33 N.E.2d 3 | Ohio | 1941
Lead Opinion
The important question in this case is: Did the plaintiff in operating his automobile at the time of collision with the defendant's truck violate Section 12603, General Code, which provides that "no person shall drive any motor vehicle in and upon any public road or highway at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the assured *83 clear distance ahead"? If he did violate this statute, his contributory negligence in that respect precludes his recovery in this action.
In 1928, before the adoption of the assured-clear-distance-ahead statute in this state, this court in the case of Tresise v. Ashdown, Admr.,
At the next session of the Legislature in the spring of 1929, the "assured clear distance ahead" requirement was for the first time incorporated in the laws of this state by the amendment of Section 12603, General Code, effective July 22, 1929. (113 Ohio Laws, 283.) The first case to reach this court calling for the application of this statutory requirement was that of Skinner v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co.,
Before the enactment of the statute a question of fact was presented as to whether a motorist who collided with a truck or other obstruction at rest on the highway was guilty of negligence proximately causing his injury. The statute was amended to remove the uncertainty attendant upon the appraisal of the conduct of the motorist in this regard, and to place upon him the burden of doing a specific thing, namely, to drive his car at such speed as will enable him to stop and avoid a collision with discernible objects within the distance ahead assured to him by the range of his vision. The purpose of the amendment to the statute was undoubtedly to prevent accidents on the highways, and it is just as importart to prevent them at night, in foggy or rainy weather, and on hills or around curves, as it is to prevent them in daylight and on level roads. To permit courts and juries in each particular *85 case to interpret differently the meaning of the plain term "assured clear distance ahead," is in effect to abolish the statute and its requirement by judicial amendment, and to place automobile drivers in the same position they were in before the statute was amended to its present form. Clearly, Section 12603, General Code, is a safety measure which to accomplish its purpose must be applied according to its clear and unambiguous language.
The states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Iowa each have assured-clear-distance statutes which are identical in terms and language. The construction of this statute becomes important to motorists of Ohio not only because they are affected by the law in this state, but because they are subject to the same rule when operating motor vehicles, as they do, to the extent of thousands of miles annually in the contiguous states of Michigan and Pennsylvania. Furthermore, it is highly desirable that the statute be given a similar interpretation by the courts of the several states wherein it is in force.
The Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Lindquist v.Thierman,
"Reading the Iowa statute under consideration in the light of the modern trend of legislation relating to automobiles * * * the phrase 'within the assured clear distance ahead' may be defined readily. * * * It is evident that the words 'within the assured clear distance ahead,' as used in the statute, signify that the operator of the automobile, when driving at night as well as in the day, shall at all times be able to stop his car within the distance that discernible objects may be seen ahead of it. To illustrate, a driver of an automobile at night, as well as in the day, in order to stop within the assured clear distance ahead, must be able to timely discern a man, a horse, a cow, or another vehicle; whereas *86
such driver of the automobile might or might not discern a thin wire or a small stake in time to stop within the assured clear distance ahead. If, then, the driver of an automobile, because of the defective lights, cannot see more than 10 feet ahead of his car, he must so control the same that he can stop it if necessary within such radius of the lights. * * * The definition above adopted requires that the operator of the automobile shall at all times be able to stop his car within the distance that discernible objects may be seen. Therefore, under the many cases above cited, the operator of an automobile must thus control his car, even though there are unlighted vehicles on the highway." See, also, Hart v. Stence,
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case ofStark v. Fullerton Trucking Co.,
The Supreme Court of Michigan in the case of Ruth v. Vroom,
Notwithstanding the strict construction given the assured-clear-distance statutes by this court, and by the supreme courts of other states in the cases just cited, this court in the cases of Gumley, Admr., v. Cowman, supra, Kormos
v. Cleveland Retail Credit Men's Co., supra, and Hangen v.Hadfield,
The composite rule then may be stated as follows:
To comply with the assured-clear-distance-ahead *88
provision of Section 12603, General Code, the driver of a motor vehicle must not operate it at a greater speed than will permit him to bring it to a stop within the distance between his motor vehicle and a discernible object obstructing his path or line of travel, unless such assured clear distance ahead is suddenly cut down or lessened, without his fault, by the entrance within such clear distance ahead and into his path or line of travel of some obstruction which renders him unable, in the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid colliding therewith.Spencer v. Taylor,
The greatest difficulty and confusion in the application of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule arises in the determination of what circumstances may constitute an exception to it. As indicated in preceding paragraphs of this opinion, such exceptions must arise out of sudden emergencies which change the situation for the operator of the motor vehicle, but which do not arise by reason of his own failure or neglect to comply with the rule. In this connection, by way of extenuation or exoneration, it has been suggested in certain cases that the driver of an automobile in operating his car has a right to assume, until he has notice to the contrary, that others on the highway will obey the law. Under the ordinary rules of negligence this is true, but in the light of the requirements of the statute under consideration, the rule above referred to has little, if any, application. Lindquist v. Thierman, supra. The statute is a safety regulation and imposes upon the operator of a motor vehicle at all times the unqualified *89 obligation to be able to stop his car within the distance that discernible objects may be seen. By force of the statute the motorist may therefore assume nothing that is not assured to him by the range of his vision.
It is apparent that the exception to the statutory rule, in contrast with the rule itself, cannot be stated in exact terms. It can be stated only relatively and to a large extent by terms of inclusion within and exclusion from the rule, depending upon the circumstances of the case. For this reason a few instances of judicial determination will serve to clarify and define the exception to the assured-clear-distance rule.
Under the following circumstances the statutory rule of assured clear distance ahead was applied:
Where a motorist in the nighttime drove his automobile into a train of cars across a highway on which he was travelling (Skinner v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co., supra; Capelle v. Baltimore Ohio Rd. Co.,
Under the following circumstances the driver of the *91 motor vehicle was legally excused from the application of the assured-clear-distance-ahead rule, and was held to the rule of due care under the circumstances:
Where a motorist having the right-of-way at a street intersection collided with a motor vehicle attempting to cross the intersection at the same time (Morris v. Bloomgren,
In the instant case, the plaintiff seeks to avoid the application of the rule on the ground that the unlighted parked truck was located in his path of travel just over the crest of a hill which cut off his view of the truck ahead, and that he was blinded by the lights of an automobile coming from the opposite direction, which automobile was opposite the truck at the time of collision. There is a conflict in the evidence as to where the truck was parked and where the collision occurred in relation to the crest of the hill, but even if the parked truck was beyond the crest of the hill as claimed by the plaintiff, that furnished no excuse for his colliding with the truck. As has been shown from the adjudicated cases, the fact that the motorist's view is limited by the crest of the hill does not warrant his driving at such speed as to preclude him from stopping his car within the assured clear distance that may be afforded after he reaches the crest of the hill. Likewise, the interference with the view by the lights of automobiles approaching him from the opposite direction, does not constitute any excuse for failing to keep his car within control so that it may be stopped before colliding with an obstruction in front of him. The statute has been adopted by legislative action to secure safety in travel on the highways. So long as it remains in force and effect it must be observed.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and final judgment rendered for appellant.
Judgment reversed and final judgment for appellant.
WEYGANDT, C.J., MATTHIAS, ZIMMERMAN and BETTMAN, JJ., concur.
TURNER and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
As abstract propositions of law, I agree with both paragraphs of the syllabus. But *93 I do not agree that Section 12603, General Code, is to be read to the exclusion of other statutory rules of the road. The purpose of all rules of the road is safety in driving, and Section 12603 is to be read in the light of that purpose and in connection with the facts of each case.
Paraphrasing the third paragraph of the syllabus ofHangen v. Hadfield,
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the question of contributory negligence was properly left to the jury, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
WILLIAMS, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.