103 Mich. 580 | Mich. | 1895
Lead Opinion
This was a summary proceeding to-recover possession of land for non-payment of rent. Com
The evidence which the jury followed showed that complainant bought the land with defendant in possession;
If the parties were bound by the terms of the agreement, there could be no doubt that the jury were justified in finding for complainant. Judd v. Fairs, 53 Mich. 518. But it is insisted that the contract was within the statute of frauds; that complainant could not be bound beyond one year; and that, if this was so, defendant could not be held to be bound to pay the consideration for two years' occupancy, and that, therefore, he must be held a tenant at will.
It is undoubtedly a general rule that an agreement void under the statute of frauds is void in all its parts, and cannot be considered for the purpose of assessing damages, .and is not good as fixing the consideration. Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112; Raub v. Smith, 61 Id. 543; Wardell v. Williams, 62 Id. 50. But, in this case, defendant
The judgment will be affirmed, with costs.
The deed is dated April 6, 1893.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). It is conceded that the defendant is in possession of premises under a parol lease-for two years. The parties agree that the consideration-for this lease was the defendant’s promise to clear two parcels of land. They disagree as to the time it was to be done; the complainant asserting that the land was to be° cleared during the spring following the making of the-lease, and the defendant claiming that it was to be done-during the term of two years. The work not being done-in accordance with complainant’s claim, he began summary proceedings after a notice to surrender the premises within seven days after service. The jury evidently believed the complainant.
If it be conceded that this was a good notice, under subdivision 2 of section 8295, How. Stat. (and it seems not to be questioned), it leaves this case to turn upon the
It is contended that this contract was within the statute-of frauds, and therefore void for all purposes, under the*rule laid down in the cases of Sutton v. Rowley, 44 Mich. 112; Raub v. Smith, 61 Id. 543; Wardell v. Williams, 62 Id. 50; Chamberlain v. Dow, 10 Id. 319; Hall v. Soule, 11 Id. 494; Holland v. Hoyt, 14 Id. 238; Grimes v. Van Vechten, 20 Id. 410; Hillebrands v. Nibbelink, 40 Id. 646; Niles Water Works v. City of Niles, 59 Id. 311. An examination of these cases will disclose that most of them involved contracts in relation to personal property and labor. This rule does not apply to cases where lands have-been leased for a period of more than a year at an annual' rent, and possession has been taken, and rent paid. In> such case "the lessee is considered as tenant from year to-year. Doe v. Bell, 5 Term R. 471; People v. Rickert, 8 Cow. 226; Clayton v. Blakey, 8 Term R. 3; Reeder v. Sayre, 70 N. Y. 180; Laughran v. Smith, 75 Id. 205; Wood, Landl. & Ten. § 23, and note; Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 286; Schneider v. Lord, 62 Id. 141; Huntington v. Parkhurst, 87 Id. 44.
In this case it was stated that the rent was not payable, annually, but was all payable at once, according to the-complainant’s theory. The rule is that the agreement regulates the tenancy “ in every other respect ” than duration. People v. Rickert, 8 Cow. 231; 1 Cruise, Dig. 261; Schuyler v. Leggett, 2 Cow. 663. The case of People v. Rickert was similar to this one, being a letting for four years, for which the tenant was to inclose the demised premises in fence, by way of rent. 8 Cow. 227. It differed, however, from this case in one particular, viz...
But counsel suggest, in substance, that this lease can still be held a valid lease for a year, and that the law will imply a promise to pay the fair rental value annually. To so hold would be to say that the writing should bind one and not the other. We think it would be like any •other nudum factum. Perhaps the occupancy would entitle the lessor to remuneration, but it would be because ■of the occupancy, and not by reason of the agreement. 'The difficulty in implying such promise is the fact that the parties made another and inconsistent agreement. Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich. 566; Peters v. Gallagher, 37 Id. 407; Hough v. Comstock, 97 Id. 14, and cases cited.