476 N.E.2d 714 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1984
Lead Opinion
William C. Slusher, plaintiff-appellant herein, and Patsy Slusher were married on July 18, 1980. On July 18, 1983, William Slusher filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County against defendant-appellee, Fred Oeder, seeking damages under the following four causes of action: (1) criminal conversation, (2) alienation of affections, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) loss of consortium based upon each of the first three causes of action. The complaint alleged that shortly after the Slushers were married, Oeder began to continuously and repeatedly telephone Patsy Slusher and harass her with the intention of enticing, persuading, and inducing her into having sexual relations with Oeder. The complaint also alleged that Oeder's persistent advances towards Patsy Slusher resulted in her having sexual relations with Oeder without her consent in March 1981. Oeder allegedly continued to call Patsy Slusher to solicit sexual relations until about May 1983 despite her requests that he stop. Oeder filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion was granted, and William Slusher now appeals, offering the following assignments of error:
First assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because Ohio Revised Code Section
Second assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because Ohio Revised Code Section
Third assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint because the complaint stated a valid cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress."
The first assignment of error questions the trial court's reliance on *433
R.C.
R.C.
"No person shall be liable in civil damages for any breach of a promise to marry, alienation of affections, or criminalconversation, and no person shall be liable in civil damages for seduction of any person eighteen years of age or older who is not incompetent, as defined in section
By its terms, R.C.
In the case of Haskins v. Bias (1981),
"* * * that R.C.
The Haskins court found that the causes of action which were abolished by R.C.
"We find that the interests protected by the common law causes of action for alienation of affections and criminal conversation are not interests in `land, goods, person or reputation' such as may be recognized at law. We therefore find R.C.
Since the common-law torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affections are interests which are no longer recognized at law, it therefore follows that R.C.
For his second assignment of error, Slusher argues that R.C.
It has been previously stated that "* * * marriage has never been regarded as a contract within the constitutional prohibitions against laws impairing the obligation of contracts."Moore v. Bur. of Unemp. Comp. (1943),
Slusher's final assignment of error claims that the trial court erred in holding that his complaint failed to state a valid cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In his brief, Slusher claims that Oeder telephoned Patsy Slusher at times when Oeder knew that Slusher was at home or had reason to know that he was at home. Slusher claims that Oeder continued to make these telephone calls despite being told by both Slusher and his wife to discontinue the calls. As a result of Oeder's conduct and subsequent seduction of Patsy Slusher, William Slusher claims that he suffered a loss of appetite and sleep and became fearful of losing the relationship he had with his wife. Oeder points out that Slusher's complaint fails to allege or set forth any of the above-stated allegations, and takes the position that the trial court was correct in dismissing the complaint since it failed to allege any action against Slusher himself, but only alleged that the actions on the part of the defendant were directed towards Patsy Slusher.
In the recent case of Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983),
Under the Yeager doctrine, it is obvious that if Slusher could allege and prove that Oeder personally accosted and confronted Slusher and threatened to seduce or rape Patsy Slusher, Slusher would have a cause of action if it indeed caused him serious emotional distress. Oeder's position seems to imply that since there was no "direct or personal confrontation" between himself and Slusher, that Slusher has failed to sufficiently plead or allege a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress along those lines established in Yeager,supra.
In setting the guidelines for the tort of intentional infliction of serious emotional distress, the court in Yeager,supra, at 374, stated the following:
"The standard we adopt in our recognition of the tort of intentional infliction of serious emotional distress is succinctly spelled out in the Restatement as follows: `One who byextreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causessevere emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.' Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 71, Section 46(1)." (Emphasis added.)
As Dean Prosser stated in his learned treatise:
"In the great majority of the cases allowing recovery the mental distress has been inflicted intentionally, either in the sense that the defendant desired to cause it, or that he knew that it was substantially certain to follow from his conduct. There are, however, a few cases which indicate that liability for extreme outrage is broader than intent, and that it extends to situations in which there is no certainty, but merely a high degree of probability that the mental distress will follow, and the defendant goes ahead in conscious disregard of it. This is the type of conduct which commonly is given the name of willful or wanton, or sometimes recklessness." Prosser, Law of Torts (4 Ed. 1971) 60, Section 12.
Clearly, had Oeder directly and personally confronted Slusher and made his threats, demands and intentions known to Slusher, such would be a sufficient basis for bringing an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress provided Slusher could prove the requisite degree of conduct on the part of Oeder and that the emotional distress suffered as a result of Oeder's actions was serious. However, even if Oeder purposely avoided any direct and personal confrontation with Slusher, his actions of making continuous and repeated advances towards Mrs. Slusher indicate a conscious disregard on his part of the high degree of probability that mental distress could follow from his conduct.
Our discussion of this particular aspect of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress would not be complete without reference to the recent case of Reamsnyder v.Jaskolski (1984),
Oeder raises other arguments to support the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint. Specifically, Oeder takes the position that the complaint fails to allege serious emotional distress and further, that there is no allegation that Oeder's conduct was outrageous. A review of the complaint, especially the third cause of action, reveals that in paragraph 17, Slusher alleges that the conduct of Oeder was "willful, wanton andoutrageous" (emphasis added) and that the actions taken by Oeder were "with the deliberate intention of causing Plaintiff severe emotional distress." As to the requirement that the emotional distress be serious, we look to the Supreme Court guidelines which hold that:
"By the term `serious,' we of course go beyond trifling mental disturbance, mere upset or hurt feelings. We believe that serious emotional distress describes emotional injury which is both severe and debilitating. Thus, serious emotional distress may be found where a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case." Paugh, supra, at 78.
In paragraph 18 of the complaint, Slusher alleged that, as a result of Oeder's conduct, Slusher had suffered "extreme mental anguish, distress, and anxiety." Paragraph 6 of the complaint which was incorporated into the third cause of action, alleged that Slusher had suffered distress of mind and body.
We must now consider this in light of Slusher's allegation that the trial court erred in granting Oeder's motion to dismiss for failing to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(6), "* * * the complaint is to be liberally construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the material allegations are to be taken as admitted." Slife v. KundtzProperties, Inc. (1974),
Turning to the case at bar, in view of our previous discussion, we feel that Slusher has alleged sufficient facts upon which to base a claim for a cause of action founded on the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that such cause of action should not have been dismissed pursuant to a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. Despite the fact that the General Assembly has statutorily abolished the common-law torts of criminal conversation and alienation of affections, it appears that the Supreme Court has implicitly resurrected such causes of action, and that either may now be maintained in the form of an action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, provided a plaintiff can sustain the necessary burden of proof in such a case. We do not interpret Yeager, supra, as holding that criminal conversation and alienation of affections are once again actionable torts. The tort, under our rationale, would be intentionally inflicting serious emotional distress, and the concomitant interference with the marital relationship would be merely incidental. Furthermore, there would appear to be no sound reason to grant immunity to a tortfeasor *437 intentionally inflicting serious emotional distress under myriad outrageous circumstances simply because a marital relationship was either initially or ultimately destroyed as a result thereof.
Somewhat analogous is Wilson v. Dabo (1983),
Judgment reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings according to law and not inconsistent with this decision.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
KOEHLER, J., concurs.
HENDRICKSON, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Dissenting Opinion
I concur with the majority's disposition of the first and second assignments of error, but I must dissent from their disposition of the third assignment because I am not convinced that the Supreme Court has "implicitly resurrected" civil actions for alienation of affection by recognizing actions for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Before the advent of R.C.
In response to appellant's third assignment of error, the majority has now resurrected the civil action for alienation of affections, which was specifically abolished by statute, by assigning it a new title, namely intentional infliction of emotional distress. In order to recover, plaintiff must prove exactly what a plaintiff was previously required to prove in order to recover for alienation of affections, except that he or she must now explicitly rather than implicitly document the emotional damage inflicted by the defendant's action. However, none of the cases cited by the majority in support of their position arose as a result of conduct which would have provided the basis for any of the amatory actions described in R.C.
It therefore follows that if the interests protected by the cause of action for alienation of affections are no longer interests recognized and protected by law (see Haskins v. Bias
[1981],