109 Minn. 407 | Minn. | 1910
The complaint, a demurrer to which upon the ground of no cause of action was overruled by the district court, alleged: That in 1889, when the plaintiff was twenty three and the defendant sixty seven years of age, and with a promise by defendant that upon the termination . of certain litigation a public ceremonial marriage would be celebrated, they entered into a secret marriage. That in January, 1890, the plaintiff became pregnant, and thereafter was ill, mentally distressed, and anxious for the performance of the promised marriage ceremony, which was constantly being delayed by the defendant. That on May 20, 1890, the plaintiff, at' defendant’s request, but without reading, having read to her, or comprehending the same, signed what purported to be an antenuptial contract, a
1. The complaint states a cause of action. If, as alleged, the parties were husband and wife when the contract sought to be set aside was signed, it is void; but that, as well as the allegation that it was by mutual agreement subsequently rescinded, may.be traversed, and inasmuch as neither appears upon the face of the complaint this case is not within the line of authorities which hold that an action will •not lie to set aside an instrument a mere inspection of wdiich - establishes its invalidity. Maloney v. Finnegan, 38 Minn. 70, 35 N. W. 723; Baldwin v. Canfield, 26 Minn. 43, 1 N. W. 261, 276.
If the contract was never delivered, that may be an additional ground for declaring it of no effect; but the complaint also alleges that the defendant claims it to be a valid and subsisting contract, which must include a claim upon his part of valid delivery. If the complaint alleged a valid contract, it would then state no cause of action; but it seems false logic to say, because extrinsic facts are alleged which, if true, render an apparently valid instrument invalid, that no grounds are furnished for setting it aside.
2. The plaintiff may maintain this action now, although she .has no present right in the defendant’s property, and although the contract has never been recorded nor has the defendant affirmatively acted upon it. Courts are established, and law and equity administered, for the purposes of justice in the adjustment of differences between
3. The complaint alleges- acts- by defendant and circumstances which, if true, constitute undue influence, which is always a species of fraud. Graham v. Burch, 44 Minn. 33, 46 N. W. 148. In re Nelson’s Will, 39 Minn. 204, 39 N. W. 143. A characterization of those acts as fraudulent would add little to the conclusions to be •drawn from them; but the complaint does in the eleventh paragraph .allege that the defendant, in procuring her signature, “wrongfully •and fraudulently availed himself of his influence over the plaintiff.”
4. The action is not barred by the statute of limitations. In the third assignment of error counsel for defendant argue that the plaintiff has no such interest in the property of her husband, during his lifetime, as gives her the right to assail the contract. This amounts to a claim that the action is prematurely brought, and, while we hold contrary to that contention, no one will say that after the death of defendant the plaintiff, if surviving, would not be at liberty to defend against any claim made under the contract. If her right to insist on the invalidity of the instrument will not be barred at a future day, how can it be barred to-day? Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 358 (480); C. Aultman & Co. v. Torrey, 55 Minn. 492, 57 N. W. 211. The statute is described as one of repose. It can never make unassailable a void instrument, although if, by virtue of such instru? ment, possession of property has actually passed, or rights have been acquired, and ,the situation continues for the necessary period, the status quo will not be disturbed. The same reasoning applies to the claim that the plaintiff has been guilty of laches.
Order affirmed.