambulance when he heard Beaty's semi approaching. Williams then witnessed the collision between Beaty's semi and Smith's van.
Smith was hospitalized for three days and treated for five fractured ribs. As a result of his rib injuries, Smith suffers from a condition known as pseudo-arthrosis which continues to limit his physical activities. We will state additional facts in our discussion as needed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the evidence, we apply the same standard as the trial court and look only to the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the non-moving party. Clark v. Wiegand (1993), Ind.,
Negligence
Smith contends that the trial court erred when it granted Beaty's motion for judgment on the evidence bеcause he presented enough evidence on each element of his negligence claim to allow the case to proceed to the jury. The tort of negligence is comprised of three elements: 1) a duty on the part of the defendant in relation to the plaintiff; 2) a failure by the defendant to conform its conduct to the requisite standard of care; and 3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the failure. Fawley v. Martin's Supermarkets, Inc. (1993), Ind.App.,
A. Duty
The parties do not dispute that, as a motorist, Beaty owed Smith a duty to maintain a proper lookout, to use due care to avoid a collision and to maintain his semi under reasonable control. See Schultz v. Hodus (1989), Ind.App.,
B. Breach of Duty
Beaty disputes whether he breached the duty he owed Smith. Beaty maintains that Smith failed to produce sufficient evidence that he breached the requisite standard of care because Smith introduced no evidence that Beaty failed to maintain a proper lookout or did not use due care to avoid a collision and maintain his semi under reasonable control. Smith, however, asserts that he presented sufficient evidence "to allow a reasonable fact finder to differ as to whether the care exercised by the defendants with respect to speed and the visibility of objects on the road was reasonable." Brief of Appellant at 15.
The evidence most favorable to Smith reveals that the accident occurred in the early morning at approximately 4:80 a.m. when the sky was not completely light, but was described as a "gray dawn" or "predawn." Record at 396 and 689. After Smith lost control of his vehicle and his van rolled over, it came to rest upside down, with its nose partially obstructing the eastbound lane of State Road 60. On that particular stretch of road, the westbound lane of the road comes out of a curve into a straightaway approximately four-tenths of a mile long before the *1033 road curves again. Smith's van was located in the straightaway between the two curves.
Smith testified thаt one of his vehicle's headlights was still operating and was shining into the trees on the hill north of the roadway. Leon Williams testified that Smith's vehicle could be seen without difficulty in the roadway, and he and Smith both stated that at least two westbound vehicles passed the accident scene before Beaty's semi arrived. Further, Wells testified that after she arrived on the scene, she parked her truck in the center of the roadway and positioned it behind Smith's van so that one of her headlights shone down the roadway to the west and the other shone onto Smith's van. Wells also activated the emergency flashers on her truck. Wells saw nothing in the roadway that would block or obstruct the view of her truck from vehicles proceeding in an easterly direction.
Finally, Williams testified that he observed Beaty's semi-tractor trailer as it approached the accident scene eastbound on State Road 60. Williams stated it appeared that Beaty was looking down into his outside rearview mirror as he approached the seene and that, a few seconds before the impact, Beaty looked up and swerved the semi into the other lane.
A motorist upon a highway regularly used by the public is not required to antiсipate extraordinary hazards, nor to constantly expect and search for unusual dangers. Opple v. Ray (1935),
Here, Smith presеnted evidence that the sky was not completely dark and that the accident seene was clearly visible. Witnesses testified that Smith's vehicle could be seen without difficulty in the roadway, at least one of Wells headlights was pointed down the roadway to the west, Wells' flashers were operating and at least two other vehicles passed by the scene without difficulty. There was also testimony that Beaty was looking down into his rearview mirror and only looked up a few seconds before the impact. Thus, a question of fact exists concerning whether Beaty breached his duty to keep a proper lookout. When all of the evidence is viewed most favorably to Smith, we are unable to conclude that there is no probative evidence supporting the breach of duty element of Smith's negligence claim.
C. Proximate Cause
Beaty maintains that Smith failed to present any expert evidence that his injuries were proximately caused by Beaty's actions and/or omissions. Smith admits he did not present expert testimony to a reasonable degree of certainty that the semi's impact with his van was the proximate cause of his injuries, but he contends that he presented sufficient objective evidence thаt his injuries were caused by the semi's impact to allow the submission of the case to the jury.
Causation, or the requirement of a reasonable connection between a defendant's conduct and the damages which a plaintiff has suffered, is an essential element in a negligence action. Daub v. Daub (1994), Ind.App.,
In this case, Smith presented expert medical testimony by Dr. J.F. Pangan, his treating physician. However, Dr. Pangan testified that he could not say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty whether the rolling of the van or the impact of the semi caused Smith's rib injuries. On cross-examinatiоn, Dr. Pangan stated that he could only speculate as to which event caused the injuries. Beaty argues that the question of which impact caused Smith's injuries was a scientific question necessarily dependent upon expert medical testimony. According to Beaty, the trial court properly entered judgment on the evidence because Smith failed to submit any evidence "which would provide thе jury with an option other than pure speculation." Brief of Appellees at 18.
Beaty misstates Smith's burden of making a prima facie showing of causation to submit his case to the jury. Causation in a negligence case need not always be proven by expert testimony. See Barrow v. Talbott (1981), Ind.App.,
Herе, while Dr. Pangan was unable to say to a reasonable degree of certainty which event caused Smith's injuries, Smith was able to testify that he felt severe pain only after the impact of the semi. Smith testified that before the van was struck by the semi, he was able to yell for assistance and to slip his left arm through the shoulder harness in an attempt to free himself from the confines of the seatbelt, both without experiencing any rib pain. Smith further testified that after the impact of the semi, he experienced a great deal of pain which he believed was attributable to broken ribs. He also stated that he was familiar with the pain associated with broken ribs because he had broken ribs on his right side years before.
We conclude in this case that a lay person would be competent to draw inferences from these facts and determine that Beaty's conduct was a cause of Smith's injuries. Dr. Pangan's inability to determine whether the rolling of the van or the impact of the semi caused Smith's injuries was not fatal to Smith's case. The defendant's act need not be the sole cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Lucas v. Dorsey Corp. (1993), Ind.App.,
-It is true that standing alone, an opinion which lacks reasonable probability is not sufficient evidence by itself to support a verdict. Noblesville Casting Division of TRW, Inc. v. Prince (1982), Ind.,
Dr. Pangan was able to testify that, in his opinion, an individual with fractured ribs sim-lar to Smith's fractured ribs would experi *1035 ence severe pain as a result of the fractures if he tried to move his arms or lift his weight in the way that Smith had when he attempted to free himself before the impact of the semi. His testimony was not the only evidence рresented on causation. As shown above, Smith's testimony concerning the time when he first felt pain in his ribs established the causal link between the semi's impact with the van and his injuries. Wells corroborated Smith's testimony. She testified that when she first arrived on the scene, Smith asked her to help him get out of the van, but he made no complaints of pain and did not indicate he was injured in any way. Wells recalled that when she spoke with Smith after the van had been struck by the semi, Smith appeared to be in a great deal of pain, was holding his ribs and told her that he thought his ribs were broken. Finally, Smith's x-rays taken after the accident identified multiple left rib fractures, and entries in Smith's Discharge Summary and History and Physical Exam Report, made by Dr. R.S. Wright at Bedford Medical Center, stated that Smith suffered the major injuries to his chest after the second impact.
We cоnclude that Smith's testimony about his injuries, together with the testimony of Wells and Dr. Pangan and Smith's medical records, established a prima facie showing that Smith's rib injuries were caused by the impact from Besaty's semi. Indeed, Smith and Wells' lay report of the facts went beyond a mere hypothesis of causation but was sufficient for the jury to infer without resort to speculation that Beaty caused Smith's injuries. Cf. Daub,
Beaty also asserts that Smith failed to present a prima facie case for causation because it was Smith who breaсhed a duty to maintain his vehicle under control. Beaty's argument misses the mark. In effect, Beaty's position is that Smith's own negligent driving caused his injuries. However, even if the evidence established that Smith's own negligence was a cause of his injuries, Smith was not necessarily precluded from recovery under Indiana's Comparative Fault Act. See IND.CODE § 34-4-83-4(a). A plaintiff is barred from recovery only if his fault is greater than the fault of аll persons whose fault proximately contributed to his damages. Id.
The apportionment of fault under the Comparative Fault Act is uniquely a question of fact to be decided by the jury. McKinney v. Public Serv. Co. of Indiana (1992), Ind.App.,
CONCLUSION
From our review of the evidenсe, we cannot say there was a complete failure of proof on any element of Smith's. negligence claim. Therefore, we hold that Beaty's motion for judgment on the evidence was improperly granted by the trial court. The judgment of *1036 the trial court is reversed and we remand with instructions to grant a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Notes
. Beaty purports to bring a cross-appeal, but he has mislabeled an argument as a cross-appeal. Beaty argues that even had Smith established negligence on his part, Smith failed to present evidence that his injuries were proximately +- caused by Beaty's negligence. Beaty's argument is not a cross-appeal which raises a new issue but is an assertion of alternative grounds upon which the judgment of the trial court may be sustained.
. It appears from the record that sometime after the accident Wells was married and that on the date of trial her last name was Albertson. In their briefs the parties refer to her as Wells, and we will follow their example in our discussion.
. Beaty analogizes the facts of this case to the facts in Daub. In Daub, the only evidence presented at trial was the testimony of the plaintiff and defendant. Mrs. Daub had significant preexisting conditions and subsequent injuriеs. However, she failed to present any expert testimony to establish causation as is ordinarily required under such circumstances. Daub,