Sledge v. KooiSledge v. Kooi
Ronnie Sledge appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy,
J.)
granting Dr. Pang L. Kooi’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Sledge’s complaint raising claims under
BACKGROUND
In May 2005, Sledge,
pro se
and incarcerated, filed a second amended complaint
On February 14, 2006, Sledge moved to compel the production of his medical records for the years 1999 through 2005. Kooi opposed the motion, explaining that Sledge had already been informed that his medical records were available from the medical department at his detention facility. When Kooi moved for summary judgment in July 2006, he provided Sledge and the District Court with copies of Sledge’s medical records from October 2002 through March 2005. In August 2006, the Magistrate Judge (Lowe, M.J.) ordered Kooi to produce Sledge’s medical records for inspection at Sledge’s correctional facility, as Kooi had indicated was possible.
As previously noted, Kooi moved for summary judgment in July 2006. Kooi’s motion was supported by,
inter alia,
an affidavit of Kooi, Sledge’s medical records from October 2002 through March 2005, and a statement of material facts as required by the Northern District’s Local Rule of Practice 7.1(a)(3). As required by N.D.
On February 12, 2007, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Kooi’s motion for summary judgment be granted. The Magistrate Judge began by stating that, while the court generally affords special solicitude to
pro se
litigants, “there are circumstances where an overly litigious inmate, who is quite familiar with the legal system and with pleading requirements, may not be afforded [this] special solicitude.” The Magistrate Judge explained that the “rationale for this revocation of special status ... is not that the
pro se
litigant should be punished but that his excessive litigiousness demonstrates his
experience,
the lack of which is the reason for conferring the special status upon
pro se
litigants in the first place.” Applying this analytical framework, the Magistrate Judge noted that Sledge had filed at least twelve other federal or state court actions or appeals, that he had been victorious or partially victorious in at least three of these, and that among the partial victories was a sue
The Magistrate Judge then noted that Kooi had filed a N.D.
Turning to the merits of Sledge’s claims, the Magistrate Judge found that Sledge had failed to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, and that it was therefore unnecessary to determine whether Kooi was entitled to qualified immunity. The Magistrate Judge also recommended dismissal of other claims in the complaint, which are not at issue in this appeal. Sledge objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation. By decision and order dated March 28, 2007, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s findings and granted Kooi summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Sledge argues that the District Court erred in adopting the Magistrate Judge’s determination that Sledge’s special status as a pro se litigant should be revoked. He further contends that he established a valid Eighth Amendment claim and that Kooi is not entitled to qualified immunity. Finally, he asserts that he was unaware of the requirement that he file a response to Kooi’s statement of material facts, and that, even if he had been aware of that requirement, he was prevented from complying with that mandate by Kooi’s failure to produce his medical records for inspection.
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Howley v. Town of Stratford,
We take Sledge’s second claim first, because it is dispositive of this appeal. A
de novo
review of the record reveals that Kooi was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To substantiate an Eighth Amendment claim for medical indifference, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.
See Farmer v. Brennan,
Notwithstanding our conclusion that Sledge’s appeal must fail, we write additionally to give guidance — hortatory in nature — to district courts facing pro se litigants who are repeat filers. We note approvingly that the Magistrate Judge expressly indicated that he did not intend to punish Sledge for excessive litigiousness, but rather merely to charge him with the responsibilities accompanying his manifest experience with civil litigation. We also find commendable the Magistrate Judge’s careful analysis of Sledge’s previous experience not only with civil litigation in general, but also with the particular procedural context in which Sledge appeared before the Magistrate Judge. We cannot agree, however, with the Magistrate Judge’s ultimate conclusion that Sledge’s previous experience with civil litigation justified depriving him of the special solicitude with which we approach pro se litigants for the entirety of the action.
In reaching this conclusion, the Magistrate Judge relied on our decision in
Davidson v. Flynn,
Were it necessary to reach this issue, we might conclude that Davidson should not be read as endorsing general withdrawal of the solicitude ordinarily afforded pro se litigants from a litigious complainant, at least absent a stronger showing than was present here that a pro se litigant has truly acquired the relevant experience. Instead, we might conclude that, pursuant to Davidson, it is appropriate to charge a pro se litigant with knowledge of, and therefore withdraw special status in relation to, particular requirements with which he is familiar as a result of his extensive prior experience in the courts. Accordingly, it is our recommendation that, when a court considers whether to withdraw a pro se litigant’s special status, it should consider not only that litigant’s lifetime participation in all forms of civil litigation, but also his experience with the particular procedural setting presented. Absent a strong showing that a pro se litigant has acquired adequate experience more generally, so as to render special solicitude unnecessary and potentially inappropriate, a court would do well to limit the withdrawal of special status to specific contexts in which the litigant’s experience indicates that he may be fairly deemed knowledgeable and experienced.
Were we to reach this question, we might conclude that the broad revocation of Sledge’s special status as a
pro se
litigant was unwarranted. It is a close question whether a party who, like Sledge, merely has appeared in approximately a dozen federal and state actions and has demonstrated minimal competence therein can, without additional evidence of extensive participation in many facets of civil litigation, be reasonably charged with
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Sledge also raised First and Fourteenth Amendment claims in his complaint, but he has not raised these claims on appeal. We therefore deem these claims abandoned.
See LoSacco v. City of Middletown,
. In 2006,