delivered the opinion of the court.
Thе designation of the county seat of a county in Dakota, or providing for its designation ■ by popular election, whs a matter properly belonging to the legislative department of the tеrritorial government. It was not á matter by itself for judicial cognizance. But when the law of the Territory left the designation of a county seat to the voters of the county, and provided that the validity of the election could be contested by any competent elector of the county before the District Court of the district within which the county was situated, upon leave obtained-from such court for that purpose, and prescribed the mode in which such contest should be prosecuted by the contesting elector,, and defended by the eommis.sioners of the county under whose direction the election was held, and proofs be taken upon the matter in issue, and that the validity of the election should then be determined by the District Court — the designation of a county seаt under the. law became the subject of judicial cognizance, a case or controversy arising upon such proceedings being taken to which the judicial power of the Territory attaches. This has been substantially the meaning.given to the terms “cases and controversies,” used in the judicial article of the Constitution defining the limits of the judicial power of the United States. By those terms are intended the claims of contentions of litigants brought before the courts for adjudication by regular proceedings established for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim or contention of a party takes such a
*174
form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it, then it has become a case or controversy. Thus, in
Osborn
v.
Bank of the United States,
’ We are of opinion, therefore, that the validity of an election to determine the countynseat of a county in Dakota under the laws of the Territory, when presented to the courts in the forms prescribed by those lаws, becomes a subject of action within the jurisdiction of the territorial court. As thus presented, it is a case of controversy between an elector of the county and its commissioners, and the judgment thereon of the ■ District Court of the Territory was subject to appeal to its Supreme Court,. Whether the judgment of that court can be reviewed here must depen u Upon tne.act of Congress or march 3, 1885 23 Stat. 443, c. 355, which provides as follows:
“ Sec. l.^That no appeal or writ of error shall hereafter be allowed from any judgment or decree in any suit at law or in equity i,n the Suprеme Court of the District of Columbia, or in the Supreme Court of any of the Territories of. the United States, unless the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum of five thousand dollars.
“ Seс. 2. That the preceding section shall not apply to any, case wherein is involved the validity of any patent, or .copy-1 right, or in which is drawn in question the validity óf a treaty! or statute of, or an authоrity exercised under, the United * States; but in all such cases an appeal or writ of error may be brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute.”
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TLe objection that (no Federal question is involved undоubtedly has reference to the second section. of the above act,, which provides that the appellate jurisdiction of this court over cases from the territorial courts shall not be determined by the amount in dispute, if the validity of a treaty or a statute of, or an authority exercised under, the United States, is drawn in question, but that in such cases an appeal or writ of errоr may be -brought without regard to the sum or value in dispute. No such question being involved, our appellate jurisdiction in this case depends upon whether the amount in dispute, exclusive of costs, exсeeds the sum designatéd. By matter in dispute is meant the subject of litigation, the matter upon which the action is brought' and issue is joined, and in relation to which, if the issue be one of fact, testimony is taken. It is conceded that the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute may be determined, not only by the money judgment prayed, w;here such is the case, but in some cases by the increased or diminished valué оf .the property directly affected by the relief prayed, or by. the pecuniary result to one of the parties immediately from the judgment. Thus a suit to quiet the title to parcels of real property, or to remove a cloud therefrom, by which- their use and enjoyment by the owner are impaired, is brought within the cognizance.of the court, under the statute, only by the value of the property affected.
Alexander
v. Pendleton,
It is not' necessary, therefore, to consider the alleged refusal *177 of a majority of the county commissioners to prosecute the аppeal, and their application to the court below to vacate the order allowing it. The appeal had,been perfected, and the jurisdiction over the causе thus transferred to this court, before the attention of the court below was called to the action of the majority.' .Whether such majority could afterwards authorize a withdrawal of the aрpeal, holding the relation the -commissioners do to the county, need not now be discussed.
But there is a ground, not taken, by the respondent, which forces itself upon our consideration, and that is, that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory is not in form a final judgment. It not merely reversed the judgment of the District Court, but. remanded the cause to that court for further proceedings accоrding to law and the judgment of the appellate court. A judgment óf a lower appellate court which reverses the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction, and remands the case to it for furthеr proceedings, is not a final judgment. A judgment of reversal is only final when it also enters or directs the entry of a judgment which disposes of the case, On this ground, therefore, as well as on the previous ground, the appeal must be
Dismissed,