67 So. 516 | Ala. | 1914
The questions presented to us by this record challenge the sufficiency of certain counts of the appellees’ complaint, when tested on demurrer. The questions presented are of importance, and for that reason the reporter will set out, in his report of this case, counts 1, 8, 5, 6, 9, 13, and 14. The counts referred to will, when read in connection with this opinion, illustrate its full meaning.
Out of respect to necessity, public and private, electricity and steam, which are also dangerous agencies, are in constant use in our cities, towns, and villages and upon our public highways. The use of these agencies entails upon human life and property some modicum of danger which human skill and foresight cannot prevent, and which must be traced to inevitable accident. These dangers, inherent in the most careful use of such agencies, must be submitted to “in order that the greater good of the public be conserved and promoted.” The care with which the law requires the conductors of electricity to be insulated and placed beyond the reach of the average man in his customary use of our streets and highways, and the care which the law exacts of those who use steam power to maintain properly constructed, equipped, and inspected engines, are indications of the rigid adherence by the law to that salutary declaration of the law that, to use the language of Chief Justice Stone, “there is a limit to this duty (on the part of the citizen) to yield, to this claim and right to expect and demand. * * * ‘Sic utere tuo,’ in such conditions, is enjoined by social obligations and by law.” — Tennessee Coal, Iron & Rail
It may be that it is possible for a magazine for the storage of large quantities of dynamite and powder to be so constructed and operated, at places similar to that described in the complaint, as to render it probably not more dangerous to surrounding property and to the lives of human beings than a similar magazine would be situated in a place not so exposed, but, if so, the defendant has the burden of so showing. Presumptively there was inherent danger in the place mentioned in the complaint.
“Presumptions arise from the doctrine of probabilities. The future is measured by the past, and presumptions are created from the experience of the past. What has happended in the past, under the same’conditions, will probably happen in the future, and ordinary and probable results will be presumed to take place until the contrary is shown.” — Judson v. Giant Powder Co., supra.
That the defendant was unfortunate in the selection of the place for its magazine we think is most obvious, and we unhesitatingly hold that the third count of the complaint was free from demurrer.
3. What we have said disposes of the assignments of error based upon the action of the court below in overruling the demurrer to the second count of the complaint.
4. In the above case of Kinney v. Koopman & Gerdes, this court, through Coleman, J., said: “We are of the opinion that a count prima facie sufficiently shows a want of due care, which charges the storing of large quantities of gunpowder in a wooden building in a pop-u lous place in the city of Cullman.”
In the above case of Rudder v. Koopman & Gerdes, this court, through Head, J., said: “The defendants
5. We see but little substantial difference between count 6 and counts 9, 10, 11, and 12. They come directly within the reason of the rules above announced, and the demurrers to these counts were properly overruled.
While there are expressions in some of our older cases (see Kinney v. Koopman & Gerdes, supra; Rudder v. Koopman & Gerdes, supra; Collins v. A. G. S. R. R. Co.,
When Lord Holt made use of the above expression, the explosive force of gunpowder was, • in comparison with the force of modern explosives, as was the speed of a then sailing vessel to the speed of a modern hydroplane. • While modern methods of preserving these high explosives have probably improved, we are inclined to believe that many of the opinions of common-law judges on the subject now in hand would never have found their way into the books, if, when’they delivered those opinions, explosives had possessed those highly dangerous qualities which now belong to them. A modern bomb possesses, probably, as much explosive force as anciently belonged to a barrel of gunpowder, and, in applying the rules of the common law to present conditions, we must not lose sight of the real reasons which underlie those rules and apply them in accordance with their purpose rather than in accordance with their mere letter. We direct attention to the wording of the rule as we deduce it from what we regard as the sound declaration of our own cases on the subject and from what we regard, as the rule which has been declared by the best adjudicated cases in other states, viz: That he who keeps stored, indefinitely, in a thickly settled neighborhood, large amounts of high explosives which are liable, as dynamite or gunpowder or other high explosives are liable, to explode and do serious injury to surrounding persons
It may be that the storage for indefinite periods of large quantities of high explosives in a thickly Settled community would be more convenient to their owner than to keep them stored elsewhere. It may be that a requirement that he shall keep such a place of deposit at a point which subjects the public to less danger in the event of an explosion will entail upon him some inconvenience and expense in keeping supplied, at his place of business, with his usual needs. The needs of the individual must give way to the higher demands of the public for protection against all needless possible, not probable, sources of danger in their lives and in their property. It is the public demand, not the mere private need, for electric lights, electric cars, telephone and telegraph lines, which justifies, in the sight of the law, the imposition upon any human being of the slight modicum of danger which is attendant upon .the maintenance of electric conductors upon our streets and upon our highways. 'The law should be as cáreful in conserving the
In our opinion counts 13 and 14 were not subject to demurrer, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.