| Vt. | Jan 15, 1854
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On the trial of this cause at the circuit, the plaintiff introduced evidence to prove a possessory right to the land described in his declaration, and also the injury of which he complains. The parties are adjoining proprietors of land, and the matter in controversy is in relation to the dividing line between them. For the purpose of showing a title, and right of possession to the land in dispute, the defendants gave in evidence the record of a suit before a justice of the peace, in an action of trespass on the free-hold, brought in favor of the plaintiff against the defendants and two others, who defended under their title.
From this record, it appears, that a judgment was rendered for the defendants; that the plaintiff appealed; and that more than twelve days before the session of the court to which the appeal was taken, the plaintiff, under the provisions of the act, paid the justice the costs allowed the defendants, in settlement of the suit. The appeal was never entered in the appellate court, and was no further prosecuted. It is admitted, that the alleged trespasses were committed on the same land, and that the title was in dispute and litigated before the justice. The county court held the proceedings in the justice’s court conclusive upon the title to the land, and directed a verdict for the defendants. For this ruling of the. court, these exceptions have been taken. The question arises whether that record is conclusive, between these parties, against the plaintiff’s title to the land.
The action of trespass quare clausum, fregit is a possessory action, the gist of which is an injury to the possession. The title to the premises is not necessarily involved in its prosecution. In this respect it is unlike the action of ejectment and other real actions; yet, the title may be litigated, as a matter directly involved in the issue, and when that question is adjudicated, and a judgment has been rendered in this form of action by a court having competent jurisdiction of the matter, the judgment will conclude the parties,
In relation to the jurisdiction of the justice, before whom these proceedings were had, and Ms right to adjudicate upon the question of title to the premises, we think there can be no doubt as to the construction of the act, or the intention of the legislature. The Comp. Stat. 288, § 20, expressly gives jurisdiction to justices of the peace in actions of trespass on the free-hold, where the sum in demand does not exceed twenty dollars. Jurisdiction is also given of all other actions of a civil nature, where the matter in demand does not exceed one hundred dollars, except actions of slander, false imprisonment, replevin above the sum of seven dollars, and where the title of land is concerned. TMs last exception will exclude from the jurisdiction of the justice, the action of ejectment ; case, against an officer for the defective levy of an execution ; covenant, on covenants in a deed, 2 Vt. 407" court="Vt." date_filed="1829-01-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/hastings-v-webber-6571177?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6571177">2 Vt. 407 ; actions on the case for a nuisance, 11 Vt. 250" court="Vt." date_filed="1839-01-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/whitney-v-bowen-6572172?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6572172">11 Vt. 250; 20 Vt. 183" court="Vt." date_filed="1848-01-15" href="https://app.midpage.ai/document/haven-v-needham-6573826?utm_source=webapp" opinion_id="6573826">20 Vt. 183; and, indeed, all actions in whatever form, where the title'to real estate is involved, except tMs particular form of action. Trespass on the free-hold, where the matter in demand does not exceed twenty dollars. TMs form of action, to this extent, is given by statute, and jurisdiction when not expressly taken away, is necessarily given over every matter that arises on common law principles under the issue formed in the case. "Where that jurisdiction exists, the conclusiveness of an adjudication is a matter of legal inference, unless a contrary provision is expressly made by statute.
The act of 1824, (Slades Comp. 140,) gave the same jurisdiction in this form of action to a justice; but provided, that if the defendant justified by plea of title, the records in the case were to be certified by the justice, and returned to the next term of the county court; in which court, the case was to be entered as an original action. Under this act, the legislature intended to take from the jurisdiction of the justice, the right to determine the question of title to land in this form of action, and tMs rendered necessary a special provision of that character. But in our present revision of the statutes, while the jurisdiction of a justice over this
The effect of the judgment, which was given in evidence, and ■of the proceedings before the justice, is a matter of more difficulty. So far as the cause of action is concerned on which that suit was brought, we must, on the authority of the case of Catlin v. Taylor, 18 Vt. 106, regard those proceedings, as a bar to any other suit for that matter, and no further claim for damages can be made. In giving that effect to those proceedings, it is not necessary to ■consider that claim as having been adjudicated, or that a judgment still subsisting has been rendered thereon. It is sufficient for that purpose to say, that the commencement of the suit, the appeal taken from the judgment of the justice, the subsequent payment of costs in settlement of the suit, and the neglect of the plaintiff to prosecute that appeal in, the appellate court, will operate as a retraxit, “ or an open and voluntary renunciation of the suit.” In such case, it is a bar to any action, for the same cause, or duty. 3 Blac. Com. 296. Jac. Law Dict 523, title Retraxit. If this suit had been brought for the same injuries, for which that suit was prosecuted, those proceedings would be a good defence to this prosecution. But this suit is brought for other injuries to the same land; and the question is, do those proceedings conclude the parties in this suit, on the question of title; in other words, is there a judgment unvacated, and still subsisting, in which the title to this land was the subject of express and direct adjudication. It is not sufficient, that a judgment was rendered by the justice, having jurisdiction of the subject matter before him, or that the title of the land was the subject of investigation; but it must also appear, that that judgment still remains in full force, unvacated and unreversed. Unquestionably, that judgment is binding upon the par-,
The Comp. Stat. 238 § 74 provides, that any party having appealed from the judgment of a justice to the county court, may at any time, not less than twelve days before the session of such court tender and pay to the creditor, or leave with the justice the amount of such judgment; or may tender to such justice a confession of
In Massachusetts, it would operate as a discontinuance of the
The judgment rendered by the justice, having been vacated by the appeal, and never affirmed, or prosecuted to judgment in the appellate court, we think there has been no adjudication on the question of title to these premises, and that there.is no existing judgment, which concludes the parties as a matter of evidence, for that- purpose.
The result is, that the judgment of the County Court must be reversed, and the case remanded.
In this case Chief Justice Redeield delivered the following opinion, in which the learned Judge discusses the doctrine of collateral estoppels, and dissents from the intimation of the opinion of the court upon this subject.
Concurrence Opinion
Opinion by
As I concur in the judgment just pronounced, it seems scarcely needful to specify the grounds of that opinion. But on one point, the intimation of the opinion of the court is so important, in its practical bearings, and so much opposed to my own views of the true principle of the just application of the doctrine of estoppels, that I shall briefly express my dissent.
I. I entertain no doubt the justice has jurisdiction of the action of trespass on the freehold, where the damages claimed are less than twenty dollars.
II. It is certain, that is an action where the title of land is concerned,, but not ordinarily brought in question. This portion of the jurisdiction of a justice is, therefore, in derogation of the general limits of jurisdiction, between justice courts and the county court. In all other cases the justice jurisdiction is prohibited, “ where the title of land is concerned.” This exception, too, is clearly made from convenience, and not with any view to encourage the bringing of actions, where the title of land is concerned, even in trespass quare clausum fregit, before justices, in as much as full costs are given in such actions, in the county court, “ where the court shall certify that the title of land came in question.” This exceptional jurisdiction, in this class of actions, to justices, was clearly not intended to bring into justice courts actions of
But we think it obvious to infer, that it was no part of the design of the legislature to confer upon justice courts, any jurisdiction to try and determine the title of land. In all other cases, actions involving the title to land are studiously excluded from the cognizance of such courts.
It is true indeed, that the question of the validity of title to land may incidentally come in question in almost any action, before a justice, and if it do so come in question, does not oust the jurisdiction. In an action upon note for $50, the title of an estate sold for $20,000 may come in question, and itbecome necessary to decide it, in order to determine the validity of the note. And it might equally come in question in an action upon a note below $20, and so the judgment of the justice be final. But did any one ever suppose, that such an adjudication might be used to defeat a recovery upon all the other notes, and that it even settled the question of the title to the land between the parties too, so that, in an action of ejectment, this collateral determination of the justice, in the action on the note, could be used as a conclusive estoppel, upon the question of title to the land? We think few men would be prepared to carry the doctrine of collateral estoppels to such absurd lengths. But there is no calculating the extent to which general rules will be applied in the law. Lawyers and judges seem to have an abhorrence of exceptions to general rules, as nature was formerly said to have, to a vacuum ! Common minds, especially if at all educated, seem to suppose there is a wonderful symmetry maintained, if general rules are made universal / But experience and true wisdom shows, that the symmetry and beauty
And in carrying our illustrations of this case a step farther, to show that it does not really come within the true principle of estoppels, we have only to suppose the wife should swear the peace against the husband, and some collateral question should arise, by which it became necessary for the justice to pass upon the question of the validity of the marriage, or of an alleged divorce between the parties, could any man be so insane as to claim, that such questions were thus forever settled, in all future actions between the same parties ? Or in an action of asstímpsit, for necessaries furnished the wife, it might become necessary for the justice, in order to determine the action, to decide either the validity of the original marriage, or its continuance; and is such decision of any force in any other action, even between the same parties, in another court.
It seems to me, these illustrations must show, to the comprehension of all, that a collateral determination of a question in a court, having no general jurisdiction of that class of questions, wants the basis of a binding estoppel, i. e., the decision of the same question, between the same parties, by a competent tribunal. Can it fairly be said that a justice court is a competent tribunal to decide questions of the title to real estate, when that whole subject has been studiously excluded from their cognizance? I trust not.
The whole subject of collateral estoppels is one of comparatively recent origin, in this state and in England. And it is exclusively of the creation of the courts, and like fictions of law, ought not to be allowed to aid in the perpetration of wrong. But if the doctrine is to be carried to this ludicrous extent, I, for one, shall feel compelled to fall back upon my Lord Coke’s definition, that “ estoppels are odious! not to be favored! that they shut out truth,” &c.! But when the question fairly arises, whether the decision of a justice, in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, settles finally the title to the land, I yet believe, that this court will not be prepared to perpetrate such an absurdity, as to hold that it does. I certainly do not desire to have it supposed, that by silence, I have become participator in such a deed. This doctrine has already been carried to the utmost limit of reason and
In the case of Barrs v. Jackson, 1 Young & Collyer 585, 594, after the most learned and elaborate examination of the subject, the learned vice Chancellor Knight Bruce, declares bis opinion of collateral estoppels, even when the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, that they are never binding upon other courts, in regard to the same question between the same parties. What such a judge would say to a collateral estoppel, claimed on account of the incidental determination of the question by a court, having no general jurisdiction of the subject matter, it is difficult to conjecture, as no such question has ever arisen anywhere, except in the present case.