[¶ 1] Bruce G. Harris appeals from a judgment awarding Linda A. Smestad $30,025 plus interest for loans Smestad claimed she made to Harris during their 18-month relationship. We conclude the district court’s findings that an orаl agreement existed between the parties for Harris to repay Smestad $30,025 for the loans and that Harris failed to prove his counterclaims are not clearly erroneous. However, we further conclude the oral loan agreement is unenforceable under the statute of frauds in N.D.C.C. § 9-06-04(4). We affirm the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings to consider Smestad’s claim based on unjust enrichment.
I
[¶ 2] Smestad and Harris were involved in a personal and business relationship from spring 2007 through late 2008. The couple did not marry, but Smestad moved into Harris’s Mandan home in November 2007. Harris owned and operated Oasis Water Systems, Inc. (“Oasis”), a Subchapter S corporation with Harris as the sole shareholder. Smestad worked as an еngineering technician for the city of Bismarck and also had a part-time job. During their relationship, Smestad, using two checking accounts, wrote numerous checks to Harris, Oasis, and others on behalf of Harris and Oasis.
[¶ 3] After the relationship ended, Smestad brought this action against Harris seeking more than $112,000 “as reimbursement/repayment for monies” she had provided to him. Smestad claimеd the
[¶ 4] At the bench trial, Smestad testified the parties had an oral agreement that Harris would repay her for the loans she had made to Harris and Oasis. Harris claimed the payments were not loans, but were intended to compensate him for work projects completed on homes owned by Smestad, her brother, and her parents. The district court found “Smestad’s testimony to be more credible than Harris’ testimony” and awarded Smestad $30,025 for some of the loans she had made to Harris. The court refused to order repayment of any loans Smestad made to Oasis because the corporation was not a party to the action. The court also ordered a van аnd generator owned jointly by Smestad and Harris be sold and the net proceeds divided equally between the parties. The court dismissed Harris’s counterclaims, finding that “Harris has failed in burden of prоof as to each claim, and that additionally, he failed to prove measurable damages, if any, for these causes of action.”
II
[¶ 5] Harris, who is representing himself on appеal, lists about 35 one-sentence “issues” in the “statement of the issues” portion of his brief. These “issues” range from alleged trial court errors to criticism of his trial attorney’s handling of the case. These “issues” are not further developed or explained in the body of the brief. Instead, Harris makes additional allegations about improper conduct on the part of the triаl judge, Smestad’s attorney and his trial attorney, which also are not developed into comprehensible arguments. These “issues” are inadequately briefed for our consideration. See, e.g., Olsrud v. Bismarck-Mandan Orchestral Ass’n,
[¶ 6] For the most part, Harris’s allegations challenge the district court’s refusal to accept Harris’s version of the facts. A district court’s findings of fact will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). “ ‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, after reviewing the entirety of the evidence, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.’ ” Murphy v. Rossow,
[¶ 7] We conclude the district court’s findings that Harris orally agreed to repay Smestad $30,025 for the loаns and that Harris had not proven his counterclaims are not clearly erroneous.
Ill
[¶ 8] One issue Harris has sufficiently raised in his appellate brief is whether the district court’s award of $30,025 to Smestаd is barred by the statute of frauds.
[¶ 9] Section 9-06-04(4), N.D.C.C., provides in relevant part:
“The following contracts are invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof is in writing and subscribed by the pаrty to be charged, or by the party’s agent:
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4. An agreement or promise for the lending of money or the extension of credit in an aggregate amount of twenty-five thousand dollars or greater.”
The statute of frauds is an affirmative defense that must be pled or else it is waived. See Farmers Co-op. Elevator v. Lemier,
[¶ 10] Because an oral agreement is neither in writing nor subscribеd by the party to be charged, see Kuntz v. Kuntz,
[¶ 11] Consistent with the requirement that the statute of frauds be specifically pled as an affirmative defense, the statute of frauds affects only the remedy on the contract, and to the extent a promisor waives the protection, the contract is enforceable against the promisor. See Baldus v. Mattern,
[¶ 12] Because N.D.C.C. § 9-06-04(4) requires consideration of the “aggregate” amount of a series of loans, each loan cannot be considered a severable part of the parties’ oral agreement. In Oster,
[¶ 13] Here, the district court found the parties had an oral loan agreement for funds exceeding $25,000. We conclude the oral loan agreemеnt is unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
[¶ 14] Smestad argues she should nevertheless prevail because this Court has recognized that “[w]here the promisor receives a direct рersonal benefit as a result of the promise, the promise is outside the statute of frauds.” Nelson v. TMH, Inc.,
[¶ 15] In her complaint, Smestad sought “such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.” We reverse in part and remand this case to the district court for determination whethеr Smestad has requested equitable relief against Harris that now should be considered by the court. We note the judge presiding over the first proceeding has retired. “On remand, the district court will need to make a Rule 63, N.D.R.Civ.P., certification prior to conducting further proceedings or, alternatively, order a new trial.” Clark v. Clark,
“If a judge conducting a hearing or trial is unable to procеed, any other judge may proceed upon certifying familiarity with the record and determining that the case may be completed without prejudice to the parties. In a hearing or a nonjury trial, the successor judge must, at a party’s request, recall any witness whose testimony is material and disputed and who is available to testify again without undue burden. The successor judge may also recall any other witness.”
IV
[¶ 16] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.