173 So. 642 | Ala. | 1936
Where the state relies on the testimony of an accomplice, in the main, to support an indictment and conviction for a felony, the statute, section 5635, Code 1923, *3 prohibits a conviction unless the testimony of the accomplice is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense. Whether or not such evidence has been adduced by the state is a question for the court. The credibility and weight of such evidence is a question for the jury. If the jury does not believe the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal; but in weighing and considering the evidence the jury is not required to segregate such evidence and set same apart from the other evidence in the case and make a preliminary finding in respect thereto; but it is their duty to consider the corroborating evidence in connection with all the other evidence in the case, and when so considered, if they believe the corroborating evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and from the whole evidence they are satisfied of the defendant's guilt in that degree, it is their duty to convict.
In a very recent case the rule was thus clearly stated: "Whether or not there was any evidence corroborating the accomplice witness, and tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, was a question of law to be determined by the court; but its probative force and sufficiency, along with the testimony of the accomplice to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, were questions for the jury." Berry v. State,
Our judgment is that the evidence showing the liaison between the defendant and the Teachworth girl, and defendant's hasty trip to Arkansas — traveling a distance of 480 miles — immediately after he had been under suspicion and investigation for the crime, and what occurred between them, was sufficient corroborating evidence, under the statute, to justify the submission of the case to the jury.
Whether the trip to see the girl was prompted by a consciousness of guilt and a desire to suppress testimony favorable to the state, or other motives, were questions for the jury.
As observed in Malachi's Case, supra, "In Ross v. State,
While, as argued by counsel for the defendant, the hurried trip by the defendant to see the Teachworth girl cannot be considered as flight, yet, forsooth, it was prompted by the same motive — consciousness of guilt — and, in addition, a desire to suppress material testimony.
The Court of Appeals seems to have misinterpreted the opinion of this court in Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney General (Cobb v. State,)
For the errors noted, let the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further consideration.
Writ granted; reversed and remanded.
All the Justices concur.