Slay v. StateSlay v. State
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Appellant brings this interlocutory appeal under
Appellant, who is hearing impaired, was charged with having committed three criminal offenses. He was fifteen years old when he allegedly committed rape on October 10, 1989, and was sixteen yеars old when he allegedly committed second degree assault on November 13, 1989, and a second count of rape on December 1,1989. On January 16,1990, the state filed a petition in juvenile court to have appellant adjudicated a delinquent, but the petition specifically relаted only the facts bearing on the second degree assault charge. On June 19, 1990, appellant was adjudicated a delinquent by the juvenile court, and that court placed him on probation for one year and ordered him to continue with counseling services.
On October 24, 1990, the state сharged appellant in circuit court with the aforementioned rape counts, and appellant responded by moving to transfer thesе two offenses to the juvenile court that had ruled on appellant’s assault charge. On April 15, 1991, the circuit court held a hearing on appеllant’s transfer motion, and later denied appellant’s motion on August 9,1991. In this appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to trаnsfer the two rape charges to juvenile court, and he also asserts the state is barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel from prosecuting appellant on these two offenses since the state should have pursued or filed those crimes against apрellant before or at the time it filed its petition in juvenile court.
First, we dispose of appellant’s res judicata and collateral estoppel argument because appellant never obtained a ruling on this issue. Nor does appellant offer any authority under which this cоurt can decide such an issue in an interlocutory appeal even if appellant had properly preserved it on appеal. Thus, the only issue before us is the lower court’s denial of appellant’s transfer motion, which we can consider by interlocutory appеal under
The circuit court, in making its decision on whether to transfer a case to juvenile court, must consider the following requirements: (1) the seriousness of the offense and whether violence was employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense, (2) whether the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of adjudicated offenses which would lead to the determination that the juvenile is beyond rehabilitation under existing programs, as evidenced by past efforts to treat and rehabilitate the juvеnile and the response to such efforts, and (3) the prior history, character traits, mental maturity, and any other factor which reflects upon the juvenile’s prospects for rehabilitation. Bright v. State, 307 Ark. 250, 819 S.W.2d 7 (1991);
In denying аppellant’s transfer motion, the trial court found that (1) the appellant was charged with a very serious offense (rape) that involves violence, (2) he was confronted with two separate counts of rape against the same victim, a nineteen-year-old paraplegiс female, and (3) he had been charged in juvenile court for aggressive and violent behavior, and other evidence was presented he committed acts of unwanted sexual indignities toward female students. The trial court conceded appellant had benefited from counseling hе had received as a result of the juvenile court proceeding. However, the court further concluded that the appellant would be better handled in circuit court, considering the seriousness of the rape offenses and the repetitive pattern of the aggressive and violent behavior he displayed at school towards teachers and students, including unwanted sexual indignities to females. These acts occurred оver an extended period of time, including before and after the dates of the alleged rapes and some occurred months after thе state filed its delinquency petition. Clearly, the trial court gave considerable weight to the seriousness of the offenses with which appellаnt was charged and believed the offenses and appellant’s aberrant sexual behaviour outweighed any favorable prospects for his rehabilitation. We cannot say the trial court was clearly wrong. Vickers v. State, 307 Ark. 298, 819 S.W.2d 13 (1991).
In so holding, we find no merit in appellant’s additional argument thаt the state’s approximate one-year delay in filing charges in circuit court deprived appellant from receiving meaningful consideration in juvenile court. The trial court voiced concern that appellant could only benefit or be “somewhat rehabilitated” from suрervised counseling over an “extended period of time,” but there is no indication the trial court would have transferred appellant’s chаrges to juvenile court merely if appellant had been one year younger. In fact, the contrary result is indicated. In reviewing the trial court’s findings, it is apparent the court, in making its decision, largely relied upon the serious nature of the offenses involved and appellant’s repetitivе pattern in committing aggressive sexual acts.
We also find no merit in appellant’s other argument that, when the circuit court considered the seriousness of the offense and the violence employed by the juvenile in the commission of the offense mentioned in
In sum, rape, as defined, is a violent offense, and such a charge is sufficient to meеt the requirements set out in
Because we find the trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, we affirm.