Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Wilma Guzman, J.), entered March 24, 2006, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained when the car in which plaintiff was a passenger struck a dumpster owned by defendants-appellants, denied appellants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them, reversed, on the law, without costs, appellants’ motion granted and the complaint dismissed as to them. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
It was therefore incumbent upon plaintiff passenger and defendant driver to raise a triable issue of fact regarding appellants’ negligence. Even assuming, as the driver and passenger contend, that there was no stop or left-turn sign at the intersection, they have failed to meet that burden. The driver’s self-serving, utterly vague and imprecise testimony that the dumpster was “in a part of the street that cars would normally drive on” is insufficient to raise a material issue of fact that the dumpster was situated in an unsafe location. Similarly, respondents’ assertion that appellants were negligent in failing to place reflectors or lights on the dumpster is devoid of evidentiary facts and unsupported by any authority—expert or otherwise. Given the admitted circumstances in which this accident occurred—skidding on a wet road while making “too wide” a turn at 35 to 40 miles per hour—the claim of negligence on appellants’ part is purely speculative, and, consequently, insufficient to defeat summary judgment (see Castro v New York Univ., 5 AD3d 135, 136 [2004]). Concur—Andrias, Friedman and Marlow, JJ.
Tom, J.E, and Gonzalez, J., dissent in a memorandum by Tom, J.E, as follows: At issue on this appeal is not whether defendant driver was negligent but whether the location of the 20-cubic-yard refuse container that he struck and its visibility (or lack thereof) contributed to the injuries sustained by plaintiff. Resolving several issues of fact as a matter of law, the majority concludes that because the driver was negligent in the operation of the motor vehicle, other defendants cannot be held accountable regardless of the location and condition of the dumpster. Because the record contains evidence that the dumpster was located “in a part of the street that cars would normally drive on,” and was unseen until virtually the moment of impact, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the owners of the refuse container were negligent in placing it in an
Plaintiff Markking Smalls was a passenger in a Chevrolet Cavalier proceeding east on Randall Avenue in Bronx County in the early morning hours of December 14, 2001. Defendant Jahkim Jenkins was the driver. Defendants AJI Industries, Inc., Eastern Ecology Services, Inc. and Industrial Ecology Services (collectively, AJI) are the owners of a 20-cubic-yard refuse container placed somewhere along the northbound side of Zerega Avenue and close to the intersection with Randall Avenue.
At his examination before trial, Jenkins testified that it was raining as the vehicle approached the end of Randall Avenue, and he described the area around the intersection as “dimly lit.” Jenkins conceded that, upon reaching the junction with Zérega Avenue, he made the 90-degree left turn at 35 to 40 miles an hour, began to skid due to the wet road surface and “made the turn too wide.” Only as he was completing the turn onto Zerega Avenue did Jenkins see the dumpster directly in front of him. As he described the collision, “I was making the turn. I saw the Dumpster and I was moving wide. I tried to swing back in like I’m trying to turn it, and the car was skidding an[d] I couldn’t catch it and I hit the Dumpster.” Jenkins further testified that at the time of impact the container was located in the portion of the roadway where cars normally traverse and was not equipped with any lights, reflectors, reflective tape or other visual warning. He spent the next month in the hospital.
Plaintiff testified that the top speed of the vehicle driven by Jenkins while it was proceeding east on Randall Avenue was “[l]ike thirty-five.” He stated that the road was dry and, consistent with Jenkins’s testimony, denied that any signs were posted that required a stop or prohibited a left turn. Describing the vicinity of the accident, he stated, “like over there in that area was real dark.”
The evidence clearly raises an issue of fact as to whether AJI’s container encroached upon the lane of travel (see DeBartolo v Coccia, 276 AD2d 663 [2000]) or was otherwise dangerously situated (see Dery v DeCostole Carting, 281 AD2d 508, 509 [2001]) and whether such negligence was a proximate
On the other hand, Jenkins’s testimony that the container was located in the travel lane represents a firsthand account of its position immediately prior to the accident. Merely because a statement is made by a party or other interested person does not render it inadmissible or incredible as a matter of law (see Butler v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 198 AD2d 131, 132 [1993] [plaintiffs self-serving statement sufficient to raise triable issue of fact]; Harris v City of New York, 147 AD2d 186, 189 [1989] [parent’s statement]).
In addition, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the dumpster was placed in a dimly lit area of the roadway without any markings to warn drivers of its presence. Both Jenkins and the police officer testified that the dumpster did not have any reflectors or lights, and according to both Jenkins and plaintiff, it had been put in a dimly lit spot. This is significant since a driver proceeding along Randall Avenue approaching the subject intersection has a good view of Zerega Avenue located immediately left of the intersection due to flat terrain unobstructed by any structure. Thus, a jury might reasonably conclude that had AJI’s refuse container been equipped with markings to render it visible to motor vehicle operators approaching the intersection, Jenkins would have realized that there was a stationary object on Zerega Avenue close to the intersection with Randall Avenue and executed a slower, more acute left turn, thereby avoiding the accident altogether. Thus, a jury could reasonably find that the location of AJI’s refuse container, without lights or reflectors, was a hazardous condition that contributed to the injuries sustained by plaintiff (see Hart v Scribner, 44 AD2d 59, 64 [1974] [stalled car standing without lights in the darkness constituted a “menace”]).
Even assuming that Jenkins might have had some responsibility for the accident (that is, by making an illegal turn, speeding somewhat and/or losing control of his vehicle when it skidded), it certainly cannot be said, as a matter of law, that AJI did not contribute to the occurrence of the accident by placing a dumpster, lacking any reflectors, in a dimly lit area and in a location that a jury could find to be a traffic lane.
AJI has failed to produce evidence in admissible form sufficient to eliminate every material issue of fact in the case against it (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Thus, summary judgment must be denied, irrespective of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]).
Accordingly, the order denying summary judgment to AJI should be affirmed.
