*1 SMALL, IVAN Appellant, Petitioner GLACIER TRUSTEES, OF BOARD NO. DISTRICT MONTANA, SCHOOL COUNTY BROWNING, Cross-Appellant. Respondent
Respondent,
00-526.
No.
April
Briefs
2001.
Submitted on
August
2001.
Decided
Johnson the Court. Opinion of delivered the REGNIER JUSTICE Judicial by the Ninth order issued from the appeals Ivan Small, a tenured County, concluding that Court, Glacier teacher, was entitled process before his was terminated but was damages. not entitled to The Board of Trustees of ("Board") Glacier SchoolDistrict No. 9 cross-appeals. We affirm in part, part, reverse in proceedings remand for consistent with this opinion. parties raise two issues: 1. The Board contends that the District Court erred when *2 concluded that Small awas tenured teacher. 2. Small contends that
¶4 the District Court erred it when denied his request damages for due to termination. BACKGROUND January 29, 1997, On ¶5 Board voted to terminate Small's
employment at the end of his then employment current contract. The Board's termination ofhis employment was made hearing without a a determination ofgoodcause. Small appealed the Board's termination County to the Glacier he had in Superintendent ofSchools. Small contended that continuously been employed by the School District since 1987 position requiring and, such, a teacher certification as he was a tenured teacher whose employment could in be terminated -207, accordance with 20-4-204 and MCA. The parties §§ filed a stipulation of facts and summary judgment. cross-motions for On 5, 1997, September County the Glacier Superintendent of Schools issued its Decision and holding Order that as an "Assistant Superintendent," Small was September tenured teacher. On 1997, Small filed a Notice of Appeal with the State Instruction, Public who affirmed the decision of the Glacier Superintendent. ¶6 filed Petition for Judicial Review with the Ninth Judicial Court, 19, 2000,
District Glacier County. April On the District Court issued an order reversing the decision of the State Superintendent. The court concluded that the State Superintendent had erred as a matter of law when it held that Small was not a "tenured teacher" pursuant 20-4-203, MCA. The court request § denied Small's for damages, concluding damages that the issue of premature, was remanded the case to the Board with instructions provide Small with the process provided termination in § MCA. Small appeals from the District Court's determination that the damages issue of premature. cross-appeals was The Board from the District Court's determination that Small was a tenured teacher.
STANDARDOF REVIEW findings We review of fact in ¶7 administrative cases to determine whether findings clearly erroneous; we review conclusions of law to determine whether they Baldridge are correct. v. Board of Trustees, Rosebud County Colstrip, School Dist. No. Mont. 53, 58,
ISSUE ONE that Small was a it concluded Did the District err when tenured teacher? Small held valid Court concluded that because certificate, school district in a employed was
Montana teacher position requiring certification, had offered and had teacher been at least with the district for four accepted consecutive Small had an contract years, and was not acquired MCA, provides in Montana's teacher tenure
relevant part: acceptance elected the offer and
[WJhenever a teacher has been year employment by a as a of a district in a fourth consecutive contract position requiring specialist, teacher is considered to year teacher ... unless the year
be reelected from tenured by a majority membership trustees resolve vote their with the terminate the services of the teacher provisions The accordance 20-4-204. arguments support makes two separate proposition pursuant that Small not entitled First, expressly statute. the Board contends that excludes require as Small are in such who which Second, the superintendent certification. Board contends ambiguous interpret light statute is should of its thus we *3 argument legislative separately. We will address each purpose. A. Certification ¶12 ¶13 pursuant The maintains Small is not entitled to tenure Board that because, to this held a as an district superintendent, statute assistant Small position him to a valid Montana required which have superintendent's argues phrase Board "in a certificate. The as a district position requiring except teacher certification deny all superintendent specialist" positions or tenure to operates superintendent specialist. or In require which certification as a district words, interpreted other the Board that the statute should be asserts require does teacher grant only person tenure "in as a district require but does not certification certification superintendent ¶14 specialist." or interpretation of the statute is
Small contends the Board's does not "district certification superintendent" nonsensical because Rather, notes, position required his him to exist Small Montana. "superintendent hold a class 3 teacher certificate with valid Small, superintendent According because district endorsement." certification only exist, statutory can phrase does not this position, in a interpreted granting "employed to teachers specialist, requiring or teacher superintendent other than as a district words, tenure to all grants tenure statute certification." other persons employed positions requiring teacher certification persons those employed as superintendents specialists. or argues because his required and because he was not a district superintendent or a specialist he is entitled to tenure. The Board's interpretation of the tenure precluding persons
tenure to those position requires whose them to hold district if district superintendent certification, would be reasonable superintendent However, certification notes, existed. as Small there is thing no such as district superintendent certification in Montana. Rather, there are positions such as require Small's which certification with a superintendent endorsement. See Rule 10.57.403(6), legislature ARM. If the had intended phrase to be interpreted in the manner that the Board suggests, they could have easily done so by using phrase "except those requiring a superintendent's endorsement." Accordingly, interpretation statutory this phrase is capable of is the one Small urges accept: us to namely, deny serves to tenure to those as district superintendents specialists. We conclude that Small is not expressly denied tenure this statute. We note that particular ¶16 construction made this statutory - argument expressly that the statute denied tenure to all persons whose positions required "district certification"
- for the first time in its cross-appeal. brief on agreed Board with Small's construction below that phrase in question only expressly denied tenure to district superintendents and specialists. What the actually argued Court, Board before the District us, what it has alternatively argued before is that the tenure clearly statute does not and unambiguously grant tenure to assistant district superintendents. We now turn our attention to the merits of this argument. B. Statutory Ambiguity
¶17 ¶18 Alternatively, the argues that the statute clearly does not and unambiguously grant tenure to assistant district and because of purpose mindful ambiguity, we should be of the statute's applying it to Small. regard alleged With to the statute's ambiguity, the Board contends that the teacher tenure clearly grants tenure to "teachers" and denies tenure to "district superintendents," but does not clearly grant deny tenure to assistant superintendents. The Board contends that because the term "assistant superintendent" defined, is not legislatively Small's tenure status should be determined based whether his *4 duties were more like a teacher's duties or more like a district superintendent's duties. Because Small's duties were more like a duties, superintendent's argues, the Board he should be denied Board, According to the because the teacher tenure statute does
203 superintendents, assistant district clearly deny or tenure to grant underlying considerations the public policy the we should examine and district legislatively-drawn distinction between teachers Community Citing Sibert superintendents College purposes for of tenure. 587 Flathead of to teachers is to granting Board that of tenure purpose asserts thinking insure and to stimulate free freedom to teach truth purpose that the society reprisal. fear of The Board maintains without give from tenure to school excluding of highest-level retain their executive flexibility boards the and dismiss as an see fit. The maintains that Small's they officers as Board "light-years superintendent was removed assistant district any that the performance teaching of classroom other role tenure protect" laws and thus he should not be considered a were enacted regard, "teacher" of In the Board purposes for the tenure statute. Supreme of issued the Minnesota refers us to a number decisions concluding that are not positions Court various administrative teaching statutory of purposes considered for Minnesota's (Minn. Frye v. School No. 625 protections: Independent tenure ("Associate 1992), for Curriculum and 494 N.W.2d (Minn. Instruction"); City v. Sand Minneapolis Ed. of of of ("administrative 1948), assistant" to district 34 N.W.2d (Minn. City Eelkema Ed. Duluth superintendent); v. Board of of ("district 1943), superintendent"). 11 N.W.2d ambiguity no in the tenure statute responds Small there is ¶20 and, "teacher," he was because he fits within the definition of Rebutting analysis, to tenure. Small policy entitled Board's non-teaching expressly applies *5 therein, inis terms or in substance contained not to what has insert been omitted or to omit what been has inserted." Section Statutory according MCA. must to language plain be construed its and, meaning language unambiguous, if the is clear and no further Dodson, 287, interpretation Infinity is v. MT required. Ins. Co. 487, ¶ plain 302 Mont. 46. If the words of a ¶ ¶ however, ambiguous, step judicial statute interpretation the next in statute is to determine intent of the legislature. Infinity, 46. ¶ Thus, ambiguous. Montana's teacher tenure statute not ¶22 policy arguments jurisdictions to appeal or decisions other interpreting interpretation different tenure statutes to aid our unnecessary. Montana's tenure statute is See As Infinity, ¶ below, this statute argued clearly grants tenure to "teachers" superintendents." denies tenure to "district The remaining issue with to Small was to tenure regard whether entitled position is whether Small's fits within the definition of 20-1-101(18), MCA, "teacher." that a provides Section teacher means person, except superintendent, "a a district who holds a valid Montana certificate ... and who is a district as a member of instructional, supervisory, its or administrative staff." Small held a certificate, superintendent, valid teacher was not a district and was employed by the district as a member its supervisory Therefore, staff. administrative Small was entitled to tenure.
ISSUE TWO request Did the District Court err when it denied Small's to ¶23 damages determine due to termination? parties agree Both that if we affirm the District Court's conclusion
¶24 tenure, that Small was entitled Small is entitled to a determination to damages. of County remand the case to the requests we Glacier evidentiary hearing an Superintendent of Schools conduct Therefore, damages. affirm the District Court's conclusion that we Small was entitled to tenure and remand to the Glacier Superintendent of Schools. part, Affirmed in reversed in and remanded. part,
¶25 NELSON, COTTER and TRIEWEILER. JUSTICES LEAPHART, dissenting: JUSTICE I dissent. majority purports construing the teacher tenure of the rules of construction. The Court's be mindful however, ignores two basic rules of construction. interpretation, question provides: The (1) Except provided 20-4-203. Teacher acceptance offer and a teacher has been elected whenever by a year fourth consecutive of contract except as a requiring district the teacher is considered specialist, [Italics .... year year as a tenured teacher be reelected from added.] superintendent." phrase "except At issue here is the remote term modifies question is whether The Court concludes that term "certification." or the nearer
"position" that since Small the remote term reasons "position" it modifies he is excluded superintendent, of a was not in ignores the rule the Court reaching from tenure. In that conclusion nearest must construed to relate that a relative clause Hjelm antecedent that will make sense. Dussault 282, 285, 627 1237, 1239. antecedent that makes Here the nearest Thus, the Small held that question is "certificate." not whether sense "position" certified as but whether he was
of district rather *6 superintendent. a held Class 3 district Since Small a endorsement, a he is Superintendent Administrative Certificate with by the language excluded of the statute. plain a Furthermore, reject well a court must accepted it is ¶30 construction the any part statute that leave a would 280, (1997), without effect. language Montco Simonich 287, 1047, any statutory 1051. The Court must avoid the any superfluous construction that and renders sections give Berger does not all of used. effect to the words State v. Mont. 554. Under the Court's construction statute, a phrase "except superintendent" the tenure the as district is the superfluous. The Court concludes that excludes district However, is being from tenured. there no need superintendents the you district assume in superintendents exclude unless they They are Under eligible § first instance that for tenure. not. MCA, A "teacher" defined only "teachers" can be tenured. is a valid person, superintendent, as "a who holds is Montana teacher certificate ... and who instructional, supervisory, of its or administrative staff." member added). 20-1-101(18), Obviously, MCA since (emphasis Section superintendent does come the definition of not within teacher, qualify he or not for tenure the first sentence she does under 20-4-203, MCA, does need to be from the tenure of statute. The not excluded meaning exclusionary thus has no whatsoever language who, although holding applied it unless to someone certified as a district of a district nonetheless is, it unless it is meaning applied That has no superintendent. like a teacher certified a district someone Small who is of an assistant district serving in the superintendent. exclusionary legislature I inserted Since conclude
language for a purpose, not as mere surplusage, I dissent.
CHIEF JUSTICE GRAY dissenting: I join foregoing dissent of JUSTICE LEAPHART. JUSTICE RICE dissenting: join I Leaphart's Justice dissent and find the Court's decision
flawed for additional reasons. premises The Court its interpretation 20-4-203, MCA, of § on the
proposition that "there is thing no such as district superintendent certification in However, Montana." ignores ¶15. the Court very authority cites for this proposition. 10.57.403, ARM, Rule is entitled "CLASS 3 added). ADMINISTRATIVE CERTIFICATE" (emphasis rule This sets forth requirements for administrative certification of superintendents, principals, and other supervisory personnel. Those who meet the stated requirements receive an endorsement for each position they are certified for. The position description ¶34 a "valid job for Small's required he possess Superintendent's Montana Certificate." While Small now conveniently contends that superintendent exist, certification does not he took a decidedly different stance when he offered himself as a qualified applicant position. for the incongruous It is for him to argue, and erroneous hold, this Court certification for Montana, does not exist in when the law provides for it. MCA, declares § unambiguous. A review of the procedural history of this case reveals that the District Court found the say statute to something different than the Browning Board, School Superintendent and State Nancy Now, Keenan found. justices of the Montana Supreme Court cannot agree on its meaning. Apparently, everyone who reads the statute believes abundantly it to be clear—they just disagree about clearly says. cases, what it helpful such it is purpose examine the Browning here the School Board has offered *7 rational public policy excluding reasons for assistant positions from the teacher tenure statutes. Small applied accepted position requiring that he possess a valid Superintendent's Montana He performed Certificate. the duties and received the management benefits of his position, including $60,800 a salary of I per year. his believe effort to now redefine himself as a teacher and wring tenure for himself from the law conflicts with the language of the statute and the public policy underlying rationale the statute. I would reverse the finding District Court's decision Small is
entitled to tenure. notes the tenure school statute to teach the obviously administrators who do not need be free truth 20-1-101(18), that the reprisal. (providing without fear of See MCA "supervisory, term "teacher" includes members of school's staff). Furthermore, even if the tenure statute turned administrative freedom, importance academic Small exclusively preserving he its strong protections. asserts case can made that deserved that, responsible like principal, a tenured he was observes made job description and his him supervising classroom teachers program. district's instructional responsible aspects for all ofthe school if the academic protect Small asserts that tenure is intended teachers, those it must also extend to freedom of classroom Lastly, charged supervision. their Small contends with upon relied without Supreme cases Minnesota dispute interpret those decisions tenure value in the instant because statute unlike tenure statute. which is construing Montana's are mindful In we the teacher of a construction. the construction following rules declare what simply to ascertain and judge "[t]he office