Slaughter v. StateSlaughter v. State
Cross appeals from a judgment of the Court of Claims (Hanifan, J.), entered October 24, 1995, upon a decision of the court in favor of claimant.
The issue in this case is whether a preponderance of the evidence supports the finding by the Court of Claims that the State breached its duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of State Route 414 in the Town of Catlin, Chemung County. At approximately 9:45 p.m. on January 30,1991, claimant was seriously injured when her vehicle "fishtailed” as she was traveling south on Route 414 and collided with a northbound Department of Transportation (hereinafter DOT) sander operated by Darrell Bish. Following a bifurcated trial on the issue of liability, the Court of Claims determined that the State was negligent and apportioned it 60% of the liability for claimant’s accident. Following the damages portion of the trial, the State was ordered to pay claimant $388,247. The State appeals and claimant cross-appeals.
The State’s primary contention on appeal is that the record does not support the Court of Claims’ imposition of liability against it. Primarily, the State argues that it had neither actual nor constructive notice of the icy condition of Route 414 within a sufficient time prior to the accident and, consequently, cannot be held liable for claimant’s injuries. The alleged negligence of the State is based on its failure to sand this road after having received actual and/or constructive notice of its icy conditions over three hours before claimant’s accident.
Whether the State received such notice and thereafter unreasonably delayed before remedying the condition is a factual issue. Admittedly, "[t]he presence of * * * ice on Route [414] and the fact that claimant’s vehicle skidded out of control do not alone establish negligence against the State” (Freund v State of New York,
It was established at trial, through the testimony of three individuals who lived along Route 414 in the immediate vicinity of the accident site (compare, D'Alessio v State of New York,
Although neither Gee nor the Keyes informed DOT or the State Police that Route 414 was slippery between 4:30 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., there is evidence that DOT was aware of or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware of the icy condition of the road by virtue of the fact that a DOT employee, Vincent Putney, patrolled it at or around 6:35 p.m. on January 30, 1991. Although Putney allegedly reported to the Coopers Plains DOT shop (the shop responsible for maintaining Route 414 in Chemung County) that the road was "ok” at 6:35 p.m. and a notation to this end was made in the shop’s operating log, the Court of Claims could properly discount this notation since it was directly contradicted by the testimony of these three disinterested witnesses (see, e.g., D'Alessio v State of New York, supra; Rooney v State of New York,
In view of these witnesses’ testimony and in light of the fact that Putney traversed this road on or around 6:35 p.m., we find that claimant established that the State should have been
Claimant’s accident occurred at 9:45 p.m.—over three hours after the State was on notice of the icy condition (see, Citta v State of New York,
Turning to claimant’s cross appeal, we reject her contention that the Court of Claims erred in apportioning her 40% liable for the accident. The testimony at trial clearly revealed that claimant was well aware of the freezing rain and conditions of the roads that night. Having herself slipped on ice less than one hour prior to the accident and experienced reduced tire traction as she proceeded home on the slippery roads, we find no basis to disturb the Court of Claims’ conclusion that claimant was operating at an unsafe speed as she approached the curve where the accident took place and is, therefore, partially responsible for the accident.
We have reviewed the parties’ remaining contentions and reject them as unpersuasive.
Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Casey and Peters, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Notes
Although not entirely dispositive, the absence or presence of icy conditions "elsewhere” is relevant (La Tournerie v State of New York,