224 Pa. 135 | Pa. | 1909
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
The learned trial judge submitted this case to the jury which after long deliberation reported a disagreement, whereupon a verdict for defendant was directed and judgment entered thereon. It is clear as indicated by the course of the trial that the learned court in the first instance entertained some doubt as to the liability of the defendant, but after more mature deliberation concluded that there could be no recovery
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I cannot agree with the disposition made of this case by the majority of the court, and as it affects every individual in the state who has occasion to use a street railway, I will submit the reasons for my conclusion. The case is disposed of by an opinion which cites a single authority to sustain its conclusion but which in my judgment, as I shall hereafter point out, is not an authority for the principle which controls the case at bar. I believe the rule announced by the majority is so much at variance with the well-settled doctrine on the subject that it will invite legislation which, in seeking to correct the effects of the decision, may impose too great responsibility upon street railway companies.
The material facts of the case which were sufficient to send it to a jury are not in dispute, or if in dispute were sufficiently supported by evidence to require the case to be submitted to the jury. The female plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's cars going north on the east side of Old York road, and desired to alight at Eckert avenue. She signaled the conductor, who stopped the car just short of the usual place of stopping at
The plaintiff, as she testified, did not know of the ditch where the accident occurred. The conductor should have stopped the car in front of the store which was the usual and safe place for passengers to alight. The place at which she did alight was dangerous and so known to the conductor, and hence to the defendant company.
The majority opinion holds that the public authorities were responsible for the condition of the street at the place the passenger was directed to alight; that no duty rested upon the company to put the place in proper and safe condition; and that whether the car was stopped at a proper place or whether
It is uniformly held that a street railway company is a common carrier and that its duties and responsibilities and the degree of care required of it in the carriage of passengers are substantially the same as those of a railroad company. We have time and again held that it is the duty of a carrier of passengers not only to transport the passenger to his destination in safety, but to furnish a safe place for him to alight. In the case of a person alighting from a street car it is said the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease until he gets a footing upon the street which he can maintain: Nellis on Street Surface Railroads, 449; but the better and more' generally accepted doctrine is that the relation continues until the passenger has reasonable opportunity to leave the car and roadway of the company after the car reaches its stopping place: Melton v. Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. (Ala.), 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467. Of course, a street railway company cannot be held to as strict accountability in furnishing a place for a passenger to alight as a railroad company. The former must discharge its passengers in the public highway and at places over which it does not have exclusive control; and hence its liability is different from that of a railroad company which has the exclusive control over its stational facilities. It is well settled, however, that a street railway company must exercise care in the selection of the place at which it discharges passengers. This is the doctrine of all the authorities: 1 Fetter on Carriers of Passengers, sec. 64; Middlesex R. R. Co. v. Wakefield, 103 Mass. 261; Creamer v. Ry. Co., 156 Mass. 320;. Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Walsh, 146 Ala. 290; Foley v. Brunswick Traction Co., 66 N. J. L. 637; Flack v. Nassau Electric R. R. Co., 58 N. Y. Supp. 839; Henry v. Grant Street Electric Ry. Co., 24 Wash. 246; Sweet v. Louisville Ry. Co., 113 Ky. 15. In Mobile Light & R. Co. v. Walsh, 146 Ala. 290, the passenger signaled the conductor to stop the car, but it was run beyond
It is, therefore, manifest that the rule announced in the majority opinion is in conflict with the well-settled doctrine throughout the country. It is not a question of who constructed the bridge or platform over the ditch at the place the plaintiff alighted, as contended by the majority, but whether the defendant company stopped its car at a suitable place for the plaintiff to alight. The fact that the municipal authorities had permitted the place of the accident to become unsafe for passengers to alight from the defendant’s cars will not excuse the company for stopping its car at that point, known by its
The majority opinion cites the Mahoney case to sustain it on “the questions whether the car was stopped at a proper place, or whether notice should have been given to the passenger before alighting.” This, I think, is a misapprehension of the decision. That case, like the present, was trespass for injuries sustained by stepping into a ditch when alighting on the right-hand side of a street car operated on Old York road. As here, it was contended that the right-hand side was the “unsafe side” on which to alight, but this court said: “Under ordinary circumstances it is obviously the safe and prudent thing for a passenger to leave the car upon the right-hand side.” Again: recognizing what the plaintiffs allege here was the duty of the conductor under the circumstances when he saw Mrs. Sligo about to step from the car, the opinion in the Mahoney case says (p. 184): “If there was any duty upon the defendant company under the circumstances, it would have been that of giving warning at the precise moment of leaving the car.” This is the opinion of the court as to the duty of a conductor under circumstances such as existed in the present case, the failure in the performance of which would be clear negligence.
I would reverse the judgment and direct the case to be retried.