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SMALICH v. Westfall
269 A.2d 476
Pa.
1970
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*1 Appellants, Smalich et v. Westfall. al., 1969. Before October Argued Jones, C. Bell, J., *2 and JJ. O’Brien, Boberts Cohen, Eagen, Pomeroy, DeBroff, B. with him David It. Gold, Morton appellant.

Carl him Fisher Fisher, Robinson, Long, E. & for appellee.

Opinion 9, 1970: by October Justice Mr. Eagen, in County. automobiles collided Westmoreland Two of owned Julia by op- vehicles, Smalich, One her Felix Bush Westfall. Julia Smalich and erated by in automobile passengers minor were Michael, son, The other vehicle involved was operated the time. at Louise Blank. Julia Smalich suffered Stephanna which her in the collision caused death. Mi- injuries but recovered. Smalich was injured, chael in was later trespass action instituted, naming This Blank and as defendants. estate both Westfall in both a death sought damages wrongful Smalich Julia action. Marco a survival and Smalich, action claimed minor, damages the minor’s guardian on injuries behalf the minor and on his own behalf as guardian.

At trial, jury returned verdict in all favor plaintiffs against both defendants. Damages were awardеd in the wrongful death action in the sum $1025; the survival action in the sum $2000; the guardian’s action in the sum of $166.50; minor’s action in sum of $20,000. Post-trial mo- tions were filed timely defendant Blank, seeking judgment the verdict in the notwithstanding on actions behalf of the Smalich Estate and a new trial actions on behalf of the minor and guardian. Both motions were en granted by court banc below. The plaintiffs appealed.

The Minor’s Action In this the court *3 instance, below awarded a trial new because it concluded that the verdict was the agаinst of the weight and evidence, was also excessive. We said have many times that the grant of a new trial lies within the inherent of the power trial and on court, we appeal will not interfere with the thereof, exercise unless there been has a clear abuse of discretion or an of error law which necessarily controlled the grant of the trial: Kralik new v. Cromwell, 435 Pa. 258 A. 2d 654 (1969); Gets Balliet, Pa. A. 441, 246 2d Guzman v. Pa. Bloom, 413 198 A. 2d An examination of the record fails per suade us that the сourt abused its discretion award a new trial ing actions the minor’s in involving and juries, we affirm will, therefore, its order in this respect. on

Actions Behalf of the Estate The trial found that jury Westfall’s negligent op- of automobile eration the Smalich was a proximate record amply That the trial of the collision. cause be questioned. and cannot finding supports under ruled that, court en banc After trial, be of must Westfall contributory negligence facts, a matter automobile as оf the to the owner imputed Es- the Smalich recovery by of and this precluded law, conclusion Blank. This tate defendant against Pitts- our in Beam v. on ruling court below based was 77 A. 2d 634 (1951), Co., Railways burgh dictated that decision. by clearly admittedly auto- of an that where the owner In Beam held we operated negligently is being mobile while is present of the owner a there is by presumption another, in the ab- to control and, the power it, the vehicle has a contrary, relationship to the of evidence sence and servant exists be- or master and agent principal of which the driv- because driver, the owner and tween owner, to the contributory negligence er’s injuries from caused recovering the owner barring In third considering a negligence person. conclude re-examined Beam and have case, we instant above set forth, holding to the as that, portion no be as longer recognized overruled it should be of this Commonwealth. the lаw to be barred from re- ought not a plaintiff First, the contribu- defendant a negligent covery against the relation- third unless person tory and the third is such person plaintiff between ship liable a de- vicariously plaintiff acts person: third fendant *4 (3d 1964). of Torts ed. al- The Law See §73 Prosser, Torts 486 491 §§485, (Second), Restatement so, of in the context a driver’s case, Placed ‍​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍(1965). to a not be passenger, will unless negligence them is such between the passen- relationship liable as a vicаriously defendant ger

413 Railways negligent Pittsburgh driver’s acts: See Beam v. supra. relationship passen ., between the Co ger very and the driver is therefore a ciátical one, worthy analysis of careful and consideration. relationships

At least three an could exist between (1) and a driver of an automobile: (2) principal-agent; (3) bailor-bailee; master-ser- vant. delivery personalty

A bailment is a for the ac complishment purpose upon express some a contract, implied, purpose after has been fulfilled, person shall be redelivered to the who it, delivered according otherwise kept dealt with to his directions Wright until he Sterling reclaims it: v. Land 157 Co., Superior Pa. (1945). gen Ct. 43 A. 2d 625, 614 As a eral a bailor rule, not liable for the operation bailee of a bailed chattel: v. Brower Employers’ Liability Assurance Co., Ltd., 318 Pa. 440, (1935); McColligan 177 A. 826 v. Penna. 214 R.R. Co., (1906); Pa. Hajduk Fague, 229, A. v. 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 186 A. 2d 55, Therefore in a,n trespass by action in damage bailor to recover for thing caused bailed, act of a party, contributory negligence third of the bailee is no unless acting defense, the bailee was at the time the bailor’s Banking servant: Commercial Corp. Superior P.T.C., 162 Pa. Ct. 56 A. 2d 344 (Second), (1965) §486 Torts ; Prosser, (3d 1964). The Law Torts ed. And the fact thing (here, bailor that a shares the use of the bailed passenger automobile) rides as a bailee necessarily does not cause a termination of the bail relationship: Rodgers and create а ment new v. Saxton, 158 A. 80 A.L.R. Agency relationship (1) is the which results from person manifestation consent one to another *5 subject behalf and act on his other shall (2) to act: the other so by consent and control, (3) to his 2d Pa. 81 A. Stahlman, v. Chalupiak Such (1) (Second), Agency Restatement §1 an if is agreement there only results agency control by with fiduciary relationship of a creation 88 A. Cohen, Rosenberg the beneficiary: §1, Restatement (Second), Agency 707 (1952); 2d of control by “The a and b (1958). right comments exercised what by prescribing be may the principal or at not do before the shall agent acts, shall agent .... Further, he or at both times acts, the time when authori to revoke the agent’s has power principal breach of his con constitute a this would although ty, of does him The control the principal .... tract ex its moment; include control at every not, however, the prin attenuated as where may and, ercise very Restate be ineffective:” absent, is physically cipal an a. comment Since Agency §14, ment (Second), to subject not a servant is any right iswho agent over the details his physi control his by principal upon rests conduct, responsibility agent cal for harm is not caused liable, alone, principal Com physical conduct: unauthorized 360 Pa. Mining Corp., v. Minds Coal monwealth (Second), Agency Restatement 14 (1948); §250 A. 2d been said to be long it has the general Thus upon no vicarious liability there is the prin rule that Law Prоsser, (3d in such case: Torts §70 cipal 1964). ed. and a principal, is a servant species

“A master of agent:” (Second), Agency a species a “A principal a. master is who employs comment §2, in his service affairs and who con- perform an agent right physical conduct or has trols of the performance service. other A ser-

4-15 agent employed by perform vant is an master ser- physical per- vice Ms affairs whose in the conduct subject formancе the service is controlled right (Sec- to control the master:” Restatement ond) Agency (1) (2) (Emphasis added.) , Thus *6 only a master not controls but results work may also direct the manner work which such shall rendering agreed be and a done, servant, ‍​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍services, entirely remains under the control and direction of the Joseph master: v. United 343 Pa. Assn., 636, Workers (1942) McColligan 23 A. 2d 470 ; Penna. Co., R.R. supra. rendering retaining “Those service but control doing over the They manner of it are not servants. agents, only аgreeing to use care and skill accomplish subject fiduciary a result and to the duties loyalty princi- and obedience to the wishes of the pal ... :” Mining Corp., Commonwealth v. Minds Coal supra, right at 17. Because a master has the to exer- physical cise control over the activities of the servant vicariously within the time of he service, is for liable negligent scope servant’s acts committed within the employment: (Second), Agency §219 Restatement (1958); (3d 1964). §69 The Prosser, Law оf Torts ed. recovery master likewise Therefore, is barred from against negligent a contributory neg- defendant ligence acting scope of his servant within the of Ms employment: (Second), §486 Torts (3d 1964). Prosser, Law Torts ed. correctly supra, applicable Beam, so stated this law a master. recognize contrary

In we now essence, that, to what many prior we have said in automobile accident cases,1 1 Pittsburgh Railways Co., supra; E.g., Beam v. Mazur v. Kle wans, (1950) ; A. 2d P.T.C., Von Cannon v. 365 Pa. 73 397 Suрerior Spegele (1942) ; A. 2d Ct. v. Blum field, Superior 182 A. 120 Pa. Ct. relationships above,

only discussed one of tbe three liability gives to vicarious rise master-servant, that of many Perhaps results negligence.2 of the harsh imputation of contribu- sometimes associated tory negligence to our as- can mistaken be attributed vicariously principal sumption liable that a agent. therefore now state of his We acts relationship only unequivocally a master-servant justify joint enterprisе3 finding an im- a will contributory negligence. putation of ordinary situa- in the doubt that, We have serious understanding of the the mutual tion, owner-passenger reserves a driver is that the and the driving physical right details over to the con- to submit himself that the driver consents more It seems reasonable of a driver.” trol “back-seat understanding that the driver will mutual that the retaining accomplish a result, use care and skill *7 subject yet operation manner of the trol the over owner-passengеr duty of the of obedience to the wishes only things destination. Such would as to such relationship agency one of master- and not stitute an undoubtedly although are situations there servant, might understanding to con- be such as the well where been Pa. Ct. 169 [2] Superior recognized Tbe necessity Ct. 299 and in the Connor (1928) ; a master-servant older cases. v. Penna. McMahen See, e.g., Railroad, Co., relationship v. White, Lassock 30 24 Pa. seems to have v. Pa. Bileski, Superior Superior 94 Ct. 241 3 enterprisе joint a or absence of existence the While below, we have considered record in the court here or raised proof question established mind. If such a rela in recovery by preclude existed, tionship Smalich Es this would right reached court result albeit for the tate, if the lower and Taylor wrong reason, be affirmed. v. Churchill its decision (1967). However, Country Club, 228 A. 2d 768 we 425 V. joint enterprise. did not evidence establish a that satisfied are (Second), §491 Torts Restatement See

417 relationship.4 stitute a master-servant All that we now relationship is that hold character created parties express must be determined from their agreement or from the circumstances, which presence disclosed at trial. “The mere of the owner in an being automobile while is in driven a necessarily manner another does not lia make him injury ble thereby, impute for an caused or to him the Pittsburgh Railways driver’s :”5Beam v. Co., supra, longer pre any at 370. Nor will it create a sumрtion of a relationship. master-servant presence

We do not mean, however, entirely owner is legal or that there no irrelevant, significance present an owner in his car has power to control it.6 These are relevant determin ing neg whether the actually been has ligent failing himself7 in to control the conduct Any driver. passen §495. See Torts, ger required to exercise care reasonable own safety, recovery and will be from barred if he unreа example, inexperienced For learning, if the driver were or prospective purchaser driving under actual directions. 5 Analogous (hus (Second), hereto are Restatement §487 Torts wife), (parent child), (bailee) band and §488 and and §490 guest (passenger vehicle). in a Beam, Pittsburgh, Railways Co., supra; v. See Mazur Kle v. supra wans, 6; supra P.T.C., headnotes Von 3 and Cannon v. head supra 8; Spegele Blumfield, note headnote 1. actually apply The statement seems to havе been intended to appeared Jacobs, to this situation. It first Bell v. 261 Pa. (1918) A. this context: “It was defendant’s car and acquiesced Finlc, acting him, did, he what who was *8 personally be excused because he not cannot at the wheel. A riding responsibility in car is man his not relieved from out for management because, permission, acting its another is especially driver; tacitly this is ‍​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍so where the and owner assents to presumption, the car is driven. the manner which There is a present rebutted, power owner that an in his not here car has to it.” control be driver of a wbicb to warn danger fails

sonably to control of an ability or to make use discovers Landy Rosenstein, be v. wbicb possess: negligence Penna. Railroad A. 855 v. Highton 325 Pa. 209, 188 (1937); 1 A. 2d 568 Co 132 Pa. Ct. ., Superior cir (1965). “Any Torts (Second), to believe reason tbe gives plaintiff cumstance which be heed would warnings bis advice, directions, that barred whether be is in determining ed is important them. to attempt give from failure to bis recovery by vehicle or the owns the . . . The fact that the plaintiff carelessly used, is being to bis knowledge chattel which one who is another’s since driving is ... importance, at more likely pay bis chattel is using vehicle be to than to the owner’s directions tention own car:” Restatement of a bis guest tbe directions e This differs comment §495, Torts (Second), where due to contributory negligence, from imputed and driver, the passenger between relationship is in all cases of the driver “in order to bar the plain this rule, Under passenger. necessary plaintiff . . recovery ., from tiff safety essential bis it is or should know know of the third Restate person:” conduct comment d §495, ment Torts (Second), nature of the between precise relationship repeat, We under driver, and the he t of fact wbicb it evidence, question presents of the jury except determine, function exclusive and the dispute evidence is are the facts where no question credibility certain, presenting direct infer inconsistent ground no sufficient leaving Workers Assn., supra. United Joseph of fact: ences court on tbe charged jury the lower case, In contributory negligence accordance of imputed issue *9 n with supra, our doing, decision in in Beam, so and, granted specific following requests charge plaintiffs: presence “No. The 6: mere of a car own- by er being in that automobile while it is an- driven necessarily operation other, does not mеan the car is within the control of the If owner. No. 7: you relinquished find that the decedent, Julia Smalich, right her expressly to control her either automobile, impliedly, by words, actions and at the conduct, time of right the accident had transferred that to you trol the car defendant then should Westfall, any find that conduct defendant Westfall cannot right personal repre- affect or bar the of the decedent’s jury sentative to recover this case.” The rendered plаintiffs against verdict Blank, defendant and, therefore, must have determined that Julia Smalich relinquished right had her her automobile to defendant Westfall. On the such a facts, conclusion justified under the law as we have now stated it. Judgments n.o.v. should not, therefore, have been en- tered in against favor defendant Blank and judgments Smalich Estate. These are and the vacated, record judgments remanded with directions enter against favor the Smalich Estate and defendant jury’s Blank in accordance with the verdict.8 awarding order of the court below a new trial involving in the actions Judg- minor is affirmed. n.o.v. in the on ments actions behalf of the Smalich Es- tate are and the vacated record remanded with direc- tions.

Mr. Chief Justice concurs the result. Bell jury against Since rendered a verdict defendant Blank charge charge more favorable her when than a in ac present opinion be, our cordance defendant Blank has hereby. harmed not been Opinion

Concurring Mr. Justice Roberts: I repudi- am today partially Court pleased I doctrine. the imputed contributory negligence ates be- join however, am unable to majority’s opinion, I “both ways” cause believe that a limited adopting *10 of reform falls of the accomplishing degree it short test, in I am disturbed necessary this area. particularly in to the doctrine continuing the majority, apply much so places the master-servant relationship, to master over a on the control a has ser- weight physical in concur the result. I can only therefore vant. doctrine has The contributory negligence imputed ob- For one, quite been criticized on two it is grounds. fiction is based on the absurd vious that the doctrine the to control that the has the “right” owner-passenger can a In real however, passenger vehicle.1 world, control over in no exercise way operational safe But if he the owner.2 in which he even is rides, vehicle requires doctrine contributory negligence imputed constantly advise owner-passenger only if if be. For need but also to seize the wheel driver, setting contributory negligence, imputed in the of The doctrine English case, case of roots in the 1849 in this its involved has Thorogood Eng. Rep. Bryan, Thorogood was 452. 8 C.B. against public passenger the owner of omnibus of a a suit a recovery passenger denied because The was omnibus. another negligent. driver, omnibus, other was of her as well driver theory passenger of control had a measure over The was “employed” driver; “[i]f the driver and he is dissatis he had obliged conveyance, he is not him mode of avail fied with written, As Dean Prosser has a at this was Id. 132. of it.” self England fiction,” later abandoned which “nonsensical Prosser, had followed America. See which those states (3d 1964) (citing cases). Torts 502 ed. of the Law Handbook degree course, can, exercise some The owner may times, required give driver; or, he at he selects when advice, per Improper like “slow down.” of directional kind some negligence, be active but duties that is not these formance this case. involved actively pull

he does not seek to Ms driver out of any he will have to trouble, he shoulder losses may suffer in an accident. Of course if he does inter- likely actively fere, he negligent.3 to be found One wonders what riding the owner should do if he is just perhaps go the back sleep.5 seat;4 hе should A second weakness in the doctrine of tributory negligence from arises courts fact that have using often failed to discern the difference between the fiction impute negligence control to when the owner-passenger using is the it to im- defendant, pute contributory negligence when the plaintiff. assumption is the has been that if the only driver’s imputed, logical it is to like- impute contributory negligence. wise But there is justification imputing no contributory negligence, strong psychological other appeal than “the of all rules cast in logical symmetry.”6 the form of balanced and *11 Unfortunately, empty approach, formalism of this example an Harper of what and James have termed the “both-ways even test,”7 became imbedded in the first 3 passenger physical “In ability the usual case the has no operation car, opportunity of the and no to interfere it; any attempt part with on his so in do fact would be a dangerоusly distracting piece driving might very of back-seat which negligence Prosser, well amount to in itself.” Handbook of the Law (3d 1964). of Torts 494 ed. 4 Pennsylvania R.R., 372, 377, 803, Cf. Nutt v. 281 126 Atl. (“But ‍​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍(1924) guest, especially an invited 805 one who occu pies opportunity rear seat the car where no of control exists operating not concerned ... with of the car and be cannot operation joining the driver in its viewed 5 Indeed, contributory often been has held that a driver’s asleep to an cannot be who is See, e.g., Roadway occurs. the accident v. when Transit Stafford 1948) (applying (3d Pennsylvania Co., law) 2d Cir. F. 920 ; 165 Lines, Caster, Greyhound (Del. v. A. Inc. 216 2d 1966). 689 S. Ct. 6 Harper James, The Law of Torts & 2 1273 7 at 1273-77. See id.

422 is barred plaintiff of Torts §485: “[A] aof act omission

from recovery them relation between only if, but if, third person a defend- be liable as that plaintiff is such such negligent caused to others by ant harm of a third person.” duct to see quick have been and commentators

Courts The fiction was criti in the doctrine. these two errors see to a horse-drawn carriage, applied cized even when 203, 111 N.Y. Co., 199, York H. R.R. v. New C. & Hoag mounted and the criticism (1888), 18 N.E. 649 648, at “Any automobiles: applied when the fiction was of control right wresting of the exercise tempted foolhardy. Equally from the driver would wheel ma operation efficient driver’s menacing denunciations, strident raucous reproaches, chine are from the back admonitions unctuous even persistent Mich. 91 395, 353 N.W. Korff, 387, v. seat.” Sherman statements, see, е.g., For similar 485, 2d 2d 355, S.E. 840, 848, 193 Va. Lingon, v. Painter 177 Misc. Co., Contracting v. Veeder Jenks 360 (1952); 281 (1941), aff’d, 2d 278, 30 N.Y.S. dis (1942), 2d 230 appeal 37 N.Y.S. Div. 979, App. 46 N.E. 2d 848 cf. N.Y. 787, missed, F. 264 (9th Co. Wright, Southern Pacific 1918). Cir. test” has been “both-ways strongly

Similarly, seem it was written In 1932 “[c]ourts criticized. or deny- involved granting the policies unaware from be different those con- plea the defensive ing of a damages master the responsibility trolling *12 and that latter are servant, prob- of his the conduct re- providing with financially simply concerned ably Gregory, Yicarious Responsibili- defеndant.” sponsible 41 Yale Negligence, L.J. 833 Contributory 831, ty Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Eso- In Johnson

423 press, Ore. 352 P. 2d Inc., 387, of Oregon Court the doc- (1960), Supreme rejected trine “The stating: lia- practical necessity imposing on bility an owner in the cases which do the doc- justify trine of is not imputed liability present the situation where owner injured is ‍​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​‍an own car. passenger two-way test of the Restatement does commend itself as either useful or Its necessary. only virtue, pointed out Harper James, supra, is that it is logical and symmetrical. Important legal rights ought to have better than mere footing architectural symme- try.”

It should be noted that the majority does not adopt the old “both ways” test but rather the re- view vised Restatement of for while Torts, partially abolishes the imputed negligence that doc- doctrine, trine is retained in the areas of master-servant rela- tions and joint See enterprise. 491 Restatement §§486, of Torts I (Second). submit However, the criti- cisms I hаve noted above concerning tributory negligence doctrine force to apply equal the two exceptions carved out second Restate- ment.

In days these of congested travel on high speed highways, dangers that someone requiring wrest a vehicle from the if driver the latter is neg ligent are certainly present whether driver bailee, agent servant of the passenger. The Supreme Court of Minnesota re-examined the whole problem imputed contributory negligence recently a well-rea soned close opinion deserves study. See Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., Minn. N. W. 2d There the court repudiated the applica of the doctrine to tion the master-servant relation in cases, automobile negligence stressing the absurdity the control argument, and absence of need for a

solvent unlike vicarious cases defendant, liability where accountable the master is held for the properly negli- of his servant. gence

I look to the when forward this Court day completes reform in area. its v. Fiala.

Chanoff, Appellant,

Case Details

Case Name: SMALICH v. Westfall
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Oct 9, 1970
Citation: 269 A.2d 476
Docket Number: Appeal, 124
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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